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Summary
My PhD thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter revisits the results in Bernard
and Jones (1996) that argue that a group of 14 OECD countries does not converge in the man-
ufacturing sector. For an updated dataset I show that the non-catch-up in the manufacturing
sector result still prevails for the standard estimators, but when I allow for parametrical hetero-
geneity it is overturned. I conclude that the estimators allowing for parametrical heterogeneity,
for example MG and CDMG, can deal with the cross-country level measurement issues inherent
for the manufacturing sector and reverse the pathological results about the convergence.
The second chapter focuses on the role of the services sector for aggregate productivity growth
and cross-country productivity differences. I show that, because of the substitutability between
high- and low-productivity growth services sectors (progressive and stagnant services sectors),
structural change would not take down aggregate productivity growth further in the future for
developed countries. My results also reveal that this substitutability within the services sector
contributes to productivity differences between the US and other developed countries.
In the third chapter of my PhD thesis I want to understand the deeper causes behind the
substitutability between progressive and stagnant services sectors. My results reveal that the
substitutability of the progressive services with other sectors in the economy remains robust to
the changes in input/output table and structural change within the investment value added. I
note that the positive correlation between the nominal and real value added shares reflects the
presence of progressive services. Modelling the progressive services separately can alone account
for 30% of the income effects.
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Chapter 1
Revisiting Bernard and Jones
(1996): Sectoral Total Factor and
Labor Productivity Convergence
Across Countries
1.1 Introduction
The empirical economic growth literature that became popular after studies of Barro (1991),
Mankiw et al. (1992) and others usually considers the convergence behavior of the aggregate
economy. Two influential papers by Andrew Bernard and Charles Jones in 1996 (Bernard and
Jones, 1996 a,b) extend the convergence analysis to the sectoral level.1 The most important
result emerging from these papers is that there is no convergence in the manufacturing sector
for fourteen OECD countries for a period from 1970 to 1987. This is a surprising finding,
since the factors identified behind the convergence performance of the OECD economies (such
as knowledge spillovers and increased competition due to international trade, as discussed in
Baumol (1986)) are expected to matter most for the manufacturing sector (Bernard and Jones
1996,b). Together with other studies including Broadberry (1993), Carree et al. (2000), and
1Dollar and Wolff (1988), Dowrick (1989) and Hansson and Henrekson (1994) are some examples of research
that date before Bernard and Jones (1996 a,b) and analyze the convergence at the sectoral level. Bernard and
Jones (1996 a,b) differ from them in the sense that they include the sectors not considered previously in these
studies, such as services, construction, mining and utilities.
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Hansson and Henrekson (1994) no convergence in the manufacturing across OECD countries has
become an accepted fact in the literature (Madsen and Timol, 2011). This result even paved the
way the theoretical models that consider differential convergence dynamics across sectors (for
example, Eicher and Turnovsky, 1999 and 2001).
Some recent theoretical and empirical research challenge this result. Rodrik (2013) considers
the labor productivity in the total manufacturing and manufacturing industries for a sample
consisting of developed and developing countries, and finds that the manufacturing exhibits
unconditional convergence. Madsen and Timol (2011) consider a historical dataset of total
factor and labor productivity in the manufacturing for nineteen OECD countries, and conclude
that there is unconditional convergence in this sector. Benetrix et al. (2015) note the tendency
of developing countries to exhibit greater labor productivity growth rates in the manufacturing
than developed countries for a given time period, and interpret this as evidence of the catch-up
in this sector. Duarte and Restuccia (2010) analyze a theoretical model of structural change
and conclude that productivity differences across countries have reduced in industry where the
manufacturing constitutes the largest part for most countries, and this result stands behind
cross-country convergence at the aggregate level. In a study based on trade Levchenko and
Zhang (2016) note the systematic catch-up in the manufacturing sub-industries across countries
in the last five decades.2
The research cited above pose a question in relation to the results in Bernard and Jones
(1996 a,b): If there is convergence in the manufacturing sector, then how could one explain
divergent behaviors of the OECD countries with their highly skilled workforce, extensive R&D
expenditures, advanced organizational capacities, and high exposure to international trade? Is
the time period considered in Bernard and Jones (1996 a,b) exceptional, as argued in Madsen and
Timol (2011), or have the OECD countries transitioned to a different stage in the manufacturing,
maybe due to different specialization patterns in trade, as discussed in the original articles of
Bernard and Jones (1996 a,b)? The aim of this research is to offer an explanation for these
conflicting results in the literature.
2Samaniego and Sun (2016) could be also included to this list. This work emphasizes the specialization
pattern resulting from structural change that increases the TFP growth rate in manufacturing over the course of
development. If advanced countries experience this specialization property, then we expect their TFP and labor
productivity growth rates in the manufacturing sector should increase over time. Under the assumption that
advanced countries are roughly around the same stage of this specialization process, they should exhibit similar
growth rates. This is another way of saying that these countries have been converging in this sector.
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In this paper I consider different notions of convergence for labor and total factor productivity
at the sectoral level across twelve OECD countries, with a special emphasis to the manufacturing.
My results show that many sectors exhibit convergence, but there are noticeable differences
between them: for example, the agriculture exhibits highest convergence rate (between 0.17-
0.14 percent), while construction is the slowest (0.04-0.05 percent). The convergence results
also show variation with respect to different definitions of convergence: for example, although
agriculture exhibits strong convergence behavior with respect to the time-series definitions, it
does not show any evidence of β-convergence or σ-convergence. These results reemphasize the
importance of using appropriate definitions of convergence in any related research.
In addition to the manufacturing I also pay a special attention to analyzing the services at a
more disaggregated level. In the end year of Bernard and Jones (1996 a,b), 1987, this sector on
average accounts for 60% of the aggregate economy across countries. But as of 2007, its share
on average has increased to 70%, and for some countries in the sample, such as the UK and US,
this number is close to 80%, whereas some six sectors considered in Bernard and Jones (1996
a,b) such as mining and utilities have negligible shares in the aggregate economy, no greater
than 3%. It is also well known that this sector consists of highly heterogenous units (Timmer
and Jorgenson, 2011). Since such facts make the 6-sector classification considered in Bernard
and Jones (1996 a,b) inadequate for developed countries, I also consider productivity dynamics
of the market services sub-sectors. My main findings are as follows: the market services shows
strong convergence behavior both for labor and total factor productivity, and this result is robust
with respect to different specifications and convergence definitions. For the services sub-sectors,
the results are rather mixed across different specifications, and it is difficult to reach broad
conclusions. However, it could be still maintained that the financial intermediation sector shows
a robust convergence performance.
The manufacturing sector shows the most conflicting results. For total factor and labor
productivity, it satisfies neither β-convergence nor σ-convergence nor time-series convergence
definitions. However, these results change when parameter heterogeneity is introduced to the
main specification. When convergence rates are allowed to differ across the panel, the technology
gap becomes economically significant but remains statistically insignificant. When time trend
is also allowed to differ across the panel, the technology gap becomes both economically and
statistically significant. Based on the results of the diagnostic tests, the specification with full
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parameter heterogeneity where the technology gap and time trend are heterogeneous across the
units is preferred over other specifications. Hence, I conclude that the manufacturing indeed
exhibits convergence.
How could one interpret these results? One explanation could be that the convergence in the
manufacturing is very conditional. There are possibly some factors (i.e human capital, R&D,
openness) across countries that interact with the technology gap in the manufacturing. If one
does not condition on these factors by allowing the convergence rate to differ across the panel,
it follows that manufacturing does not exhibit convergence. Or perhaps, the effects of shocks
in the manufacturing differ across countries. If one does not consider this fact and impose
a homogeneous shock structure, the inference becomes unreliable. Therefore, the conflicting
results related to the convergence in the manufacturing in the literature could be explained in
part by not fully accounting for this heterogeneity.
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, this research offers an explanation for contra-
dictory results on the convergence in the manufacturing by emphasizing the role of heterogeneity.
Therefore, it relates to recent concerns in the empirical economic growth literature (Eberhardt
and Teal, 2011). Second, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study on comparative
productivity that both considers such a disaggregated level of services for different definitions
of the convergence and employs the methods allowing for the parameter heterogeneity. (more
specifically, CDMG and MG estimators)3
The literature on productivity convergence at the sectoral level is vast. Some recent notable
contributions include Dal Bianco (2016), Martino (2015), Castelacci et al. (2014), van Biese-
broeck (2009), and Sondermann (2014). The closest to this study in terms of the methodology
and the research question is McMorrow et al. (2010). Although McMorrow et al. (2010) attempt
to reveal deeper determinants of convergence at the sectoral level, I do not do it here because
of what I see as lack of a clear theoretical guidance.
The outline of this paper as follows. The second section contains a brief introduction on the
convergence definitions used in this study. The third section discusses the data and estimation
of TFP. The fourth section presents the empirical results for cross-country sectoral convergence.
The fifth section presents the empirical results for the sectoral convergence across countries in
3Griffith et al. (2004) and Cameron et al. (2005) also use MG estimators. However, they differ from this study
in the sense that they only concentrate on the manufacturing industries. Here, MG refers to the mean group
estimator and CDMG the cross-sectionally demeaned group estimator.
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the presence of the parameter heterogeneity. The sixth section concludes.
1.2 A Primer on Different Notions of Convergence
In the growth empirics literature usually the following equation is estimated to analyze the
convergence (For example, in Barro (1991) among others).
gy = α+ βyinitial + y (1.1)
Here yinitial indicates the initial value of variable y (it could be GDP per capita/labor or another
measure of productivity, depending on the context), gy is the growth rate of the variable y for a
certain period, α is the constant, and y is the error term. The right hand side of the equation is
also usually supplemented by some conditioning variables. If the the coefficient of yinitial, β, is
negative and statistically significant, this is usually interpreted as the evidence of convergence.
In other words, it is concluded that countries initially backward grow at greater rates, so they
have been catching up. This notion of convergence is known as β-convergence.
The notion of the β-convergence has been criticized as inadequate (for example, by Quah
(1993) and Friedman (1992)). As an alternative σ-convergence is proposed. The σ-convergence
considers the evolution of dispersion of some productivity measure. If it has been declining, or
it declines and remains steady after, this is interpreted as the evidence that countries have been
converging, or have converged already. If the reverse is the case, then it is concluded that there
is divergence among countries.
There are also time-series definitions of convergence. In Bernard and Durlauf (1995) the
convergence between two countries is defined as follows:
Definition 1.2.1. Countries i and j converge if the following condition is satisfied
lim
k→∞
E(yi,t+k − yj,t+k|It) = 0 (1.2)
where It indicates the information set.
In other words, the long-run prediction on income or other productivity differences between
two countries converges to zero. There is also a weaker definition of time-series convergence:
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Definition 1.2.2. Countries i and j contain a common trend if the following condition is sat-
isfied
lim
k→∞
E(yi,t+k − ayj,t+k|It) = 0 (1.3)
where It indicates the information set and a is a positive, finite number.
In other words, the long-run prediction on income or other productivity differences between
two countries converge to some finite positive number.
The time-series convergence definitions above could be a bit strong, in the sense that they
fail to capture the convergence if the data in question is characterized by transitional dynamics
where the difference between a country and other country has been declining over time with
respect to some measure of productivity. For these cases it is more reasonable to consider the
following model. Suppose that the productivity growth in a country i could be driven by two
sources: The first one is the domestic factors such as local innovation and/or capital deepening,
and the second one-under the assumption that the country in question is behind the world
productivity frontier-is the technology diffusion from abroad and/or capital transfer. This idea
could be formalized in the following equation.
gy,it = 1 + σi
[
yFt
yit
− 1
]
+ λi (1.4)
where gy,it indicates the growth rate of productivity in country i,
yFt
yit
− 1 is the distance of
the country i with respect to the world frontier; σi and λi capture the magnitudes of foreign
and local sources of productivity respectively. Suppose also that the world frontier grows at an
exogenous rate such that4
yFt+1
yFt
= 1 + g (1.5)
One implication of the above model is that a country away from the world productivity frontier
would grow at the growth rate of the frontier in the long-run. This result further implies that
the relative productivity level of country i with respect to the frontier will be
yi
yF
=
σi
g + σi − λi (1.6)
The equation 1.4 presents a specification on how fast a country has been converging to its
4It is assumed that λi < g, therefore the technology leadership will not change after some finite t.
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relative steady-state productivity level. If σi turns out be positive and statistically significant,
it is concluded that country i has been converging and will satisfy at least the weak definition
of time series convergence.
In this study all definitions of convergence are considered at the sectoral level. However, our
preferred specification would be the estimation of the equation 1.4 because it presents a flexible
framework for handling both transition dynamics and long-run convergence, and at the same
time it helps us to exploit the panel structure of the data.
1.3 Data
Measuring productivity at the sectoral level and making international comparisons of produc-
tivity levels for many different sectors comes with huge data requirements. The EU KLEMS
database5 satisfies all these requirements and is used in this study. The sample includes Aus-
tralia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. In comparison to Bernard and Jones (1996 a,b) this
study includes Austria and Spain, but not Belgium, Canada, Norway, and Sweden. This choice of
the sample reflects data availability. Productivity comparisons are made for the following broad
sectors: agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, market services, and utilities (e.g.
electricity, gas and water). Market services at a more disaggregated level are also considered
and same productivity analysis is performed for the following services sub-sectors: wholesale
and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transport and storage and communication; financial
intermediation; real estate, renting and business activities. Since it is strongly discouraged to
make cross-country comparisons on the non-market services (O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009), the
following non-market services sub-sectors are omitted in this study: public administration and
defense, compulsory social security; education; health and social work; other community, social
and personal services.
The calculation of TFP requires the capital stock data for a long period, and this requirement
5This paper mostly relies on the November 2009 release of the EU KLEMS database. There are some excep-
tions. For France I use the December 2016 release of the EU KLEMS for the capital stock data. For the United
States I use the March 2008-SIC based release of the EU KLEMS. The values after 2005 for the US are obtained
by the extrapolation based on the growth rates of June 2010 revision of the NAICS-based US data of the EU
KLEMS November 2009 release. For period before 1991 I use data of the West Germany of the March 2008 release
of the EU KLEMS for Germany. Some missing values for Japan for the period between 1970-1972 are obtained
through the extrapolation based on average growth rates.
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in the EU KLEMS is only satisfied by twelve countries. Labor productivity is analyzed for the
period between 1970 and 2007, and the TFP for the period between 1980 and 2007. Since the
capital stock data for France starts in 1978, and for Austria in 1976 a different TFP index for
the period between 1970 and 2007 is prepared for the remaining ten countries in the sample.
Throughout the paper the results are reported for these three productivity indexes.
Labor productivity growth rate at the sectoral level is calculated by the following equation.6
gLt+1 = (lnRV At+1 − lnRV At)− (lnLt+1 − lnLt) (1.7)
where gLt+1 indicates the growth rate of labor productivity from period t to t+ 1, RV A is the
real valued added output, L is the measure of labor input, ln is the natural logarithm. For the
calculation of the real value added the value added at constant 1995 prices is used. For the
estimation of labor input the total hours worked by persons engaged is used.
In order to obtain a multilateral measure of labor productivity, first I define an artificial
country as the geometric average of the countries in the sample. This yields an index (RLP ) for
the relative labor productivity position of the country i with respect to the artificial country.
RLPit = ln
[
Ait
Aartifical,t
]
= ln
[
V Ait
V Aartifical,t
]
− ln
[
Lit
Lartifical,t
]
(1.8)
where Ait, V Ait and Lit are the labor productivity level, the nominal value added, and labor
input measures for country i at t; Aartificial,t, V Aartifical,t and Lartifical,t are the geometric
averages in the sample for the same measures. In order to obtain a comparable measure of the
value added output across countries, the nominal value added values are converted by using PPP
value added (double deflated) series available at the GGDC Productivity Level Database. The
labor productivity frontier (RLPFt) is defined as the country with the highest value of RLPit.
In order to obtain a distance measure of country i with respect to the frontier the following
normalization procedure is applied.
LPDISTANCEit = RLPFt −RLPit (1.9)
Since relative price series (PPP value added-double deflated) are only available for the benchmark
6Throughout this section sector indices are omitted for the sake of notational ease.
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year 1997, the relative labor productivity measure is derived for that year. For the remaining
years of the sample, the relative labor measures are obtained by extrapolating on the labor
productivity growth rates.
TFP growth rate at the sectoral level is calculated by the superlative index approach devel-
oped in Caves et al. (1982 a,b) as follows.
gTFP,t+1 = ln
[
V At+1
V At
]
−
(
σx,t+1 + σxt
2
)
ln
[
Lt+1
Lt
]
−
(
1− σx,t+1 + σxt
2
)
ln
[
Kt+1
Kt
]
(1.10)
where gTFP,t+1 is the growth rate of TFP from period t to t + 1, K is the measure of physical
capital input, σxt is the share of labor in value added. For the calculation of physical capital
stock real fixed capital stock data at constant 1995 prices is used. This index is obtained under
the assumptions that the production exhibits constant returns to scale and the productive factors
(labor and capital) earn their marginal products. The reader should note that this index is more
general than the Cobb-Douglas production function commonly used in the applied economic
growth literature, since the labor shares are not restricted to be constant over time across
countries and sectors. As also noted in Bernard and Jones (1996, a), the data strongly rejects
the constant labor share assumption, therefore imposing it could lead misleading results for
the TFP measurement. Although I deviate most of the applied economic growth literature,
the nonconstant labor shares is standard in comparative studies of productivity, for example
Griffith et al. (2004). Bernard and Jones (1996,a) also allow for this possibility and their
sectoral convergence results remain unchanged when labor shares are allowed to change over
time and across sectors.
The relative TFP level is obtained similarly in the case of relative labor productivity. First
an artificial country is defined as the geometric average of the sample, and a multilateral measure
of a country i’s relative TFP position with respect to this artificial country is obtained as follows.
RTFPit = ln
[
V Ait
V Aartifical,t
]
−
(
σi,t + σx,t
2
)
ln
[
Lit
Lartifical,t
]
−
(
1− σi,t + σxt
2
)
ln
[
Lit
Lartifical,t
]
(1.11)
where σi,t is the labor share in value added in country i and σx,t is the geometric average of
labor shares of the sample at t. The physical capital stock units are converted by PPP capital
stock relative prices available at the GGDC Productivity Level Database. The reader should
again note that this specification is more general than the Cobb-Douglas production function,
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in the sense that labor shares are allowed to differ across countries. The assumptions made in
obtaining TFP growth rates (constant returns to scale and marginal productivity) still apply.
The technology frontier RTFPFt is defined as the country with the highest RTFPit. Again, a
normalization procedure is used to obtain a measure of the country i’s distance to the technology
frontier such that
TFPDISTANCEit = RTFPFt −RTFPit (1.12)
As in the case of labor productivity, these relative levels of TFP are obtained for the benchmark
year 1997 and extrapolated for the remaining years based on the TFP growth rates.
When obtaining the measures of relative productivity levels the quality changes in inputs
intentionally are not taken into account. This choice is motivated by making this research
comparable to other studies in the literature, more specifically to Bernard and Jones (1996
a,b).7
Productivity patterns over time reveal the clear leadership of the US in many sectors. Ac-
cording to the figure A.3 in Appendix A, the US is the leader country in labor productivity in
the agriculture for the majority of the sample, and for the entire sample in utilities, manufac-
turing and market services. Since the last two also account for a great part of the economy in
all countries in my sample, it would be reasonable to expect that the US is the labor produc-
tivity leader at the aggregate level as well. For TFP, the leadership of the US is less clear-cut.
Although the US still retains its leadership position in agriculture, utilities, market services and
adds construction to the list, it never ranks the first in the manufacturing throughout the sam-
ple (Figure A.1). However, it should be still observed that the US still ranks among the three
most productive countries in TFP for the sectors in which it does not have a leadership, more
specifically in the mining and the manufacturing, over the majority of the period. Therefore,
the productivity leadership of the US across different sectors looks well established.
We also observe changes in the countries’ positions in productivity, especially in relation to
the leadership (Figures A.1 and A.3 in Appendix A). In the agriculture, Australia starts the
sample as the leader in labor productivity, but it later loses it to the US. It sometimes surpasses
the US in TFP, but it does not retain this position for a long period. In the mining the
7As a robustness check the estimates are also done with the quality-adjusted data. I observe that the qualitative
results do not change much, though the magnitude of the technology gap decline for all sectors. These results are
available upon request.
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Netherlands shows a spectacular productivity performance in both TFP and labor productivity.
It is also observed Denmark has getting closer to the frontier in labor productivity for the
mining, but its productivity level is still around the half of the Netherlands. In terms of TFP
in the same sector, Australia has been showing a catch-up performance to the frontier. In the
construction the technology leadership starts with the US, but later changes to Finland, then
lastly to Australia for both labor and total factor productivity (Austria also holds leadership
position in some instances in labor productivity for the construction). For the utilities the US
remains the leader throughout the sample, both for labor productivity and TFP. In addition to
this, especially for labor productivity, the catch-up performance of all countries in the sample
is apparent. For the manufacturing, the US holds the leadership position in labor productivity
throughout the sample. For the manufacturing TFP, Germany starts as the technology leader,
but it loses this position due to strong performance of Finland later. It should be also noted
that countries overall show a hump-shaped pattern in the manufacturing with respect to both
productivity measures. That is, they reduce their distances with respect to the frontier in the
half of the sample, but this pattern is reversed in the remainder.
The US remains the leader both for labor and total factor productivity in the market ser-
vices throughout our sample (Figures A.2 and A.4 in Appendix A). However, this result hides
considerable heterogeneity within the services sub-sectors. For labor productivity, the US only
holds clear leadership in the real estate, renting and business activities. In the wholesale and
retail trade, Denmark leads the majority of the period, then it is surpassed by the Netherlands
in labor productivity. For the same sector the TFP leadership shows considerable change over
time: It starts with Germany, then changes to Denmark, then to France, and lastly settles with
Finland. For the hotels and restaurants, France leads the early period in the sample for both
labor and total factor productivity, but loses it to Austria in the former and to the US in the
later. For the transport, storage and communication sector the clear leadership of the Nether-
lands is observed in both labor productivity and TFP. For the financial intermediation sector,
it appears that Australia and Spain compete with each other throughout the sample for both
labor and total factor productivity leadership. For the real estate, renting and business activities
sector Italy leads initially in labor productivity, then it is surpassed by the US. The productivity
leadership of the US in the market services should be explained by its strong performance in
this subsector, and the fact that countries specialize in different services sub-sectors. These
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results re-emphasize the well-known heterogeneity within the services, now from a comparative
productivity perspective.
1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 β-Convergence
In order to check if sectors exhibit β-convergence the average growth rates of labor productivity
between 1970-2007 is regressed on the log of initial labor productivity distance measure for
twelve countries. The same procedure for TFP is used for two different samples: One for twelve
countries for 1980-2007 period, and other one is for 1970-2007 for ten countries where data is
available. More specifically, the following equations are estimated:
GLP = α1 + β1 ln(RLPINITIAL) + 1 (1.13)
GTFP = α2 + β2 ln(RTFPINITIAL) + 2 (1.14)
where GLP and GTFP are the growth rates of labor and total factor productivity respectively,
α1 and α2 are constants, RLPINITIAL and RTFPINITIAL are initial values of the relative
labor and total factor productivity, 1 and 2 are the error terms that satisfy the standard
assumptions. The data is constructed such that for the frontier country ln(RLPINITIAL) and
ln(RTFPINITIAL) take the value of zero and it is the maximum value in the sample. Therefore,
if β1 or β2 is negative and statistically significant it is concluded that the β-convergence takes
place, and initially backward countries grow at greater rates. Table 1.1 summarizes the findings
of this analysis where the first column shows the β estimates for labor productivity, and the
second column those for TFP.
Among broad sectors of the economy excluding the manufacturing, only the agriculture does
not exhibit β convergence for either TFP or labor productivity. The mining sector converges in
TFP, but not in labor productivity. Construction, utilities, market services show convergence
both for TFP and labor productivity. For utilities the visual evidence has shown us that the
countries have been reducing their distances with respect to the frontier over time. This obser-
vation is proven right according to the results here. It is also observed that the convergence in
labor productivity implies TFP, but not vice versa.
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Table 1.1: β-Convergence
I.Sample consists of 10 countries and covers the period between 1970 and 2007
II.Sample consists of 12 countries and covers the period between 1980 and 2007
Labor TFP
I.Sample II.Sample
β β β
Agriculture
.0002
(.0032)
.0015
(.0060)
.0030
(.0061)
Mining
-.0137
(.0082 )
-.0214***
(.0053)
-.0229***
(.0065)
Construction
-.0143**
(.0061)
-.0166**
(.0058)
-.0149**
(.0070)
Manufacturing
-.0117
(.0096 )
-.0010
(.01817 )
-.0144
(.0146)
Manufacturing
(for 1970-1987 sample)
-.0194**
(.0072)
-.0220
(.0081)
-
Utilities
-.0176***
(.0031)
-.0155**
( .0056)
-.0145*
( .0072)
Market Services
-.0130***
(.0042)
- -
Wholesale and Retail Trade
-.0068
(.0055 )
-.0062
(.0066)
-.0050
(.0059)
Hotels and Restaurants
-.0061
(.0041)
-.0066
(.0036)
-.0089**
(.0040)
Transport and Storage and Communication
-.0043
(.0030)
-.0011
(.0039)
-.0007
(.0043)
Financial Intermediation
-.0179***
(.0029)
-.0189***
(.0044)
-.0215***
(.0061)
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities
-.0074
(.0072)
-.0164***
(.0035)
-.0080
(.0052)
Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors
***Statistical significance at the 1% confidence level
**Statistical significance at the 5% confidence level
*Statistical significance at the 10% confidence level
Although the market services exhibits the β-convergence, its sub-sectors show rather mixed
performances. Apart from the clear catch-up performance of the financial intermediation sec-
tor, none of the services sub-sectors exhibit a strong β-convergence for either TFP and labor
productivity. How could one explain the robust convergence behavior for market services at the
aggregate level despite mixed evidence at the disaggregate level? The financial intermediation
sector increases its share in terms of value added in market services over time for the countries
in our sample. The strong convergence performance of this sector might be one of the factors
behind the catch-up in the market services. Another factor could be different specialization
patterns of countries in market services. One country may specialize in a particular market ser-
vice sector and exhibits strong growth performance in that sector, while it does not necessarily
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catch-up in others. If countries specialize in different market service sectors, it is reasonable to
expect that there would be no β-convergence at the aggregate level. However, this specialization
pattern when combined with the strong performance in the financial intermediation sector could
pave the way for the catch-up at the aggregate level.
Manufacturing, with agriculture, is only broad sector that does not show any evidence of
convergence for any measures of productivity. The results are also presented for the original
period in the study of Bernard and Jones (1996 a,b), 1970-1987, for ten countries in the sample.
Since we do not have enough data to calculate TFP for the original fourteen countries considered
in Bernard and Jones (1996 a,b) this could not be considered as an exact replication. However,
the point of this exercise is to check whether the advanced OECD countries show β-convergence
in the manufacturing, not to check whether a particular group of countries have converged in
the manufacturing for a particular period. As we shall see, our main results regarding the
convergence in the manufacturing changes little in comparison to those in Bernard and Jones
(1996 a,b), evidencing that they are not driven by some particular countries.
The results for the 1970-1987 sample show that there is β-convergence in this period. This is
not a remarkable result. It is well known that the convergence results in manufacturing are sen-
sitive to the choice of base year (Sorensen, 2001). The later the base period, the more likely that
manufacturing exhibits the β-convergence. It is because of the fact that conversion factors used
in calculating PPP are imprecise and productivity measures based on them (unintentionally)
include the Balassa-Samuelson effect.8 Since our base year is 1997, it is not surprising that we
have found convergence for the period between 1970-87. It is also likely that our non-convergence
result in the manufacturing reflects the use of an early base year.
The β-convergence considers the convergence evidence for the cross-section: it checks whether
more backward countries grow at greater rates. The results of β-convergence could be driven
by the performance of some individual countries in the sample which is more likely in a small
sample like ours. If countries in our sample have already converged or are closer to their long-
run steady-state levels, it is likely that we would not observe the β-convergence and wrongfully
conclude that there is no convergence. Due to these concerns we now turn our attention to other
convergence notions.
8For the details of the discussion about conversion factors in the manufacturing here, the reader is referred to
Sorensen (2001), Bernard and Jones (2001), and Sorensen and Schjerning (2003).
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1.4.2 σ-convergence
The σ-convergence considers the productivity dispersion in a sample. If this dispersion shows a
downward trend it is concluded that the countries have been converging; if it is rather steady
over time this might be one of the indications that the countries are near their steady-state
levels. If it increases it is concluded that countries have been diverging. The standard deviation
of relative productivity levels is used as the measure of dispersion, and its evolution over time
is analyzed for the σ-convergence.9 Figures A.5-A.8 in Appendix A visually summarize the
patterns.
TFP and labor productivity show different tendencies for the broad sectors (Figures A.5 and
A.7). For agriculture, TFP dispersion remains steady but increases for that of labor productivity.
The reverse pattern is observed for the mining. Both measures of dispersion for the construction
show upside and downside trend over time; while general trend is flat for labor productivity,
TFP dispersion become steady in the latter period of the sample. Labor productivity dispersion
is clearly decreasing over the sample for the utilities, but TFP dispersion slightly increases
for the same sector. Manufacturing shows a U-shaped pattern for both labor and total factor
productivity: The dispersion decreases initially but after around the mid-1990’s this pattern is
reversed. This trend is also observed visually in our initial inspection based on time-series data
on the manufacturing.
The market services has been showing a clear declining trend for labor productivity, while
TFP dispersion remains steady (From Figures A.5 and A.7). However, the market services
subsectors show rather mixed patterns (Figures A.6 and A.8). For the wholesale and retail trade,
the dispersion in labor productivity remains flat, but it increases for TFP. For the transport,
communications and storage, the dispersion is overall constant for both labor productivity and
TFP. The dispersion in labor productivity slightly increases for the hotels and restaurants, but
it remains flat for TFP. The financial intermediation sector shows a clear declining dispersion
for both labor and total factor productivity. Apparently, this pattern looks reversed after 2000;
since our sample finishes in 2007, it is difficult to tell whether it is a long term phenomenon or a
short-term transitory period. Lastly, the real estate, renting and business activities demonstrates
a declining trend for both labor productivity and TFP, though this pattern is rather muted for
9Some formal tests are available for the σ-convergence (for example, Carree and Klomp (1997)), but they are
not considered in this study.
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the later.
Although the results are less clear-cut than the β-convergence, some general conclusions could
be still maintained. The market services shows declining or steady dispersion in productivity
among countries. This is an indication that countries have been either reducing productivity
differences among themselves, or have been around their steady-state levels in this sector. Simi-
larly, countries have been transiting to a more equal distribution of productivity in the financial
intermediation sector. For the manufacturing there is a clear divergence after the mid-1990’s,
an indication that productivity differences have been decreasing before that and increasing af-
ter. These results on the σ-convergence overall coincide with those of the β-convergence. Most
significantly, the manufacturing still does not show any signs of convergence.
1.4.3 Time Series Convergence
The testing hypothesis for the time-series convergence is derived in Bernard and Jones (1996,b)
with a model similar to the described in the second section. Suppose the productivity growth
in a follower country is positively linked to its distance with respect to the frontier country and
the productivity grows at a constant positive rate in the later. More formally,
ln
[
Ai,t+1
Ai,t
]
= αi + βi ln
[
AF,t
Ai,t
]
(1.15)
ln
[
AF,t+1
AF,t
]
= αF (1.16)
Equations 1.15 and 1.16 describe the evolution of productivity in the follower country i and the
frontier respectively. If equation 1.16 is subtracted from 1.15 the following equation is obtained.
ln
[
Ai,t+1
Ai,t
]
− ln
[
AF,t+1
AF,t
]
= (αi − αF ) + βi ln
[
AF,t
Ai,t
]
(1.17)
Rearranging the terms yields
ln
[
Ai,t+1
AF,t+1
]
= (αi − αF ) + (1− βi) ln
[
AF,t
Ai,t
]
(1.18)
The above equation has a testable implication for the convergence. If βi > 0 and the difference
between αi and αF converges to zero asymptotically, there is convergence. If βi = 0, countries
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will not asymptotically grow at same rates (that is αi 6= αF ). This is akin to saying that the
series ln
[
Ai,t
AF,t
]
contain unit root with drift under no convergence, and they are stationary in
the case of convergence. Therefore, the panel-data unit root tests can be used to check whether
there is convergence in a time-series sense.
Table 1.2 summarizes the results of the Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) unit root test for both labor
productivity and TFP.10 Among the broad sectors, the agriculture and the construction show
convergence with respect to both measures. The mining and the manufacturing sectors converge
with respect to labor productivity, but with respect to TFP they do not. The utilities and the
market services do not converge for either measures of productivity.
The market services subsectors show heterogeneous patterns. The wholesale and retail trade
sector and the hotels and restaurants show convergence for both measures of productivity. The
financial intermediation and the real estate, renting and business activities join them in labor
productivity, but not in TFP. The transport and storage and communications sector shows no
evidence of convergence for either measures.
10The LLC test sometimes gives different results for two different series of TFP. Since the 1970-2007 TFP series
has a longer time-dimension, the interpretations on TFP for the main body of text reflect these series.
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Table 1.2: Panel Unit Root Tests
Sample for TFP consists of 10 countries and covers the period between 1970 and 2007
Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) Unit Root Test
Labor (Adjusted t*) TFP (Adjusted t*)
Agriculture
-4.0306
(0.0000)
-4.0347
(0.0000)
Mining
-4.7152
(0.0000)
-0.2976
(0.3830)
Construction
-2.5693
(0.0051)
-3.2332
(0.0006)
Manufacturing
-1.8617
(0.0313)
2.7607
(0.9971)
Utilities
2.4424
(0.9927)
2.1920
(0.9858)
Market Services
2.0295
(0.9788)
-0.2186
(0.4135)
Wholesale and Retail Trade
-2.1570
(0.0155)
-1.8678
(0.0309)
Hotels and Restaurants
-2.7025
(0.0034)
-2.9228
(0.0017)
Transport and Storage and Communication
0.9973
(0.8407)
2.7004
(0.9965)
Financial Intermediation
-2.2878
(0.0111)
-1.5966
(0.0552)
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities
3.9441
(1.0000)
-5.1734
(0.0000)
H0:Panels contain unit roots (The null hypothesis)
Ha:Panels are stationary (The alternative hypothesis)
Numbers in parentheses are p-values
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The time-series results are conflicting and they do not fit well to our narrative so far. It
is not reasonable to expect that so many sectors exhibit the time-series convergence in labor
productivity without convergence in TFP. It is also not reasonable to expect that market services
does not exhibit convergence in labor productivity while four of the five sectors composing it
converge with respect to the same measure. What could one explain these conflicting results,
and reconcile them with our previous evidence? I start with the observation that TFP series for
longer 1970-2007 is overall in line with our previous results, as I explain later. Second, the LLC
test requires the assumption that N/T →∞. Twelve countries with either 37 years or 27 years
of observations may not be an ideal setting, and it is certainly less ideal than the case with ten
countries with 37 years of observations. Therefore for the time-series convergence, it might be
more reasonable to limit our attention to the longer TFP series. As a last point, the LLC test
has a ”1 and 0” problem: It tests the null hypothesis that each country’s series contain unit root
to the alternative that each country’s series are stationary. We do not know what the LLC test
would conclude in the case where a couple of countries have been converging to the frontier (a
non-stationary process) where other countries fluctuate around a constant level.
I maintain the view that the time-series evidence on longer TFP series is in line with our
previous findings and observations. We initially observe that the agriculture does not exhibit
the β-convergence and shows a steady pattern with respect to the dispersion. These results are
very indication that countries are around their long-run steady-state levels in the beginning of
our sample, and they would stay around these levels over time. In other words, it is reasonable
to expect that the agriculture exhibits time-series convergence and the LLC test confirms this.
For the construction, the β-convergence is not incompatible with time-series convergence. For
this sector we observe that the dispersion has decreased over the sample and remains steady
after. This pattern could be driven by the fact that countries had been converging to their
long-run levels from below in the beginning, and have converged and stayed at these levels
in the remainder. Therefore, it is natural to expect that the time-series convergence applies
to this sector. The mining sectors shows the β-convergence and increasing dispersion over
time, this transitional behavior is confirmed by no convergence in the time-series test. For the
manufacturing we find no evidence of the β convergence and increased dispersion after around
mid-1990’s. The U-shaped pattern exhibited by many countries in our sample is apparent in our
visual inspection for this sector. These are clear indications of the non-stationarity, and it is not
27
surprising that the LLC test does not reject the null. For the market services and the utilities
sectors we observe both the decreased dispersion over time and the β-convergence. These are
signs that for these two sectors transition dynamics are dominant throughout the sample, and
not surprisingly, the time-series convergence is rejected by the LLC test.
For the market services subsectors, the behaviors of the wholesale and retail trade and the
hotels and restaurants sectors with respect to the time-series convergence are compatible with
the observation that countries are around their steady-state levels over the sample for these
two sectors. We observe that the financial intermediation and the real estate, renting, and
business activities are characterized by the β-convergence and reduced dispersion. As in the
case of the utilities and the manufacturing, these indicate that transition dynamics are more
relevant for these sub-sectors. The case of the transport, communication, storage sector deserves
a special mention. This sector does not exhibit the β-convergence, and the dispersion usually
remains constant over time. However, this sector does not exhibit time-series convergence either.
Although this requires a more detailed analysis, we may relate these results to either the hump
and U-shaped behaviors shown by some countries in the sample.
The time-series convergence relies on a strong concept of convergence which may not be suit-
able for sectors characterized by transition dynamics. Our results on the time-series convergence
are rather mixed. Considering all these problems, I estimate the equation 1.15 directly. More
specifically the following equation is estimated for both TFP and labor productivity.
gjit = αj + βj ln
[
AFj,t−1
Aij,t−1
]
+ ψij +Dt + ijt (1.19)
where gijt indicates the growth rate of productivity at sector j in country i. αj is the asymptotic
growth rate of sector j which is assumed same for every country i. ln
[
AFj,t−1
Aij,t−1
]
indicates the
distance of country i with respect to the productivity frontier at sector j. βj measures the
speed of a country i’s convergence to its steady-state level which is assumed to be same for
each country. If βj is greater than zero and statistically significant, it is concluded that the
convergence takes place. ψij are the country-industry fixed effects, and Dt are time dummies.
ijt is the error term that satisfies the standard properties. Equation 1.19 is estimated by both
pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and two way fixed effects (2FE). The later differs from
the former by the inclusion of the country-industry fixed effects ψij .
The inclusion of the country-industry fixed effects ψij is motivated to control for time inde-
28
pendent factors that affect productivity growth and correlated with the technology gap. The
country-industry fixed effects also control for constant measurement errors. Therefore, it also
solves the problems related to using wrong conversion factors in estimating relative productivity
levels. Time dummies are included to capture the macroeconomic shocks that affect all countries
in a sector.
The results of POLS and 2FE are shown in Tables 1.3 and 1.4. Although both POLS and 2FE
suffer from the signs of a possible misspecification such as serial correlation and cross-sectional
dependence, we observe that POLS consistently give counter-intuitive results on convergence.
Since it is not reasonable to expect so many sectors exhibit divergence and the adjusted-R2 is
always greater for 2FE than POLS, our attention is limited to the results of 2FE.
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Table 1.3: POLS and 2FE Results for Broad Sectors
TFP-I Sample consists of 10 countries and covers the period between 1970 and 2007
TFP-II Sample consists of 12 countries and covers the period between 1980 and 2007
Labor TFP-I TFP-II
βj βj βj
POLS 2FE POLS 2FE POLS 2FE
Agriculture
.0020
(.0041)
.1353***
(.0267)
-.0019
(.0044)
.0886***
(.0218)
-.0033
(.0047)
.1460***
(.0300)
AB Test AR(1) 0.0025 0.0040 0.0097 0.0036 0.0010 0.0006
AB Test AR(2) 0.9944 0.5742 0.5373 0.5560 0.2177 0.1356
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Construction
.0111*
(.0057)
.0527***
(.0202)
.0168***
(.0072)
.0580***
(.0228)
.0149*
(.0077)
.0509*
(.0275)
AB Test AR(1) 0.0039 0.0151 0.0049 0.0109 0.0133 0.0206
AB Test AR(2) 0.3027 0.0497 0.2910 0.0798 0.5734 0.2015
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Manufacturing
-.0023
(.0059)
-.0029
(.01179)
-.0227**
(.0089)
-.0201
(.0131)
-.0137**
(.0067)
-.0173
(.0122)
AB Test AR(1) 0.0000 0.0019 0.3937 0.0010 0.0000 0.0117
AB Test AR(2) 0.0113 0.3937 0.0858 0.5616 0.1178 0.1122
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Mining
.0045
(.0071)
.0628***
(.0210)
.01987**
(.0093)
.0441**
(.0205)
.0234**
(.0111)
.0918**
(.0399)
AB Test AR(1) 0.0132 0.0149 0.2754 0.6491 0.3532 0.4316
AB Test AR(2) 0.0130 0.0452 0.0183 0.1490 0.1208 0.8703
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Utilities
.0327***
(.0078)
.0697***
(.0177)
.0174***
(.0064)
.0805***
(.0174)
.0127*
(.0070)
.1028***
(.0301)
AB Test AR(1) 0.7073 0.7688 0.2470 0.4759 0.3724 0.4613
AB Test AR(2) 0.6081 0.4900 0.4073 0.1709 0.3030 0.2114
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Market Services
.0107***
(.0039)
.0402***
(.0127)
-.0018
(.0049)
.0722***
(.0173)
-.0027
(.0042)
.0705***
(.0211)
AB Test AR(1) 0.0001 0.0021 0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 0.0003
AB Test AR(2) 0.0308 0.3296 0.0935 0.3522 0.1975 0.4542
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors
***Statistical significance at the %1 confidence level
**Statistical significance at the %5 confidence level
*Statistical significance at the %10 confidence level
AB Test AR(1):Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation of order 1
AB Test AR(2):Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation of order 2
H0: no residual serial correlation (p-values)
CD Test: Pesaran (2004) test for cross-sectional independence
H0: no cross-sectional dependence
I(1): Stationary, I(0):Nonstationary, I(1)/I(0):Ambigous
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Table 1.4: POLS and 2FE Results for Market Services Sub-Sectors
TFP-I Sample consists of 10 countries and covers the period between 1970 and 2007
TFP-II Sample consists of 12 countries and covers the period between 1980 and 2007
Labor TFP-I TFP-II
βj βj βj
POLS 2FE POLS 2FE POLS 2FE
Real Estate, Renting
and Business Activities
.0192***
(.0047)
.0358***
(.0123)
.0294***
(.0057)
.1068***
(.0105)
.0071*
(.0040)
.0930***
(.0193)
AB Test AR(1) 0.0033 0.0116 0.0000 0.0121 0.1135 0.5542
AB Test AR(2) 0.2156 0.6174 0.0008 0.5840 0.2706 0.8876
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Financial Intermediation
.0396***
(.0085)
.0690***
(.0164)
.0483***
(.0098)
.0760***
(.0172)
.0334***
(.0111)
.0769***
(.0224)
AB Test AR(1) 0.0004 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AB Test AR(2) 0.1440 0.2920 0.0067 0.0189 0.0322 0.1566
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Hotels and Restaurants
.0061
(.0045)
.0924***
(.0197)
.0080*
(.0048)
.1045***
(.0237)
.0073
(.0045)
.0692**
(.0276)
AB Test AR(1) 0.1750 0.1546 0.1917 0.0984 0.2542 0.2097
AB Test AR(2) 0.7053 0.7426 0.7179 0.6249 0.8391 0.8230
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.001
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Transport and Storage
and Communication
.0046*
(.0027)
.0732***
(.0181 )
.0007
(.0027)
.0510**
(.0202)
-.0005
(.0028)
.0439**
(.0207)
AB Test AR(1) 0.1009 0.0836 0.1587 0.1496 0.0080 0.0249
AB Test AR(2) 0.3799 0.3939 0.2370 0.2585 0.1135 0.2864
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Wholesale and Retail Trade
.0029
(.0035)
.0603***
(.0141)
.0011
(.0037)
.0456***
(.0138)
.0014
(.0040)
.0849***
(.0227)
AB Test AR(1) 0.0109 0.0589 0.0003 0.0059 0.0001 0.0021
AB Test AR(2) 0.2805 0.9906 0.1461 0.9802 0.3425 0.8935
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors
***Statistical significance at the %1 confidence level
**Statistical significance at the %5 confidence level
*Statistical significance at the %10 confidence level
AB Test AR(1):Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation of order 1
AB Test AR(2):Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation of order 2
H0: no residual serial correlation (p-values)
CD Test: Pesaran (2004) test for cross-sectional independence
H0: no cross-sectional dependence
I(1): Stationary, I(0):Nonstationary, I(1)/I(0):Ambigous
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According to the results, all sectors except for the manufacturing show evidence of conver-
gence for both measures of productivity (Construction also does not exhibit convergence for the
shorter TFP series). There are considerable differences across sectors in the rates of convergence.
While the agriculture has the highest rate of convergence (0.14 and 0.08 for TFP, 0.13 for labor)
for both measures of productivity, this value is as low as 0.05 (both for labor productivity and
TFP) for the construction. The agriculture is followed by the utilities (0.10 and 0.08 for TFP,
0.06 for labor). The market services maintains the same value (0.07) for different samples of
TFP, but for labor productivity it has the lowest value (0.04) among the broad sectors. Labor
productivity convergence rates are general lower than those of TFP for all sectors, which we
conjecture as a result that the technological catch-up is more dominant than capital deepening.
The market sub-services again show heterogeneous patterns. The most consistent perfor-
mance is exhibited by the financial intermediation sector in the sense that its rate of convergence
(0.07) is robust over different samples and productivity measures. The transport, communica-
tions, storage sector overall exhibits a low rate of convergence for TFP (0.04 and 0.05), though
this increases to one of the highest (0.07) for labor productivity. The real estate, renting and
business activities is characterized by high rates of convergence for TFP, but it has the lowest
among the sub-sectors labor productivity. The wholesale and retail trade shows volatile per-
formance for TFP; although it has the highest rate of convergence (0.08) in shorter sample of
TFP, this reduces to the lowest in longer sample. The hotels and restaurants has overall strong
performance for both TFP and labor productivity.
The results for the manufacturing are pathological: It is the only sector that does not show
any evidence of convergence. Its rate of convergence is neither economically nor statistically
significant for 2FE estimates. If we accept the results of POLS (which are statistically signifi-
cant at conventional significance levels), countries have been diverging from their steady state
levels! These, along with previous negative results in the literature for this sector, beg for an
explanation.
Although the results of 2FE (and in part those of POLS) show a strong support for the
convergence for many sectors, the diagnostic tests show that they do not have desirable proper-
ties. Although there is no unit root problem, the error terms exhibit cross sectional dependence
and serial correlation, which suggests that 2FE and POLS are misspecified. The next section
introduces heterogeneity to the baseline model to overcome these problems.
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1.5 Convergence Under Heterogeneity
So far we have maintained the parameter homogeneity in our estimations. Although the het-
erogeneity is partly accounted for by the inclusion of fixed effects, we assume that the rate of
convergence and the effects of global shocks are same across countries. This is a rather re-
stricted setting. Accounting for the heterogeneity is required both for empirical implementation
and theoretical reasons. Eberhardt and Teal (2011) provide an overview of problems where the
heterogeneity is warranted in a specification, but it is not taken into account in the implemen-
tation. Our results based on POLS and 2FE suggest we suffer some of these problems. From a
conceptual point of view, Griffith et al. (2004), among others, show that there could be many
factors (such as human capital, R&D, and openness) that interact with the technology gap. If
these factors vary across countries, it is reasonable to expect that the rate of convergence differs
across countries. Because of these reasons we now turn our attention to estimation with the
parameter heterogeneity.
In this section we mainly consider two estimators that introduce heterogeneity to our main
specification. These are Pesaran and Smith (1995)’s mean group (MG) and cross-section de-
meaned mean group (CDMG) estimators. While MG allows both the rate of convergence and
the effects of global shocks differ across countries, CDMG only allows country specific rates of
convergence. More specifically, the MG estimates the following equation
gjit = αj + βij ln
[
AFj,t−1
Aij,t−1
]
+ ψij +Di,t + ijt (1.20)
while the CDMG estimates the following
gjit = αj + βij ln
[
AFj,t−1
Aij,t−1
]
+ ψij +Dt + ijt (1.21)
Since individual country estimates are not reliable the results are reported only for the un-
weighted country averages. Tables 1.5-1.6 report the results of MG and CDMG.
Overall, the results of CDMG closely resemble to those of 2FE. The manufacturing is the
only sector that does not exhibit convergence, but now its coefficient becomes positive, therefore
economically significant. The CDMG estimates are also considerably greater than those of 2FE.
The rate of convergence increases as much as to 0.24 for the agriculture.
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Table 1.5: CDMG and MG Results for Broad Sectors
TFP-I Sample consists of 10 countries and covers the period between 1970 and 2007
TFP-II Sample consists of 12 countries and covers the period between 1980 and 2007
Labor TFP-I TFP-II
βj βj βj
CDMG MG CDMG MG CDMG MG
Agriculture
.1900***
(.0475)
.1289***
(.0339)
.1490***
(.0243)
.1243***
(.0497)
.2490***
(.0613)
.1752***
(.0543)
CH Test AR(1) 0.0911 0.0157 0.0392 0.0514 0.0861 0.0060
CH Test AR(2) 0.1822 0.5290 0.1701 0.6840 0.2755 0.6926
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Construction
.1112***
(.0269)
.0333***
(.0115)
.1360***
(.0303)
.0208
(.0167)
.1156***
(.0323)
.0857***
(.0297)
CH Test AR(1) 0.0080 0.0932 0.0100 0.0549 0.0358 0.2779
CH Test AR(2) 0.2887 0.0375 0.3562 0.0930 0.5436 0.0945
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Manufacturing
.0381
(.0265)
.0583***
(.0108)
.0200
(.0243)
.0565***
(.0127)
.0567
(.0347)
.0577***
(.0192)
CH Test AR(1) 0.0120 0.4603 0.0047 0.2276 0.0271 0.0868
CH Test AR(2) 0.9238 0.0298 0.9369 0.0030 0.0948 0.0008
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Mining
.1015***
(.0130)
.0568
(.0346)
.1045***
(.0193)
.1181***
(.0265)
.1576***
(.0359)
.1242***
(.0376)
CH Test AR(1) 0.0270 0.0790 0.5837 0.9994 0.5340 0.4808
CH Test AR(2) 0.1008 0.2089 0.2502 0.5709 0.3276 0.7460
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.285
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Utilities
.1028***
(.0274)
-.0009
(.0230)
.0935***
(.0166)
-.4353
(.4437)
.1661***
(.0488)
-1.0102
(1.0119)
CH Test AR(1) 0.4668 0.7025 0.5337 0.8429 0.7625 0.8704
CH Test AR(2) 0.6978 0.0896 0.1715 0.0213 0.0907 0.0092
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Market Services
.0918***
(.0181)
.04296
(.03437)
.1034***
(.0203)
.08709***
(.0193)
.09268
(.0228)
.0729***
(.0248)
CH Test AR(1) 0.0019 0.1794 0.0020 0.0054 0.0014 0.0003
CH Test AR(2) 0.4105 0.2062 0.5932 0.3408 0.5141 0.9640
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors
***Statistical significance at the %1 confidence level
**Statistical significance at the %5 confidence level
*Statistical significance at the %10 confidence level
CH Test AR(1):Cumby-Huizinga test for serial correlation of order 1
CH Test AR(2):Cumby-Huizinga test test for serial correlation of order 2
H0: no residual serial correlation (p-values)
CD Test: Pesaran (2004) test for cross-sectional independence
H0: no cross-sectional dependence
I(1): Stationary, I(0):Nonstationary, I(1)/I(0):Ambigous
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Table 1.6: CDMG and MG Results for Market Services Sub-Sectors
TFP-I Sample consists of 10 countries and covers the period between 1970 and 2007
TFP-II Sample consists of 12 countries and covers the period between 1980 and 2007
Labor TFP-I TFP-II
βj βj βj
CDMG MG CDMG MG CDMG MG
Real Estate, Renting
and Business Activities
.0755***
(.0047)
.0647***
(.0190)
.0904***
(.0195)
-.0034
(.0107)
.1053***
(.0240)
2.5140
(2.3538)
CH Test AR(1) 0.0123 0.0425 0.4260 0.2006 0.7518 0.9690
CH Test AR(2) 0.9376 0.9988 0.5300 0.9842 0.9270 0.7306
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Financial Intermediation
.0968***
(.0143)
.0664***
(.0212)
.0916***
(.0159)
.0862***
(.0271)
.1190***
(.0267)
.0890***
(.0255)
CH Test AR(1) 0.0055 0.0389 0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000
CH Test AR(2) 0.5903 0.8527 0.0745 0.3246 0.0322 0.1566
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.332
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Hotels and Restaurants
.1333***
(.0227)
.1093***
(.0280)
.1459***
(.0308)
.0822**
(.0398)
.1632***
(.0426)
.0890***
(.0296)
CH Test AR(1) 0.2038 0.8267 0.2544 0.8310 0.2853 0.6832
CH Test AR(2) 0.9942 0.0521 0.9339 0.1349 0.6139 0.0691
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.045
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Transport and Storage
and Communication
.0916***
(.0198)
.0639***
(.0230)
.0619**
(.0262)
.0581
(.0359)
.0810**
(.0396)
.0061
(.0309)
CH Test AR(1) 0.1256 0.8365 0.1668 0.7687 0.0120 0.4493
CH Test AR(2) 0.5070 0.1154 0.3733 0.2232 0.4010 0.2324
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Wholesale and Retail Trade
.1610***
(.0438)
.1300***
(.0249)
.1194***
(.0338)
.1636***
(.0293)
.1705***
(.0410)
.1756***
(.0414)
CH Test AR(1) 0.0129 0.0589 0.0116 0.0042 0.0019 0.0090
CH Test AR(2) 0.7896 0.9906 0.6882 0.2693 0.7038 0.1528
CD Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.013
Order of Integration I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors
***Statistical significance at the %1 confidence level
**Statistical significance at the %5 confidence level
*Statistical significance at the %10 confidence level
CH Test AR(1):Cumby-Huizinga test for serial correlation of order 1
CH Test AR(2):Cumby-Huizinga test test for serial correlation of order 2
H0: no residual serial correlation (p-values)
CD Test: Pesaran (2004) test for cross-sectional independence
H0: no cross-sectional dependence
I(1): Stationary, I(0):Nonstationary, I(1)/I(0):Ambigous
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The MG improves upon other estimators by partly circumventing the issues of serial corre-
lation and cross-sectional dependence. These problems still remain for the estimates of some
sectors, but the number of sectors with these problems are reduced with MG. MG, as in the case
of CDMG, gives results similar to 2FE. Among the broad sectors, the agriculture is still char-
acterized by the highest rate of convergence both for labor and total factor productivity. The
mining shows evidence of convergence for TFP, but not for labor productivity. The construc-
tion converges with respect to the smaller sample of TFP and labor productivity. The market
services converge in TFP and the rate of convergence looks robust over different samples and
specifications (2FE). Although the market services demonstrates the same rate of convergence
in labor productivity with respect to 2FE and MG, it is not statistically significant for the later.
Considering overall agreement between 2FE and MG for this sector and the fact that all market
services sub-sectors demonstrate convergence in labor productivity according to MG, this is not
a reasonable result. The convergence of the utilities is strongly rejected in the MG estimates.
Among the market services sub-sectors, the convergence performances of the financial in-
termediation and the hotels and restaurants sectors looks robust over different samples and
specifications. For the wholesale and retail trade, MG gives higher estimates than 2FE. These
high estimates coincide with our previous observation that countries in this sector are near their
long-run steady-state levels in the beginning of our sample. The MG estimates do not support
the convergence in the real estate, renting and business activities for TFP, but this sector looks
converging with respect to labor productivity. The case of the transport and storage and com-
munication deserves a special mention. I previously note that this sector is neither characterized
by the β nor the time-series convergence, despite its flat dispersion pattern over time. It is one
of the rare sectors in which the MG rejects the convergence. Although we previously conjecture
that these results may be driven by the hump-shaped pattern shown by some countries, overall
less than impressive convergence performance of this sector begs for a more detailed analysis.
The MG results for the manufacturing are the most interesting. According to the results
here the manufacturing exhibits convergence at a statistically significant rate of 0.05. In the case
of POLS with full parameter homogeneity, the manufacturing exhibits divergence. In the case of
2FE where country heterogeneity is partially accounted for by the inclusion of country specific
time-independent factors, the manufacturing does not exhibit convergence, but no divergence
either. When further heterogeneity is introduced by allowing rates of convergence to differ across
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countries, the rate of convergence becomes positive but not statistically significant. When time
dummies are allowed to be country specific, the manufacturing exhibits convergence. Among
specifications giving such conflicting results, which one should be chosen? Although it does not
solve the cross-sectional dependency problem (no estimators do), we tend to prefer the results of
the MG. It is the only specification where error terms do not exhibit serial correlation. Therefore,
I conclude that the manufacturing sector exhibits convergence.
How could one explain the vindication of convergence in the manufacturing with the in-
troduction of heterogeneity? Our argument is that the convergence in manufacturing is very
conditional. There are possibly some factors that interact with the technology gap and dif-
fer across the countries.11If their roles are not accounted by a country specific technology gap
slope, it turns out that the manufacturing exhibits no-convergence. Consider an empirical set-
ting where the technology gap enters the equation as a determinant of productivity growth and
interacts with other relevant factors. If the sign of the technology gap remains non-significant
but if its interactions are significant, then one should conclude that convergence in the manu-
facturing is conditional, since it could not happen without these factors. This setting is akin
to our specification with the parameter heterogeneity, under the assumption that factors with
which technology gap interacts do not change much over time. For a broader sample, Madsen
and Timmol (2011) reach a similar conclusion regarding the convergence in the manufacturing.
Another explanation could be differential effects of cross-country shocks in the manufac-
turing. Although we clearly observe the divergent behavior in the manufacturing after the
mid-1990’s, we are not sure whether it is a transitory period or driven by a permanent shock.
Apparently, when the effects of shocks are allowed to differ across countries the convergence
in the manufacturing is restored. This indicates that the effects of cross-country shocks are
transitory, but this point does not become clear if one assumes a common shock structure for all
countries. In the light of this evidence it is not surprising that our results on the manufacturing
become statistically significant when we transit from CDMG to MG.
Another explanation could be the measurement error. Some problems associated with the
conversion factors in the manufacturing are mentioned previously. If relative productivity levels
are estimated incorrectly for the base year, this error will remain constant throughout time.
The inclusion of the country specific fixed effects are motivated to control for this constant
11As indicated in the beginning of this section the literature identifies human capital, R&D and trade among
such factors
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measurement error. However, for some reason, if the measurement error shows a country specific
trend related to the changes in the technology gap, the precise estimates on the technology gap
cannot be obtained. Again, in the light of this evidence it is not surprising that the convergence
results in the manufacturing become more substantial after both the rate of convergence and
the effects of shocks are allowed to differ across countries.
Tables 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 summarize all results referred in the main body of text.
38
T
ab
le
1.
7:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
R
es
u
lt
s
fo
r
L
ab
or
P
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
β
-c
on
ve
rg
en
ce
σ
-c
on
ve
rg
en
ce
U
n
it
R
o
o
t
T
es
t
P
O
L
S
2
F
E
C
D
M
G
M
G
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
N
o
C
on
v
er
ge
n
ce
N
o
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
v
er
g
en
ce
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
M
in
in
g
N
o
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
v
er
g
en
ce
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
N
o
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
on
v
er
ge
n
ce
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
U
ti
li
ti
es
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
M
ar
ke
t
S
er
v
ic
es
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
v
er
g
en
ce
N
o
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
v
er
ge
n
ce
N
o
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
W
h
ol
es
al
e
an
d
R
et
ai
l
T
ra
d
e
N
o
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
H
ot
el
s
an
d
R
es
ta
u
ra
n
ts
N
o
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
on
v
er
g
en
ce
C
o
n
v
er
g
en
ce
N
o
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
v
er
g
en
ce
T
ra
n
sp
or
t
an
d
S
to
ra
ge
an
d
C
om
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
N
o
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
on
v
er
ge
n
ce
N
o
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
v
er
g
en
ce
F
in
an
ci
al
In
te
rm
ed
ia
ti
on
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
v
er
ge
n
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
on
v
er
g
en
ce
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
R
ea
l
E
st
at
e,
R
en
ti
n
g
an
d
B
u
si
n
es
s
A
ct
iv
it
ie
s
N
o
C
on
v
er
ge
n
ce
N
o
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
N
o
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
39
Table 1.8: Summary Results for TFP-I
TFP-I Sample consists of 10 countries and covers the period between 1970 and 2007
β-convergence σ-convergence Unit Root Test POLS 2FE CDMG MG
Agriculture No Convergence - Convergence No Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence
Mining Convergence - No Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence
Construction Convergence - Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence No Convergence
Manufacturing No Convergence - No Convergence Divergence No Convergence No Convergence Convergence
Utilities Convergence - No Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence No Convergence
Market Services - - No Convergence No Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence
Wholesale and Retail Trade No Convergence - Convergence No Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence
Hotels and Restaurants No Convergence - Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence
Transport and Storage and Communication No Convergence - No Convergence No Convergence Convergence Convergence No Convergence
Financial Intermediation Convergence - Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities Convergence - Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence No Convergence
Table 1.9: Summary Results for TFP-II
TFP-II Sample consists of 12 countries and covers the period between 1980 and 2007
β-convergence σ-convergence Unit Root Test POLS 2FE CDMG MG
Agriculture No Convergence No Convergence - No Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence
Mining Convergence Convergence - Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence
Construction Convergence No Convergence - Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence
Manufacturing No Convergence No Convergence - Divergence No Convergence No Convergence Convergence
Utilities Convergence Convergence - Convergence Convergence Convergence No Convergence
Market Services - Convergence - No Convergence Convergence No Convergence Convergence
Wholesale and Retail Trade No Convergence Convergence - No Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence
Hotels and Restaurants Convergence Convergence - No Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence
Transport and Storage and Communication No Convergence Convergence - No Convergence Convergence Convergence No Convergence
Financial Intermediation Convergence Convergence - Convergence Convergence Convergence Convergence
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities No Convergence Convergence - Convergence Convergence Convergence No Convergence
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1.6 Conclusion
This study considers the productivity convergence at the sectoral level for twelve OECD coun-
tries. Our general result is that convergence takes place for many sectors, but reaching this
conclusion depends on appropriate definition. While for some sectors (such as agriculture)
countries have already reached their steady-state levels, for others (e.g. utilities and market ser-
vices) they are more characterized by transition dynamics. The market services that accounts
for a large share of employment and value added for countries in our sample shows a robust
convergence performance. However, this performance hides a lot of heterogeneity within this
sector. While the results on the wholesale and retail trade (and also the hotels and restaurants)
show that countries have been around their steady-state levels for this sub-sector, for the finan-
cial intermediation they have been converging to their long-run levels. The later demonstrates
a strong convergence performance, since it also accounts for an increasing share of the market
services, we conjecture that the convergence behavior of the market services is driven by this
sector. On the other hand, the transport, communication, storage sector is characterized by
problematic convergence results that warrant further investigation.
Our most interesting results emerge for the manufacturing. Bernard and Jones (1996 a,b)
demonstrate a non-convergence result for this sector with respect to different convergence notions
for a group of OECD countries in a period from 1970-1987. Their work is criticized on the
grounds that their results on the manufacturing are sensitive to the choice of base year due
to imperfect conversion factors (Sorensen 2001, and Sorensen and Schjerning 2003), and the
time period they consider is special and short (Madsen and Timol (2011)). Their results are
also challenged by more recent research. This study extends the time period considered in
Bernard and Jones (1996 a,b) and controls for the measurement error by fixed effects. The
majority of our results show that the manufacturing is still characterized by non-convergence
for the OECD countries. How could one reconcile these conflicting results? Could it be that
the OECD countries have transited to a different stage in the manufacturing after 1970 which
is characterized by the non-convergence, maybe because of different specialization patterns?
Apparently, the answer relates to the recent concerns of the empirical growth literature. Our
exercises show that when heterogeneity is not properly taken into account, the manufacturing
sector appears to exhibit no-convergence. We relate this result to conditional character of
convergence in the manufacturing, heterogeneous effects of global shocks, and the measurement
41
error.
Although we have done justice to the heterogeneity, our estimates still suffer from cross-
sectional dependence. Unfortunately, we have already accounted for a commonality across
countries and it is not possible to apply popular estimation methods that deal with cross-
sectional dependence such as the common correlated effects pooled estimator (CCEP) and the
common correlated effects mean group estimator (CCEMG) to our setting. Supplementing our
baseline specification with cross-sectional averages will suppress the effect of the technology gap,
therefore it is not possible to separate them.12
12The views expressed in this paragraph reflect the footnote 28 in Eberhardt et al. (2013)
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Figure A.1: Relative TFP Levels (Broad Sectors), 1980-2007
a. Agriculture b. Construction
c. Mining d. Utilities
e. Manufacturing f. Market Services
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Figure A.2: Relative TFP Levels (Market Services), 1980-2007
a. Wholesale and Retail Trade b. Hotels and Restaurants
c. Transportation and Storage and Communication d. Financial Intermediation
e. Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities
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Figure A.3: Relative Labor Productivity Levels (Broad Sectors), 1970-2007
a. Agriculture b. Construction
c. Mining d. Utilities
e. Manufacturing f. Market Services
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Figure A.4: Relative Labor Productivity Levels (Market Services), 1970-2007
a. Wholesale and Retail Trade b. Hotels and Restaurants
c. Transportation and Storage and Communication d. Financial Intermediation
e. Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities
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Figure A.5: σ-convergence, TFP (Broad Sectors), 1980-2007
a. Agriculture b. Construction
c. Mining d. Utilities
e. Manufacturing f. Market Services
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Figure A.6: σ-convergence, TFP (Market Services), 1980-2007
a. Wholesale and Retail Trade b. Hotels and Restaurants
c. Transportation and Storage and Communication d. Financial Intermediation
e. Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities
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Figure A.7: σ-convergence, Labor Productivity (Broad Sectors), 1970-2007
a. Agriculture b. Construction
c. Mining d. Utilities
e. Manufacturing f. Market Services
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Figure A.8: σ-convergence, Labor Productivity (Market Services), 1970-2007
a. Wholesale and Retail Trade b. Hotels and Restaurants
c. Transportation and Storage and Communication d. Financial Intermediation
e. Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities
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Chapter 2
Structural Change within the
Services Sector, Baumol’s Cost
Disease, and Cross-Country
Productivity Differences
2.1 Introduction
In 1967 William Baumol observed that the services had the lowest productivity growth rate
among broad sectors of the economy. Because of its low productivity growth, the relative price
of the services sector had been rising, so had been its share in total economy. Because of this
structural change toward the services sector aggregate productivity would resemble more and
more the productivity in the services. But Baumol’s prediction was bleak: Since productivity
in fact did not grow in the services sector, aggregate productivity growth rate would decline,
and eventually settle to zero. After the publication of his paper more than fifty years ago, the
gloomy vision of William Baumol still troubles the economists. Some even wonder whether
recent productivity growth slowdown in developed countries marks the fulfillment of his pre-
dictions. Baumol (1967) is not the only work that links economic growth to structural change.
More recently, Duarte and Restuccia (2010) point that for productivity growth in the services
developed countries perform inferiorly with respect to the US, and the rise of this sector explains
56
why aggregate productivity differences between the US and other countries have increased re-
cently. Both these works mark the significance of the services sector for understanding aggregate
productivity.
Yet the services sector, in terms of productivity growth, consists of highly heterogenous
sub-units: Low productivity growth services sub-sectors, such as hotels and restaurants, co-
exist with high productivity growth ones, such as wholesale and retail trade. It would not
be wrong to argue that for developed countries characterized by a high share of the services
today (as far as 2019 is concerned, 80% of total economy for the US and the UK; for other
developed countries the number is similar) it is the structural change between these diverse sub-
groups within the services but not that among agriculture, industry and services that shapes
aggregate productivity. Although the literature has long recognized the heterogenous makeup of
the services (Jorgenson and Timmer (2011), Duarte and Restuccia (2019), Buera et al. (2019),
Duernecker, Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2019), Barany and Siegel (2019) among others), it is
difficult to say that commonly-applied and -accepted structural change facts exist for this sector.
Comparative studies of structural change that specifically target the services are also scarce. This
research aims to fill these gaps in the literature. I approach the heterogeneity in the services
from a productivity-growth perspective: I identify common high- and low-productivity growth
services sectors across countries and analyze structural change facts based on them. My analysis
reveals that the heterogeneity and structural change within the services sector have dramatic
consequences for cross-country productivity differences and aggregate productivity growth.
For each country I identify the services sub-sectors with high-productivity growth as the ones
that display a productivity growth rate greater than the aggregate services, and the services sub-
sectors with low-productivity growth as the ones that display a productivity growth rate lower
than aggregate. To distinguish common high-productivity growth services sub-sectors across
countries I restrict my attention to services sub-sectors that satisfy above-average productivity
growth criteria for the largest number of countries. Four services sub-sectors (wholesale and
retail trade; transport and storage, post and telecommunications; financial intermediation) turn
out to satisfy this criteria: Each one belongs to the high-productivity growth group for at least
80% of the countries in my sample, and for 75% of them these four services sectors rank among
the five highest productivity growth services sectors. Borrowing the terminology in Baumol et al.
(1985), I name the high-productivity growth services sectors as progressive and low-productivity
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growth services sectors as stagnant.
I later analyze structural change within the services sector through the lens of these new
services categories. For most countries the share of progressive services sectors remains remark-
ably stable around 25 − 33% of the aggregate economy. Indeed, panel-data evidence suggests
that the share of progressive services within total services will show a U-shaped pattern over
development. Both facts imply that a non-trivial lower bound exists for the share of progres-
sive services within total services - this result would constitute my principal argument against
Baumol’s cost disease.
I quantify the effects of Baumol’s cost disease on productivity growth. For the period be-
tween 1970 and 2015, Baumol’s cost disease decreases the aggregate productivity growth on
average 0.4 percentage points and accounts for 20% of the productivity growth slowdown. These
numbers hide considerable contrasts among developed countries - however, what emerges from
this accounting exercise is that Baumol’s cost disease becomes less relevant over development.
More specifically, it reduces productivity growth rate less and accounts for a small share of the
productivity growth slowdown.
To assess the future effects of Baumol’s cost disease I construct a multi-sector general equilib-
rium model with structural change. In the model I distinguish progressive and stagnant services
sectors, and to be consistent with the stylized facts I document I represent the household pref-
erences with a nested nonhomothetic-CES utility specification consisting of two layers. In the
outer layer the consumer allocates between progressive services and the rest of the economy; in
the inner layer a separate allocation problem exists between goods and stagnant services. The
elasticities of substitution that govern allocation problems differ between the outer and inner
layers; the parameters that govern the income effects also differ across sectors. A key feature of
the model is the persistent income effects needed to simulate long-term aggregate productivity
growth rates. For each country my calibration results confirm that the progressive services are
substitutes with other sectors in the economy.
I next simulate the model under certain scenarios. The model predicts that Baumol’s cost
disease would depress aggregate productivity growth less than it did in the past for almost every
country. For a typical country the predicted productivity growth slowdown for the next 60 years
is usually half of that observed from 1970-1995 to 1995-2015. My results remain robust across
different datasets and modelling assumptions.
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I later turn my attention to cross-country productivity differences. The results in Duarte
and Restuccia (2010) mask considerable contrasts within the services sector: Although the
US exhibits a greater productivity growth rate than other developed countries in the progres-
sive/business services sector, many of them surpass the US in the stagnant services. The pro-
gressive/business services sector accounts for aggregate productivity growth revivals observed
in most developed countries during the 1990’s. In addition to this, the rise of the productivity
growth in this services sub-group coincides with its increasing share within total services. These
facts motivate that the progressive/business and the stagnant services could be substitutes,
and considering the productivity growth differences between the US and other countries across
these services sub-groups, structural change within the services sector might also contribute to
cross-country differences.
To examine the sectoral sources of cross-country productivity differences and the role of
structural change in shaping them, I consider a simplified version of the model I use in the
first part of the paper. The calibrated relative productivity levels display distinct patterns
across two services groups. Developed countries overtake the US in the stagnant services sector;
regarding the catch-up, their behavior is closer to goods than aggregate services. It is indeed the
progressive/business services sector that prompts the declines in aggregate relative productivity:
For a typical country in the end year of my study, 2007, the relative productivity in this services
sub-sector is usually half of that in the stagnant services. In the counterfactuals where countries
showed a productivity growth rate in the progressive/business services so that their relative
productivity levels were equalized between two services sub-sectors at the end year of the study,
I observe that all declines in the aggregate relative productivity are overturned.
To situate these results in a context, one should consider what Baumol’s cost disease implies
for cross-country productivity differences. If productivity growth in the US -the frontier country-
had been converging to zero because of structural change, and since other countries would follow
the US with a lag, productivity differences between the US and other countries would decline
over time. In the limit Baumol’s cost disease implies absolute convergence, where all countries
would share the same productivity level. Under the light of this result, the declines in aggregate
relative productivity that started universally in the 1990’s pose a puzzle. I explain this puzzle
by showing that it is not the complementarity but substitutability that characterizes structural
change within the services. The declines in aggregate relative productivity are not temporary,
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but pointing a rather permanent phenomenon.
The substitutability between the progressive/business and stagnant services sectors indeed
point a more fundamental distinction: Although stagnant services sub-sectors are almost ex-
clusively related to final consumption, the output of progressive/business services sub-sectors
is predominantly used as intermediate and investment. We could consider the substitutability
between these two sub-sectors as the evidence that the part of the services sector more related
to the production becomes more seminal over time. This in part might explain why a Bau-
mol’s cost disease perspective is not adequate for understanding structural change within the
services, since the analysis of Baumol exclusively focuses upon consumption and overlooks that
intermediate/investment demand could also affect structural change.
In a nutshell, my research shows that the heterogeneity matters for the services. I argue that
the substitutability between high- and low-productivity growth services sectors commonly holds
across countries and the lesser effects of Baumol’s cost disease on future productivity growth
is not a fact limited to the US only. My results show, contrary to popular opinion, not only
productivity growth performance of the US in certain services sub-sectors but also structural
change within the services drive productivity differences between the US and other developed
countries. Any approach based on only productivity-growth would struggle to explain why the
reversals in aggregate relative productivity persist despite the lackluster productivity growth
performance of the US after 2007.
This paper consists of two different parts. The first part relates to Baumol’s cost disease, and
the second part to cross-country productivity differences. The next section discusses the relevant
literature. The third section presents the facts on structural change within the services sector,
Baumol’s cost disease, and aggregate/sectoral productivity comparisons among countries. The
fourth and fifth sections are devoted to the modeling of Baumol’s cost disease and its quantitative
analysis. The sixth section introduces a structural change model for cross-country productivity
differences; the seventh section consists of the calibration of this model and the counterfactual
results. The last section concludes.
2.2 Relevant Literature
This paper is most related to the literature that associates the changes in aggregate productivity
to structural change: Duernecker, Herrendorf, and Valentinyi (2019); Duarte and Restuccia
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(2010, 2019); and Buiatti, Duarte, and Saenz (2018) are the closest works to this research. By
distinguishing high- and low-productivity growth services sectors, Duernecker, Herrendorf, and
Valentinyi (2019) study the future effects of Baumol’s cost disease for aggregate productivity
growth in the US. They argue that the substitutability between high- and low-productivity
growth services sectors would limit productivity growth-slowdown in the US. I extend their
work by showing that the substitutability within the services sector is a common property of
structural change in developed countries, and this fact would restrain Baumol’s cost disease for
them as well in the future. I also show that the structural change facts in the services sector that
limit productivity growth slowdown in the US also account for increasing aggregate productivity
differences between him and other developed countries. I therefore link Duernecker, Herrendorf
and Valentinyi (2019) to Duarte and Restuccia (2010).
I extend Duarte and Restuccia (2010) by considering the services sector at a more disaggre-
gated level. Their companion paper to this work, Duarte and Restuccia (2019), also analyzes the
services sector at a more disaggregated level by differentiating modern and traditional services
sectors. Although it looks natural to associate modern and traditional services with progres-
sive/business and stagnant services, the classification of the services sub-sectors in Duarte and
Restuccia (2019) refers to the final consumption categories. Since the services sub-sectors I
analyze in this work relate to value-added, it is not clear how to link them. For some services
sub-sectors considered in this study -for example, business services or wholesale and retail trade-
no close counterparts in the final consumption exist. The relative price of a final consumption
product does not always reflect productivity differences across sectors and countries.1
The closest work to my paper is Buatti, Duarte, and Saenz (2018). They also extend Duarte
and Restuccia (2010) by considering the services sector at a more disaggregated level. I confirm
their main result that business services and wholesale and retail trade are the two services sub-
sectors that contrbiute most the aggregate productivity differences between the US and West
European countries. Differently from them, this work also analyzes Baumol’s cost disease and
structural change within the services sector. For the cross-country productivity differences part,
my study covers more countries and comes as close as to 2015, while theirs end in 2007. As
we shall see, the revised dataset that becomes available with the recent releases of WORLD
KLEMS implies smaller differences between the US and other developed countries in progressive
1Their original paper Duarte and Restuccia (2010) puts this fact plainly.
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and business services sub-sectors than what the previous datasets suggest. I therefore conclude
that the revised data endorses more the view that structural change within the services sector
drives cross-country productivity differences.
My work is also related to the literature that goes beyond the classical trichotomy among
agriculture, industry and services and notices large productivity-growth differences among ser-
vices sub-sectors: Baumol et al. (1985) and Jorgenson and Timmer (2011) are two prominent
examples of this literature. Nordhaus (2008), Hartwig (2011), and Imbs (2017) test the implica-
tions of Baumol’s cost disease for developed countries. Despite our common goal of quantifying
Baumol’s cost disease, my study differs from them methodologically.
2.3 Facts
This section presents the facts on the categorization of services sub-sectors, structural change
with respect to these categories, Baumol’s cost disease and productivity differences across coun-
tries at the aggregate and sectoral levels.
2.3.1 Classification of Services Sub-Sectors
This sub-section discusses the classification of services sub-sectors with respect to productivity
growth. For a detailed discussion about data description and sources I refer the reader to
Appendix B.
Table 2.1 displays the list of two-digits service sub-sectors, compatible with the ISIC Rev. 3.1.
classification system, considered in this study.2 For each country I calculate labor productivity
growth rate between 1970 and 2007 for the aggregate services. Since the data for real variables
in the KLEMS database are not additive, I construct a Tornqvist index for aggregating labor
productivity growth rates of different service sub-sectors based on the following formula:
∆ lnLPst =
[
Si,t + Si,t−1
2
]
∆ lnLPi,t +
[
Si,t + Si,t−1
2
− Hi,t +Hi,t−1
2
]
∆ lnHEMPi,t (2.1)
where ∆ lnLPst ≡ lnLPst − lnLPs,t−1 is the change in labor productivity in the aggregate
2Throughout the text I refer to ”Renting of Machinery and Equipment and Other Business Activities” as
”Business Services”, and ”Public Administration and National Defense; Compulsory Social Security” as ”Public
Administration”
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Table 2.1: List of Services Sub-Sectors according to the ISIC Rev. 3.1.
ISIC Code Name of Services Sub-Sector
G Wholesale and Retail Trade
H Hotels and Restaurants
60t63 Transport and Storage
64 Post and Telecommunications
J Financial Intermediation
70 Real Estate Activities
71t74 Renting of Machinery and Equipment and Other Business Activities
L Public Administration and National Defense; Compulsory Social Security
M Education
N Health and Social Work
O Other Community, Social, and Personal Services
Source: WORLD KLEMS
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services from t− 1 to t, Si,t ≡ V Ai,t∑
V Ai,t
is the share of the services sub-sector i in the aggregate
services nominal value added, Hi,t ≡ HEMPi,t∑
HEMPi,t
is the share of the services sub-sector i in
total number of hours worked in the aggregate services, ∆ lnLPi,t ≡ lnLPi,t − lnLPi,t−1 is the
change in labor productivity for the services sub-sector i from t − 1 to t and ∆ lnHEMPi,t ≡
lnHEMPi,t − lnHEMPi,t−1 is the change in the number of hours worked for the services sub-
sector i. s stands for the aggregate services. The second term in the equation refers to the
increases in labor productivity because of the movement of labor from the sectors with low-
nominal-productivity to the ones with high-nominal-productivity. Labor productivity growth is
measured according to the following formula.
lnLPi,t = lnRV Ai,t − lnHEMPi,t (2.2)
where RV Ait is the real value added and HEMPi,t is labor input in sub-sector i. In the WORLD
KLEMS, the real value added is the nominal value added at constant prices and approximates
changes in the quantity. The labor input is measured as the number of hours worked by people
engaged.
In this study I abstract from the changes in labor quality and opt for a raw measure of
labor input. This choice reflects a necessity: For most countries long-term data measuring labor
quality changes does not exist at the sectoral level we consider. Although accounting for the
labor quality is preferable, it is not an innocuous assumption in such a cross-country study. As
we shall see, developed countries have actually caught up the US in the stagnant services sector
that consists of mostly skill-intensive sub-sectors. If improvements in labor quality stand behind
this result, incorporating them would lead to different conclusions. I nevertheless believe that
the part played by the labor quality for the productivity catch-ups should be addressed in future
studies, as long as one can overcome data constraints.
Table 2.2 presents the average labor productivity growth rates for the services sub-sectors
and the aggregate services for all countries in my sample; and Table 2.3 shows whether a ser-
vices sub-sector displays a productivity growth rate greater than the aggregate services for a
particular country. Tables 2.2-3 confirm the heterogeneous makeup of the services sector from a
productivity-growth perspective: The services sub-sectors with almost zero-productivity growth,
such as Hotels and Restaurants, co-exist with the services sub-sectors with very high productiv-
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ity growth rates, such as Post and Telecommunications. These results reinforce the observations
of Jorgenson and Timmer (2011) and Baumol et al. (1985) concerning the productivity-growth
heterogeneity within the services. Table 2.2 also shows considerable productivity growth differ-
ences across countries that cannot be simply accounted for by development levels.
Table 2.3 presents a clear picture about high- and low-productivity growth services sub-
sectors: Wholesale and Retail Trade; Transport and Storage; Telecommunications and Postage;
and Financial Intermediation stand out from the rest in terms of productivity growth perfor-
mance. These services sub-sectors display a productivity growth rate greater than the aggregate
services for at least 81% of the countries in my sample. For 71% of the countries they also rank
among the five services sub-sectors with highest productivity growth rate. In any country the
services sub-sectors different from these four ones could also display above average productivity
growth (perhaps related to transition dynamics, since our time coverage is short and the sample
consists of countries at different stages of development). To address this concern, I define high-
productivity growth services sub-sectors as the ones that satisfy the criteria of the above-average
productivity growth for the largest number of countries. The four services sub-sectors I identify
are clearly the only ones that pass this test; in some countries -such as Australia, Austria, Korea,
Spain, Sweden- they are the only services sub-sectors that display above-average productivity
growth.3 Borrowing the terminology of Baumol et al. (1985) I name these four services sub-
sectors progressive services and the remaining services sub-sectors stagnant services. Table 2.4
summarizes this categorization. In the remainder of the text I use these names to refer to high-
and low-productivity services sub-sectors.
3It is interesting to compare these four with the services sub-sector that comes closest to them, Public Admin-
istration. This services sub-sector displays an above-average productivity growth for only less than 30% of the
countries in my sample.
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One fundamental distinction between the progressive and stagnant services is the differences
in their final uses. While progressive services predominantly relate to the production side of the
economy -they provide intermediate and capital to other sectors-, stagnant services almost ex-
clusively bear upon the consumption side. For a typical stagnant services sub-sector, more than
90% of its output serves to final consumption. Business Services, and to a certain extent Real Es-
tate, differs from the rest of stagnant services in the sense that its output is used predominately
as intermediate and capital. This point may seem trivial, but differences in output use implicates
different results for aggregate productivity growth: Oulton (2001) shows that, as long as they
display non-negative productivity growth, the rise of services sub-sectors that are used as an
intermediate would actually increase aggregate productivity growth rate. The Business Services
sub-sector has an increasing share and relative price; however, the rise of this service category
does not reflect the complementarity among consumption goods, but rather a choice between
producing in-house (value added) and outsourcing (intermediate goods). Although throughout
the text I maintain the assumption that the different services sub-sectors only produce different
types of consumption goods, with respect to their implications for productivity growth I feel the
difference between Business Services and other stagnant services sub-sectors should be stressed.
As we shall see, structural change facts for the services sector look encouraging for the Oulton’s
argument.
How does my categorization of progressive and stagnant services sectors compare with other
splits used in the literature? I previously argue that because of the value-added approach I
opt for in this study, it is difficult to associate the modern/traditional services split favored
by Duarte and Restuccia (2019) with my categorization of the services sectors. Duernecker,
Herrendorf, and Valentinyi (2019) consider the progressive and stagnant services for the US.
Although they analyze the services sub-sectors at a more disaggregated level, matching their
services sub-sectors to more aggregate ones considered in this paper shows that their definition
of progressive/stagnant services sectors largely overlaps with mine. The only departure is the
Business Services: although this sub-sector belongs to the progressive services sector for the
US, it is hardly the case for other developed countries. As I argue previously, in terms of
the final output use the Business Services are closer to the progressive services, and the rise
of this sub-sector suggests different results for productivity growth. Under the light of this
evidence, treating this services sub-sector with other progressive services sub-sector is a natural
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Table 2.4: Categorization of Services Sub-Sectors
ISIC Rev. 3.1
Progressive Services Wholesale and Retail Trade
Transport and Storage
Post and Telecommunications
Financial Intermediation
Stagnant Services Hotels and Restaurants
Real Estate Activities
Renting of Machinery and Equipment and
Other Business Activities
Public Administration and National Defense;
Compulsory Social Security
Education
Health and Social Work
Other Community, Social, and Personal Services
69
starting point for comparative analysis of productivity. I therefore consider the split between
the progressive/business services sector and the remaining stagnant services sub-sectors in the
second part of the paper where I study productivity differences between the US and other
countries.
Appendix C provides additional robustness checks for the categorization of services sub-
sectors.
2.3.2 Structural Change within the Services Sector
My objective in this sub-section is to provide new structural change facts for developed countries
characterized by a high share of the services sector today. In other words, I want to extend the
findings on structural change among broad sectors of the economy (agriculture, industry, and
services) by Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2014), Kuznets (1971), and Maddison (1980)
to the services. In this regard, my motivation takes after Jorgenson and Timmer (2011). To
avoid repetition and maintain a certain format in reporting the results, I document individual
structural change facts only for the US. Appendix D also reports the results for 15 OECD
countries for which I have longer data series. I report the results only for nominal value added.4
Table 2.5: Productivity Growth Rates: US, 1947-2007
Progressive Stagnant
Aggregate Goods Services Services Services
1.93 2.86 1.35 3.12 0.33
Source: WORLD KLEMS and my calculations.
For a typical country the progressive services sector exhibits a productivity growth rate
comparable to the goods sector, sometimes even greater: Between 1970 and 2007 the median
ratio of the average productivity growth rate in the progressive services to that in the goods is
0.89 in my sample. Likewise, the productivity growth rate in the progressive services sector is
on average 2.29 percentage points greater than that in the stagnant services sector. Table 2.5
presents productivity growth rates of sectoral aggregates for the US between 1947 and 2007. In
addition, Figure 2.1 demonstrates the behavior of relative prices and quantities across sectors
4To properly aggregate productivity I have to account for both nominal value added and hours worked shares.
Since structural change facts for the services sector do not vary much with respect to these two measures, I decide
to concentrate on nominal value added.
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for the US in the post-WWII period. While the relative quantity of the progressive services
with respect to the stagnant services sector increases over time, its relative price decreases
monotonically. In terms of relative prices the progressive services and the goods sectors usually
exhibit close patterns; for the US, the relative price of the progressive services with respect to the
goods sector decreases since 1969. It is worth noting that the increase in the relative quantity
of the aggregate services with respect to the goods is mostly driven by the progressive services,
and it is the stagnant services that drive the relative price of total services against goods.
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To analyze structural change within the services over development, I estimate the following
equation for the share of progressive services within the aggregate services:
SharePro = βfe + β1logGDPi,t + β2(logGDP )
2
i,t + β3(logGDP )
3
i,t + it
where SharePro denotes the share of progressive services within total services, logGDPi,t the
log of GDP per capita in 2017 US dollars, and βfe country fixed effects. Table 2.6 shows the
results of this estimation; Figure 2.2 the predicted share net of country fixed effects.
Table 2.6: Share of Progressive Services within Total Services
β1 β2 β3 β1 β2 β3
logGDP .0385∗∗∗ .1133∗∗∗ .6414∗∗∗ −.0357∗∗∗ −.8371∗∗∗ 10.1117∗∗∗
(logGDP )2 - −.0072∗∗∗ −.1110∗∗∗ - .0396∗∗∗ −1.0608∗∗∗
(logGDP )3 - - .0051∗∗∗ - - .0367∗∗∗
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Number of observations 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254
R2 0.9792 0.9857 0.9875 0.1006 0.1904 0.2768
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at 1% confidence level.
From Figure 2.2 we observe that the share of progressive services within total services displays
a U-shaped pattern over development. Although panel structure of data allows us to derive this
regularity, surprisingly we do not observe it in the country-level time series data. For example
in the US, as shown in Figure 2.4.a, the share of progressive services remains remarkably stable
around 25− 33% of the aggregate value added in the post-WWII period. Since the share of the
rest of the services sector increases in the same period, this fact implies a declining share for
the progressive services within total services. This fact holds true for most of other developed
countries as well. For some countries we can only talk about an L-shaped pattern for the share
of progressive services within total services: It first declines and remains constant afterwards.
How can we reconcile panel and time-series evidence? As we shall see, transition dynamics
concerning structural change within the services are very slow: Even a country as developed
as the US may not display a U-shaped pattern we hope to see. Reassuringly, when we project
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Figure 2.2: Share of Progressive Services within Total Services for Panel Data
Notes: GDP per capita values in 2017 US Dollars are obtained from the Total Economy Database. The data
sources for sectoral shares are various releases of the WORLD KLEMS and OECD STAN. The black dots show
the fitted values net of country fixed effects for the equation estimated in the third column of Table 2.6. The
share refers to the nominal value added. Appendix C provides a list of country codes used in the figure.
structural change within the services it would be possible to observe the U-shaped pattern for
individual countries as well.
I also consider the share of the progressive/business services, since this services sub-group
constitutes high-productivity growth services sub-sectors in the US and this distinction would
be useful in the analysis for cross-country productivity differences. More formally, I estimate
the following equation:
SharePro/Business = βfe + β1logGDPi,t + β2(logGDP )
2
i,t + β3(logGDP )
3
i,t + it
where SharePro/Business now denotes the share of progressive/business services within total
services. Table 2.7 shows the results of this estimation; Figure 2.3 the predicted share net of
country fixed effects.
From Figure 2.3 we observe that the share of progressive/business services within total
services shows a shallow U-shaped pattern over development. Unlike the share of progressive
services, we can see this regularity for the country-level data as well: Figure 2.4.b shows it clearly
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Table 2.7: Share of Progressive/Business Services within Total Services
β1 β2 β3 β1 β2 β3
logGDP .0488∗∗∗ .1077∗∗∗ .4302∗∗∗ −.0086∗∗∗ −.4836∗∗∗ 8.8508∗∗∗
(logGDP )2 - −.0057∗∗∗ −.0691∗∗∗ - .0235∗∗∗ −.9146∗∗∗
(logGDP )3 - - .0031∗∗∗ - - .0313∗∗∗
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Number of observations 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254
R2 0.9866 0.9892 0.9897 0.0051 0.0328 0.0880
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at 1% confidence level.
Figure 2.3: Share of Progressive/Business Services within Total Services for Panel Data
Notes: GDP per capita values in 2017 US Dollars are obtained from the Total Economy Database. The data
sources for sectoral shares are various releases of the WORLD KLEMS and OECD STAN. The black dots show
the fitted values net of country fixed effects for the equation estimated in the third column of Table 2.7. The
share refers to the nominal value added. Appendix C provides a list of country codes used in the figure.
for the US. Even if it does not display a U-shaped pattern in other countries, it remains mostly
stable, which is mostly consistent with the shallow U-shaped pattern we observe in the panel
data.
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We can summarize structural change facts for the services sector in three items (Figure 2.4
illustrates these structural change facts for the US economy in the post-WWII period. Appendix
D provides figures for other developed countries.):
1. The share of the progressive services sector in aggregate value added is remarkably stable
around 25 − 33% of the aggregate value added. For some countries its share in total
services first declines and remains constant afterwards (L-shaped). The panel data implies
a U-shaped pattern for the share of progressive services within total services.
2. The share of the progressive/business services sector displays a shallow U-shaped pattern
within total services.
3. The share of stagnant services excluding business services and real estate levels off around
the 25− 30% of aggregate value added. The later rise of the services is mostly accounted
for by the services sub-sectors (business services and real estate activities) that produce
intermediate and capital goods.
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What do these results imply for aggregate productivity growth? While the aggregate share
of the goods sector decreases 0.21 percentage points in the US between 1947 and 2007, the
near-stable share of the progressive services, with their greater productivity growth rate than
the goods sector, deserves attention. Even a simple back-of-envelope analysis would reveal that
Baumol’s prediction of zero productivity growth would not happen in the presence of progressive
services, since it would ultimately bound the rise of stagnant services. Actually, my results would
later reveal that the near-stable share of the progressive services signifies a more fundamental
substitutability result between this sector and the rest of economy, consistent with the U-shaped
pattern suggested by panel-data evidence. Fact 1, therefore, establishes my principal argument
against Baumol’s cost disease.5
Fact 2 motivated Duernecker, Herrendorf, and Valentinyi (2019) to conclude that the future
effects of Baumol’s cost disease would be limited in the US. My results show that this structural
change fact could be extended to any developed country. The progressive/business services sector
almost entirely accounts for the productivity growth revival that lasted between the mid-1990’s
until 2007 in the US. As we shall see, this services group explains productivity growth revivals
during the same period for other countries as well. Productivity growth differences between the
US and other countries in the progressive/business services largely justify aggregate productivity
differences between them: Fact 2 constitutes the role played by structural change in shaping
these differences.
When Baumol (1967) refers to the services sub-sectors with zero-productivity growth he
specifically mentions the services sub-sectors that make up most of the stagnant services. Fact
3, however, shows that the share of this services group does not rise indefinitely: What propelled
the later rise of the services is the services sub-sectors that produce intermediate and capital
goods. As Oulton (2001) argues, such a rise signifies different results for productivity growth.
The ascent of business services and real estate activities in aggregate value added suggests
that the forces not considered by Baumol (1967), investment and intermediate demand, exert
considerable impacts on structural change.
5Mine is not the first study that shows the near-constant share of the progressive services sector. Baumol et
al. (1985) argue that the share of high-productivity growth service sub-sectors remains stable in aggregate value
added. Jorgenson and Timmer (2011) note that for developed countries the distribution services that make up
most of the progressive services sector displays a constant share in aggregate value added. I show this fact for
a longer time period and a larger set of countries. I should add that the reduced-form approach used in these
papers prevent them to fully appreciate the significance of their result.
78
It is usually of no interest to document the behavior of individual services sub-sectors. I
reserve an exception for the Public Administration, since it is the only two-digits services sub-
sector whose share exhibits a hump-shaped pattern within total services. At its highest point
it ranks the second largest services sub-sector after the Wholesale and Retail Trade, and these
facts remain remarkably robust across countries. Does increasing intermediate use in this sub-
sector rationalize its hump-shaped pattern? Analyzing this question and other implications of
these facts should be better left for future research: Recent work by Moro and Rachedi (2018)
advance in some of them.
2.3.3 Baumol’s Cost Disease in Advanced Countries
This sub-section evidences how much Baumol’s cost disease impacted aggregate productivity
growth in developed countries since 1970. Before reporting the results, I stress that the period
I consider, from 1970 to 2007, does not offer the most ideal conditions for analyzing Baumol’s
cost disease. One productivity growth slowdown in the beginning (and a second one after 2007),
and a productivity-growth revival starting in the mid-1990’s largely characterize the journey
of productivity in developed countries during this period. Some countries in my sample (for
example, Korea) also manifest strong transition dynamics. Nevertheless, having a sample of
countries with different development levels and productivity growth trajectories provides a wider
perspective for analyzing Baumol’s cost disease and enriches our analysis. It is comforting that
my results change little when the Great Stagnation period is also taken into account.
I use the methodology of Nordhaus (2008) to quantify Baumol’s cost disease. For each
country I fix the nominal value added and hours worked shares of each industry at their average
values between 1970 and 1971, and calculate the counterfactual productivity growth rate based
on these shares. The purpose of this accounting exercise is to answer the following question:
What would aggregate productivity growth be if there were no structural change in the economy
(i.e., sectoral shares remained unchanged)? More formally,
∆ lnLPcounterfactual =
[
Si,1971 + Si,1970
2
]
∆ lnLPi,t +
[
Si,1971 + Si,1970
2
− Hi,1971 +Hi,1970
2
]
∆ lnHEMPi,t
(2.3)
In aggregating labor productivity growth I concentrate upon 16 industries: five of these
(Agriculture, Mining, Total Manufacturing, Utilities, Construction) constitute the goods sector,
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while the remaining ones are the service sub-sectors mentioned before. Some works (Nordhaus
(2008) and Sun and Samaniego (2016)) show that structural change within the manufacturing
sector favors the industries with higher productivity growth. Although considering manufac-
turing at a more disaggregated level would do justice to this fact, because of the prominence I
give to the services sector in this research, I do not do it. Table 2.8 presents the results for the
counterfactuals.
Table 2.8 reveals that Baumol’s cost disease decreases productivity growth rate on average
0.30 percentage points between 1970 and 2007. This number, however, veils considerable dif-
ferences across countries. For countries with high productivity growth rates in the goods sector
but very low ones in the services (for example, Spain and Italy), Baumol’s cost disease exerts
greater impact. For countries characterized by strong transition dynamics (Korea, Finland),
it again reduces productivity growth more. Surprisingly, for the two richest countries in my
sample, Luxembourg and Norway, structural change impacts productivity growth positively.
When these two countries along with Portugal are removed from the sample, the decrease in
productivity growth rate on average becomes 0.41 percentage points.
Another way of seeing the effects of Baumol’s cost disease is to check how much it accounts
for the productivity growth slowdown between different periods. To do this exercise, for each
country I compare the actual productivity growth difference between 1970-1990 and 1990-2007
with the counterfactual one. If the data points a greater difference between these two periods,
I conclude that productivity growth slowdown is rationalized by Baumol’s cost disease. Table
2.9 summarizes the results. On average Baumol’s cost disease explains approximately 1/3 of
the productivity growth slowdown (without Greece, it is 24%). Interestingly, it accounts for
the productivity growth slowdowns most strongly for the countries characterized by transition
dynamics (Korea, Finland, Norway, and Austria). If one considers the median instead of the
mean, Baumol’s cost disease rationalizes only 16.86% of the productivity growth-slowdown.
Although still a considerable number, it does not represent the whole picture.
I repeat these exercises for countries where I have longer data series and extend the results
to 2015. Despite the fact that the sample now includes the Great Stagnantion, the results for
Baumol’s cost disease change slightly: It lessens productivity growth on average 0.40 percentage
points and explains on average only the 23.76% of the productivity growth slowdown. I refer to
the reader Appendix E for the country-level details of these results.
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Table 2.8: Counterfactual Aggregate Labor Productivity Growth Rates (1970-2007)
Country Data Counterfactual Difference
Australia 1.76 1.92 -0.17
Austria 2.50 2.98 -0.48
Belgium 2.43 2.86 -0.43
Canada 1.64 1.76 -0.12
Denmark 1.93 2.19 -0.26
Finland 2.96 3.58 -0.62
France 2.65 3.16 -0.51
Germany 2.53 2.75 -0.22
Greece 2.00 2.61 -0.61
Ireland 3.34 3.72 -0.38
Italy 1.81 2.40 -0.59
Japan 2.83 3.14 -0.31
Korea 5.18 5.70 -0.52
Luxembourg 2.49 1.74 0.75
Netherlands 2.20 2.45 -0.25
Norway 3.25 2.85 0.40
Portugal 3.22 3.07 0.16
Spain 2.11 2.83 -0.73
Sweden 1.91 2.22 -0.31
UK 1.71 2.34 -0.63
USA 1.72 2.00 -0.28
Max 5.18 5.70 0.75
Min 1.64 1.74 -0.73
Median 2.43 2.75 -0.31
Average 2.48 2.77 -0.29
Source: WORLD KLEMS, OECD STAN and my calculations. The results are for the data compatible with the
ISIC Rev.3.1.
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Table 2.9: Baumol’s Cost Disease and Productivity Growth Slowdown
Productivity Growth
Data Counterfactual Baumol’s Effect Baumol’s Effect
(in percentage)
1970-1990 1990-2007 Difference 1970-1990 1990-2007 Difference
Australia 1.65 1.88 0.23 1.81 2.06 0.26 -0.02
Austria 3.01 1.90 -1.11 3.25 2.66 -0.59 -0.53 47.27
Belgium 3.41 1.28 -2.13 3.69 1.88 -1.81 -0.32 15.21
Canada 1.62 1.68 0.06 1.69 1.84 0.15 -0.09
Denmark 2.64 1.10 -1.54 2.81 1.46 -1.35 -0.19 12.62
Finland 3.34 2.50 -0.84 3.75 3.37 -0.38 -0.46 54.50
France 3.43 1.73 -1.70 3.80 2.41 -1.39 -0.32 18.51
Germany 3.00 1.98 -1.03 3.08 2.37 -0.71 -0.32 31.31
Greece 2.17 1.80 -0.37 2.54 2.69 0.15 -0.52
Ireland 3.80 2.80 -1.00 4.08 3.29 -0.78 -0.22 21.99
Italy 2.48 1.02 -1.46 3.01 1.67 -1.34 -0.12 8.40
Japan 3.62 2.05 -1.57 3.91 2.38 -1.53 -0.04 2.60
Korea 5.96 4.26 -1.70 6.08 5.25 -0.83 -0.88 51.49
Luxembourg 3.67 1.10 -2.57 2.75 0.55 -2.20 -0.37 14.37
Netherlands 3.01 1.26 -1.75 3.19 1.59 -1.60 -0.16 8.94
Norway 3.96 2.42 -1.54 3.03 2.64 -0.39 -1.15 74.45
Portugal 4.07 2.17 -1.89 3.89 2.03 -1.86 -0.03 1.75
Spain 2.99 1.07 -1.91 3.63 1.89 -1.74 -0.17 9.10
Sweden 1.53 2.35 0.82 1.80 2.72 0.91 -0.09
UK 1.35 2.12 0.77 1.93 2.81 0.88 -0.10
USA 1.55 1.92 0.37 1.75 2.29 0.54 -0.17
Max 5.96 4.26 0.82 6.08 5.25 0.91 -0.02 139.70
Min 1.35 1.02 -2.57 1.69 0.55 -2.20 -1.15 1.75
Median 3.01 1.90 -1.46 3.08 2.37 -0.78 -0.19 16.86
Average 2.96 1.92 -1.04 3.12 2.37 -0.74 -0.30 32.01
Notes: The sources are WORLD KLEMS, OECD STAN and my calculations. The results are expressed for data
compatible with the ISIC Rev.3.1. Baumol’s Effect is calculated as the difference between actual productivity
growth rates difference between 1990-1970 and 2007-1990 and the counterfactual one for same periods. If the
counterfactual productivity growth rates did not show much difference across time-periods but the actual ones
did, we conclude that Baumol’s cost disease accounts for productivity-growth differences across time. The effect
of Baumol’s cost disease in percentage terms is only expressed for countries where there was a productivity growth
slowdown from 1990-1970 to 2007-1990.
From all these accounting exercises, it looks safe to conclude that Baumol’s cost disease
becomes less relevant over development: It accounts for a small share of the productivity growth
slowdown and does not depress aggregate productivity growth much. For the most-developed
countries in my sample, structural change actually enhances productivity growth. Besides,
Baumol’s cost disease rationalizes the productivity growth slowdowns largely for the countries
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characterized by strong transition dynamics. How can we explain these results? First, the
fact that services sector constitutes a considerable share of aggregate economy in developed
countries today makes standard structural change from goods to services less relevant in shaping
aggregate productivity. Second, not all services sub-sectors display low-productivity growth and
these progressive services sub-sectors arrest the stagnant services to seize the whole economy.
Third, the services sub-sectors that produce intermediate and capital goods become more seminal
within total services, making Baumol’s cost disease less compatible with structural change in
developed countries. As we shall see, structural change within the services sector differs starkly
from the one between the goods and services sectors. To hint the results to come, it would
suffice to say that while the complementarily singularizes the structural change from the goods
to the services sector, the structural change within the services behaves under the leverage of the
substitutability. This result would rationalize why Baumol’s cost disease becomes less relevant
over time, and would depress the aggregate productivity less in the future.
Which sector splits capture Baumol’s cost disease best? To find the best sector-split for
analyzing Baumol’s cost disease, I aggregate 16 industries under some categories and, instead
of 16 industries I fix nominal and hours worked shares of these sectoral categories at their
initial and end-year values (that is, 1970-1971 and 2006-2007) while sectoral productivity growth
rates remain as in the data. If the difference between the counterfactual productivity growth
rates based on these categories approximates well the difference between the counterfactual
productivity growth rate based on 16 industries, then I conclude that the sector split in question
can account well for Baumol’s cost disease. I consider the splits between goods/services, 5 goods
sub-sectors/services, goods/11 services sub-sectors, goods/progressive and stagnant services,
goods/progressive plus business and stagnant services. Table 2.10 summarizes the results of
these exercises.
The most striking result emerging from Table 2.10 is that structural change between the
goods and services sectors is no relevant in any country for analyzing Baumol’s cost disease.
For the countries characterized by structural change out of the agriculture and strong transition
dynamics (Korea, Greece, Spain), the split between the goods sub-sectors and services does a
good job at capturing Baumol’s cost disease. Overall, the split between goods and the services
sub-sectors performs the best. This result strongly supports the argument that structural change
within the services to a greater extent determines aggregate productivity in developed countries
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Table 2.10: Sector Splits for Baumol’s Cost Disease
Goods vs. Goods vs. 5 Goods Sub-sectors vs. Goods vs. Goods vs.
Services 11 Services Sub-sectors Services Progressive and Progressive/Business and
Stagnant Services Stagnant Services
Australia 0.24 0.01 0.22 0.03 0.18
Austria 0.26 0.06 0.20 0.11 0.21
Belgium 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.08
Canada 0.20 0.13 0.06 0.18 0.24
Denmark 0.08 0.25 0.17 0.31 0.16
Finland 0.34 0.11 0.23 0.14 0.34
France 0.34 0.13 0.21 0.19 0.30
Germany 0.18 0.01 0.20 0.09 0.17
Greece 0.44 0.30 0.14 0.38 0.40
Ireland 0.42 0.36 0.06 0.33 0.42
Italy 0.60 0.27 0.33 0.51 0.58
Japan 0.42 0.08 0.34 0.17 0.36
Korea 0.22 0.20 0.02 0.50 0.36
Luxembourg 0.88 0.04 0.92 0.89 1.02
Netherlands 0.17 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.22
Norway 1.73 2.18 0.45 2.10 1.87
Portugal 0.41 0.03 0.39 0.50 0.42
Spain 0.82 0.68 0.14 0.68 0.82
Sweden 0.16 0.05 0.20 0.00 0.14
UK 0.37 0.37 0.00 0.21 0.36
USA 0.44 0.23 0.21 0.32 0.55
Notes: The data sources are the WORLD KLEMS, OECD STAN and my calculations. The results are for the
data compatible with the ISIC Rev.3.1 and they cover between 1970 and 2007. I calculate two counterfactual
aggregate productivity growth rates: First, by fixing the nominal value added and hours worked shares of 16
industries at their initial values (1970 and 1971); second, by fixing same shares of same 16 industries at their end
values (2006 and 2007). The difference between these two counterfactual productivity growth rates is considered
as an alternative measure of Baumol’s cost disease in Nordhaus (2008). I apply the same procedure to the sectoral
aggregates considered in table. For example, in the sectoral split between the goods and 11 services sub-sectors
(third column) I consider the shares of the goods and 11 services sub-sectors at their initial and end values, and
keep productivity growth rates of in total 12 sub-sectors as in the data. This exercise differs from the previous one
in the sense while the disaggregation level for the services sector remains the same, the goods sector is now more
aggregated. My purpose in doing it is to see the relevancy of structural change within the services for Baumol’s
cost disease. I then calculate the difference between these two counterfactual productivity growth rates. If this
difference is close to the one obtained by considering all 16 industries, then I conclude that the sectoral split
captures well Baumol’s cost disease. The numbers in table represent the absolute value of the difference between
these two differences. The lower the numbers in the table the better the related sectoral split captures Baumol’s
cost disease.
today and reinforces the main message of Jorgenson and Timmer (2011, P.26): the classical tri-
chotomy among agriculture, manufacturing, and services has lost most of its relevance. Despite
the fact that my sample consists of countries at different stages of development, the split between
progressive and stagnant services sectors approximates well the structural change within the ser-
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vices sector. The split between progressive/business and stagnant services sectors, however, does
not show the same success. These results establish that to analyze Baumol’s cost disease I can
concentrate upon progressive and stagnant services sectors to approximate structural change
within the services sector. Consistent with this result, in the modelling part I disaggregate the
services sector between progressive and stagnant services.
2.3.4 Cross-Country Productivity Differences
This sub-section reports aggregate and sectoral productivity patterns for developed countries.
One might consider cross-country productivity differences and Baumol’s cost disease as two
independent research questions. However, as we shall see, aggregate productivity differences
between the US and other developed countries originate from the same structural change forces
that limit Baumol’s cost disease.
After a protracted catch-up starting with the end of the Second World War, developed
countries have been falling behind the US in terms of aggregate productivity. Especially for the
West European countries this fact is well documented (Inklaar, Timmer, and van Ark (2008),
Duarte and Restuccia (2010), Buiatti, Duarte, and Saenz (2018) among others). I would like
to contribute some additional facts to what has been already reported in this literature; these
facts I believe point that more fundamental forces of the economy shape productivity differences
between the US and other developed countries. Figure 2.5 shows aggregate relative productivity
levels for some selected countries.
1. These declines in relative aggregate productivity are not limited to the West European
countries. They happen globally, in countries as diverse as Canada, Australia, Japan,
Israel, and New Zealand.
2. The declines in relative aggregate productivity start at the same time (around 1995 and
1996) for almost all countries. For countries already in a declining trend (for example,
Canada and Switzerland), the fall accelerates after the mid-1990’s.
3. Despite the lackluster productivity growth performance of the US since 2007, developed
countries do not revert back to their course of catching-up. Ireland, Australia, and Iceland
stand out as notable and only exceptions.
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Figure 2.5: Relative Aggregate Productivity: Selected Countries
Notes: The data source is the Total Economy Database. The figures show the aggregate relative productivity
with respect to the US in each country. The dashed black horizontal line shows the value of 1.00.
Duarte and Restuccia (2010) already show that the services sector accounts for all these
declines in aggregate productivity. Yet approaching this result through the lens of the progres-
sive/business and stagnant services classification yields new insights. Between 1970 and 1995
all countries in my sample displayed a greater aggregate productivity growth rate than the US.
They retained the same performance in the stagnant services sector, but not much in the pro-
gressive/business services (Figure 2.6). Between 1995 and 2007, the differences between these
two services groups became more stark. In only one country, Korea, productivity in the pro-
gressive/business services sector grew greater than that in the US between 1995 and 2007; yet
many countries outstripped the US in the stagnant services in the same period (Figure 2.7).6
The declines in aggregate productivity befell after 1995 despite the fact that many countries
surpassed the US in the stagnant services sector.
As can be seen from Table 2.11 the US is not the only country that revived productivity
growth. The aggregate productivity growth rate increased in six other countries (Australia,
6Besides that, between 1995 and 2007 productivity in the progressive/business services sector grew 4.20 per-
centage points greater in the US than it did in the worst-performing country, but the productivity growth difference
between the US and the worst-performing country was just 1.17 percentage points in the stagnant services.
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Figure 2.6: Productivity Growth within the Services Sector, 1970-1995
Notes: The data sources are the WORLD KLEMS and OECD STAN. The dashed vertical line represents the
aggregate productivity growth rate in the US. The dashed horizontal line represents the sectoral productivity
growth rate in the US.
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Figure 2.7: Productivity Growth within the Services Sector, 1995-2007
Notes: The data sources are the WORLD KLEMS and OECD STAN. The dashed vertical line represents the
aggregate productivity growth rate in the US. The dashed horizontal line represents the sectoral productivity
growth rate in the US.
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Canada, Ireland, Greece, Sweden, UK) as well between 1995 and 2007. The US is also not the
only country that revived the productivity growth in the services: Norway and the six countries
that reanimated the aggregate productivity growth experienced a productivity growth resurgence
in the services sector. The productivity growth revivals in the services sector largely resulted
from these countries’ superior performances in the progressive/business services: Productivity
growth increased in this services sub-group for the Netherlands and all these seven countries
that reanimated aggregate productivity. It should be emphasized that all services sub-sectors
that make up the progressive/business services contribute to these productivity growth revivals.
As I note in Section 2.3.2, the relative productivity of the progressive/business services sector
with respect to the stagnant services increases monotonically and its share displays a shallow
U-shaped pattern within total services. Between 1995 and 2007, its share within the services at
least remained stable for most countries despite surge in its productivity growth rate.
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These facts pose some challenges to the most popular explanation of productivity differences
between the US and other developed countries. According to this explanation (which can be
found in Inklaar et al. (2008)) the US surpassed other countries because of advances in the
information and communications (IC) technologies. It is the market services sector, which
largely overlaps with my progressive/business services categorization, that benefitted most from
the ICT revolution and drove aggregate productivity differences between the US and other
developed countries. As I show, the US was not the only country that experienced a productivity
growth resurgence in that period, yet relative productivity with respect to the US deteriorated
in these countries as well. If the US rekindled productivity growth more strongly than other
countries between 1995 and 2007, then it is puzzling that these countries have not reverted to
their relative productivity levels after 2007 - when the US has performed very poorly in terms
of productivity growth. I also show that for the stagnant services sector that accounts for half
of the services, productivity growth in many countries exceeded that in the US between 1995
and 2007. As we shall see, a structural change perspective missing in the literature could shed
light on some of the puzzles stated here.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to the modeling and quantitative analyses of Baumol’s
cost disease and cross-country productivity differences. The models would help me to uncover
the roles played by the heterogeneity and structural change within the services sector in shaping
aggregate productivity.
2.4 Model for Baumol’s Cost Disease
In modelling household preferences, I separate the progressive services sector from other broad
sectors of the economy, and allow a different allocation problem for the composite of the goods
and stagnant services sectors. This choice is consistent with the structural change facts I docu-
ment where the progressive services sector has a decreasing relative price with respect to both
goods and stagnant services sectors, and its share in aggregate economy has been increasing. In
Appendix F I consider an alternative specification where I separate the goods sector from the
services and consider the allocation problem within the services sector independently. Although
the substitutability of the progressive services sector with rest of the economy would eventually
imply that this services sub-sector is also a substitute with the stagnant services, the transition
dynamics are overall very slow - as noted by Duernecker, Herrendorf, and Valentinyi (2019).
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The slow transition dynamics imply that for some countries considered in this study we may
not be able to derive a substitutability result for structural change within the services sector.
Because of this fact I consider both specifications, but report the results in the main body of
the text for more general one only.
2.4.1 Demand Side
The household preferences are represented by the non-homothetic CES preferences introduced
by Comin, Mestieri, and Lashkari (2018). The problem of the representative household consists
of two layers. In the outer layer, he chooses between the progressive services (p) and the com-
posite of the goods (g) and stagnant services (s) sectors. In the inner layer a different allocation
problem between the goods and stagnant services exists. He inelastically supplies labor and
receives a wage wt every period. I abstract from the intertemporal choice; therefore, the model
is static. The outer layer of the problem is:
min
Cpt,Crt
PptCpt + PrtCrt s.t. (α
1
σc
p C
σc−1
σc
pt + α
1
σc
r C
σc−1
σc
rt )
σc
σc−1 ≥ Ct
The composite of the goods and stagnant services sector is denoted as r. Cpt and Crt denote
the consumption quantities of the progressive services and composite good, Ct represents the
aggregate quantity index of consumption. αp ≥ 0 and αr ≥ 0 are the weights. σc ≥ 0 represents
the elasticity of substitution between the progressive services and the composite of the goods
and stagnant services.
The first-order conditions of this optimization problem yield the following results:
PrtCrt
PptCpt
=
αr
αp
[
Prt
Ppt
]1−σc
Pt = (αpP
1−σc
pt + αrP
1−σc
rt )
1
1−σc
where Pt represents the aggregate price index.
In the inner layer of the problem the representative household chooses allocations between
the goods g and stagnant services s:
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min
Cgt,Cst
PgtCgt + PstCst s.t. (α
1
σr
g C
g−1
σr
t C
σr−1
σr
gt + α
1
σr
s C
s−1
σr
t C
σr−1
σr
st )
σr
σr−1 ≥ Crt
Cgt and Cst denote the consumption quantities of the goods and stagnant services. αg ≥ 0 and
αs ≥ 0 are the weights in the utility index. σr ≥ 0 represents the elasticity of substitution
between the goods and stagnant services sectors. g > 0 and s > 0 govern persistent income
effects. In the case of g = s = 1, the utility function reduces to the CES.
The first-order conditions of the inner-layer optimization problem yield the following results:
PstCst
PgtCgt
=
αs
αg
[
Pst
Pgt
]1−σr
C
s−g
t
Prt = (αgC
g−1
t P
1−σr
gt + αsC
s−1
t P
1−σr
st )
1
1−σr
where Pt represents the price index for the composite good of the goods and stagnant services
sectors.
In the allocation problem between the progressive services and composite good, σc > 1
implies that the progressive services sector and the rest of the economy are the substitutes.
Since the relative price of the progressive services sector decreases with respect to both the
goods and stagnant services, in such a case the direction of structural change would be toward
the progressive services. For the allocation problem between the goods and stagnant services,
σr < 1 implies that goods and stagnant services are the complements, and is consistent with the
increasing (decreasing) share of the stagnant services (goods) in the aggregate economy. The
parameters that govern persistent income effects g, s could reinforce or work against the price
effects; the assumption that the stagnant services sector is a luxury with respect to the goods
(s > g) conforms to the intuition.
7 In such a case income effects would attenuate price effects.
2.4.2 Supply Side
The goods, progressive services, and stagnant services sectors constitute the aggregate economy.
Each sub-sector is characterized by linear production functions. Labor, measured in hours
7The literature show that the services is a luxury with respect to the goods (agriculture plus industry) (Her-
rendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013), Boppart (2014), and Comin, Mestieri, and Lashkari (2018)), but it does
not mean that the stagnant services is also luxury against the goods
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worked, is the only input used in the production. In the data the marginal product of labor
may not be equalized across the sectors (i.e., nominal labor productivity differs across sectors).
This puts a wedge between nominal value added and hours worked shares of a sector. Since in
aggregating productivity I should also account for the hours worked share of a sector, I introduce
wedges to capture this fact.
The problem of the firm is:
max
Lit
PitYit − wt(1 + τit)Lit where Yit = AitLit, i = g, p, s
τit represents the wedge for sector i at time t. Ait denotes the labor productivity for sector i at
time t. The first-order conditions of the firm’s problem give out the following result:
Pit
Pgt
=
(1 + τit)Agt
(1 + τgt)Ait
, i = p, s
By using the production functions, this result becomes
PitCit/Lit
PgtCgt/Lgt
=
(1 + τit)
(1 + τgt)
, i = p, s
This expression would help me to derive hours worked shares from the nominal value added
shares.
2.4.3 Market Equilibrium
The market clearing conditions are stated as follows:
Yit = Cit, i = g, p, s
1 = Lgt + Lpt + Lst
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2.5 Quantitative Analysis for Baumol’s Cost Disease
2.5.1 Calibration
To make precise predictions about the future of productivity growth, my model should match
closely the aggregate productivity in each country. To achieve this objective I calibrate the
country-specific model parameters. For each country I take sectoral productivity indexes {Agt, Apt, Ast}
and the price index for the goods sector {Pgt} from the data (so, the goods sector becomes a
numeraire). I derive the wedges as the ratio of nominal value added shares to hours worked
shares for each sector and normalize the wedge in the goods sector. That is,
V Ait/Lit
V Agt/Lgt
= (1 + τit), i = p, s
I obtain the prices {Ppt, Pst} from the first-order conditions of the firm’s problem:
Pit = (1 + τit)
wt
Ait
, i = p, s
wt = PgtAgt
For the remaining parameters {αp, αr, αg, αs, σc, σr, g, s}, I target relative nominal value added
shares of the progressive and stagnant services sectors with respect to the goods,
V Apt
V Agt
and
V Ast
V Agt
, by minimizing the sum of squared differences between data and model. More specifically,
the solution of the model implies the following relative nominal value added shares for
V Apt
V Agt
(the one for
V Ast
V Agt
is similar):
V Apt
V Agt
=
PptCpt
PgtCgt
=
PptCpt
PstCst
PstCst
PgtCgt
=
αpPpt
1−σc
αrPrt
1−σc + αpPpt1−σc
αs
αg
[
Pst
Pgt
]1−σr
C
s−g
t
where
Prt = (αgC
g−1
t P
1−σr
gt + αsC
s−1
t P
1−σr
st )
1
1−σr
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Ct = (α
1
σc
p C
σc−1
σc
pt + α
1
σc
r C
σc−1
σc
rt )
σc
σc−1
and
Crt = (α
1
σr
g C
g−1
σr
t C
σr−1
σr
gt + α
1
σr
s C
s−1
σr
t C
σr−1
σr
st )
σr
σr−1
The model-implied values for Prt, Crt, Ct and their close counterparts in the data differ from
each other. To solve this issue, I get Pgt, Pst, Cpt, Cgt, Cst from the data and substitute them
into the equations above. The solution-algorithm would start from some initial values of the
unknown parameters, and these would give some values for Prt, Crt, Ct. Since the objective of the
algorithm is to match as closely as possible the relative nominal value added shares, the initial
values for the unknown parameters would get updated until we converge to a solution. While
we converge to a solution, the algorithm would produce model-consistent values for Prt, Crt, Ct.
Since it cannot be identified separately, I normalize g = 1 so that it would satisfy the regularity
conditions. I also normalize αp = 1− αr and αg = 1− αs.
Table 2.12 shows the calibration results for the US. The parameters yield desired outcomes: The
progressive services sector and the rest of the economy (the goods and stagnant services sectors)
are the substitutes (σc > 1); the goods and stagnant services sectors are the complements
(σr < 1); the stagnant services sector is a luxury with respect to the goods (s − g > 0). It is
reassuring that the model fits well to the sectoral shares and tracks closely the aggregate labor
productivity for the US (Figure 82.).
Table 2.12: Calibration: US, 1947-2007
αg αs αp αr σc σr s − g
0.76 0.24 0.23 0.77 1.03 0.66 1.39
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Table 2.13 shows the results for other developed countries. For 11 out of 21 countries (more
than half), calibration results indicate a substitutability result between progressive services
sector and the rest of the economy. For countries where it is not the case, the elasticity of
substitution between progressive services and the rest of the economy (σc) remains close to one.
For these countries I re-calibrate the model by now targeting relative hours worked shares instead
of nominal value added. Table 2.14 shows the results of this exercise. It is reassuring that the
substitutability between progressive services and the rest of the economy is restored for some
countries. If it is not the case, σc either takes a value of 1 (so the aggregator is Cobb-Douglas), or
a value very close to 1. For these countries, I observe that the elasticity of substitution between
goods and stagnant services sectors takes a value greater than 1, implying a substitutability
result for the inner layer of household problem. Since stagnant services sector turns out to be a
luxury with respect to goods, the substitutability between stagnant services and goods sectors
would slow down structural change from goods to stagnant services.
Table 2.13: Calibration Results for Other Countries, 1970-2007
αg αs αp αr σc σr s − g
Australia 0.62 0.38 0.26 0.74 1.10 0.00 1.08
Austria 0.67 0.33 0.28 0.72 0.86 0.00 0.46
Belgium 0.61 0.39 0.25 0.75 1.19 0.19 2.72
Canada 0.52 0.48 0.23 0.77 1.17 0.00 0.07
Denmark 0.50 0.50 0.27 0.73 0.81 0.00 0.64
Finland 0.64 0.36 0.22 0.78 1.17 0.57 1.55
France 0.56 0.44 0.22 0.78 1.02 0.28 2.44
Germany 0.64 0.36 0.21 0.79 0.99 0.00 4.34
Greece 0.62 0.38 0.21 0.79 1.37 0.00 1.66
Ireland 0.63 0.37 0.22 0.78 1.06 0.90 0.74
Italy 0.61 0.39 0.25 0.75 0.49 0.00 0.00
Japan 0.63 0.37 0.25 0.75 1.24 0.00 -0.04
Korea 0.76 0.24 0.25 0.75 0.78 0.41 0.00
Luxembourg 0.76 0.24 0.25 0.75 0.68 1.70 8.85
Netherlands 0.54 0.46 0.23 0.77 0.92 1.21 3.60
Norway 0.59 0.41 0.33 0.67 0.29 0.62 1.28
Portugal 0.49 0.51 0.21 0.79 0.51 1.01 0.24
Spain 0.68 0.32 0.17 0.83 0.99 1.02 5.62
Sweden 0.52 0.48 0.25 0.75 0.77 0.43 0.79
UK 0.61 0.39 0.24 0.76 1.05 0.58 3.81
USA 0.48 0.52 0.23 0.77 1.04 0.54 2.36
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Table 2.14: Calibration Results for Other Countries (Hours Worked Shares), 1970-2007
αg αs αp αr σc σr s − g
Austria 0.71 0.29 0.22 0.78 1.33 0.00 0.90
Denmark 0.58 0.42 0.27 0.73 0.93 0.00 2.60
Germany 0.71 0.29 0.23 0.77 1.07 0.26 4.68
Italy 0.81 0.19 0.20 0.80 0.86 1.51 12.22
Korea 0.88 0.12 0.14 0.86 0.97 1.05 4.97
Luxembourg 0.60 0.40 0.31 0.69 1.34 0.00 0.13
Netherlands 0.57 0.43 0.27 0.73 1.00 0.92 2.92
Norway 0.64 0.36 0.29 0.71 0.94 0.61 2.36
Portugal 0.81 0.19 0.22 0.78 1.00 1.01 3.84
Spain 0.79 0.21 0.22 0.78 1.13 0.49 3.63
Sweden 0.58 0.42 0.21 0.79 0.99 1.35 5.94
In summary, calibrations bring forth two important results for structural change: Progressive
services and the rest of the economy are the substitutes; if not the case, the share of progressive
services remains mostly stable, and the substitutability between goods and stagnant services
sectors would slow down structural change from goods to stagnant services. In either case, a non-
trivial lower bound for the share of progressive services exists within total services, and this fact
would prevent stagnant services to seize the whole economy. It also rationalizes why Baumol’s
cost disease becomes less relevant over time and, as the simulations in the next sub-section
show, it would constitute the reason why the effects of Baumol’s cost disease on productivity
growth-slowdown would be limited in the future.
In Appendix G I present calibration and simulation results for an alternative model of Bau-
mol’s cost disease.
2.5.2 Simulations
To assess how structural change would affect aggregate productivity in the future, I simulate the
model for each country and project aggregate productivity growth rates under certain scenarios.
In the first set of simulations I assume that countries would preserve average productivity growth
rates of 1970-2007 in each sector and the wedges would be equal to their averages between 1970
and 2007. Consistent with the KLEMS methodology I aggregate productivity growth rates
across sectors as a Tornqvist index. Before presenting the results of these simulations, it would
be appropriate to consider how good the model matches the aggregate productivity in each
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country and accounts for productivity growth slowdown across different time-periods: Table
2.15 shows that the model does a good job in this regard.
Table 2.15: Aggregate Productivity Growth: Data vs. Model
Actual Model
1970-90 1990-2007 1970-90 1990-2007
Australia 1.63 1.86 1.65 1.88
Austria 3.00 1.88 3.01 1.90
Belgium 3.40 1.26 3.41 1.28
Canada 1.62 1.69 1.62 1.68
Denmark 2.58 1.10 2.64 1.10
Finland 3.36 2.49 3.34 2.50
France 3.45 1.73 3.43 1.73
Germany 3.01 1.94 3.00 1.98
Greece 2.27 1.93 2.17 1.80
Ireland 3.80 2.78 3.80 2.80
Italy 2.42 0.98 2.48 1.02
Japan 3.62 2.02 3.62 2.05
Korea 5.98 4.26 5.96 4.26
Luxembourg 3.69 0.89 3.67 1.10
Netherlands 2.99 1.25 3.01 1.26
Norway 4.00 2.40 3.96 2.42
Portugal 4.21 1.66 4.07 2.17
Spain 3.09 1.12 2.99 1.07
Sweden 1.49 2.37 1.53 2.35
UK 1.32 2.12 1.35 2.12
USA 1.55 1.92 1.55 1.92
Table 2.16 and Figure 2.9 present the simulation results. Apart from Australia, Italy, Japan,
and Sweden, the predicted effects of Baumol’s cost disease on productivity growth slowdown
between 2050-2029 and 2029-2009 would been smaller than the one observed between 2007-
1990 and 1990-1970.8 From 2029-2009 to 2050-2029 Baumol’s cost disease on average would
decrease aggregate productivity growth rate 0.16 percentage points - almost half of its effect
between 1990-1970 and 2007-1990. Figure 2.10 compares simulation results based on nominal
value added shares to those on hours worked shares: Although simulation results based on hours
worked shares suggest much lower values for productivity growth slowdown in some countries
(for example, Korea) in general they are comparable to the ones based on nominal value added
8Since my assumptions regarding the wedges require a quick adjustment, I omit 2008 and report results starting
from 2009.
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and not systematically greater or lower across countries.
Table 2.16: Simulation Results for Future Productivity Growth
Baumol’s Cost Disease Aggregate Productivity
Growth (Predicted) Difference
2007-1970 2029-2009 2050-2029 (Predicted Effect of
Baumol’s Cost Disease)
Australia -0.02 1.31 1.13 -0.18
Austria -0.53 1.73 1.53 -0.21
Belgium -0.32 1.80 1.67 -0.13
Canada -0.09 1.39 1.30 -0.08
Denmark -0.19 1.42 1.27 -0.15
Finland -0.46 2.08 1.85 -0.23
France -0.32 1.99 1.82 -0.17
Germany -0.32 2.20 2.10 -0.11
Greece -0.52 1.31 1.13 -0.18
Ireland -0.22 2.91 2.76 -0.15
Italy -0.12 1.16 0.95 -0.21
Japan -0.04 2.45 2.33 -0.12
Korea -0.88 3.33 2.72 -0.62
Luxembourg -0.37 3.15 3.14 -0.02
Netherlands -0.16 1.95 1.90 -0.04
Norway -1.15 2.71 2.45 -0.25
Portugal -0.03 2.80 2.79 -0.01
Spain -0.17 1.16 0.99 -0.18
Sweden -0.09 1.37 1.21 -0.16
UK -0.10 1.36 1.31 -0.05
USA -0.17 1.62 1.59 -0.03
Notes: The values for the effect of Baumol’s cost disease for the period of 1970-2007 are taken from the seventh
column of Table 7. The predicted effect of Baumol’s cost disease is calculated as the difference between the
productivity growth rate of the period 2029-2050 from that of the period 2009-2029.
Why would Baumol’s cost disease decline aggregate productivity growth less in the future?
For most countries considered in this study, structural change within the goods sector, from
agriculture to industry, has almost completed. Although structural change within the goods
sectors exerted considerable impacts on aggregate productivity growth for countries in transition
(Greece, Korea, Spain) in the past, it is not reasonable to expect that it would display the effects
in the same magnitude for the future. Similarly, structural change from the goods to services
sector has already advanced, and the services now comprises of more than 80% of the aggregate
economy in developed countries. For these countries, what happens inside the services sector
to a greater extent affects how aggregate productivity growth evolves. Within the services, the
progressive services sub-sector displays a much greater productivity growth than the stagnant
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Figure 2.9: Baumol’s Cost Disease Effect on Aggregate Productivity Growth
Notes: The bars show how much Baumol’s cost disease declined or would decline aggregate productivity growth
rate in each country.
services, and calibration results suggest that the progressive services and the rest of the economy
are the substitutes. This substitutability prevents the stagnant services to seize the entire
economy, therefore also prevents it to depress the aggregate productivity growth further. To see
this point, consider the projected share of the stagnant services sub-sector within total services
for the US in Figure 2.11: The increase in projected share of the stagnant services within total
services slows down over time, and the figure suggests that the share of this services sub-sector
would start to decline after a certain point.
For countries where calibrations do not suggest any substitutability between progressive
services and other sectors in the economy, my results concerning Baumol’s cost disease remain
intact: It is because the elasticity of substitution that governs the share of progressive services
against the rest of the economy stays around 1 (so, the share of progressive services remains
mostly stable), and the goods and stagnant services turn out to be the substitutes. These
facts are in line with the U-shaped pattern we document in Section 2.3.2, as also predicted by
simulations for individual countries. Having said that, transition dynamics concerning structural
change within the services sector are usually very slow. These slow transition dynamics could
also explain why previous works in the literature (for example, Baumol et al. (1985) and
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Figure 2.10: Comparison of Simulations Based on Nominal Value Added and Hours Worked
Shares
Notes: The bars show how much Baumol’s cost disease would decline aggregate productivity growth rate in each
country between 2050 and 2009.
Figure 2.11: Projected Share of the Stagnant Services within Total Services: USA
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Jorgenson and Timmer (2011)) did not consider the relative stability of progressive services
sector in aggregate economy could counteract Baumol’s cost disease.
In summary, the results present ample counter-evidence against zero-productivity growth
prediction of William Baumol: His dismal vision would not happen. Whether its implications
for cross-country productivity differences are confirmed by the data constitutes the next part of
this paper.
2.6 Model for Cross-Country Productivity Differences
This section introduces a simplified version of the model I consider for Baumol’s cost disease.
Instead of using non-homothetic CES, I model the household side to have the generalized Stone-
Geary preferences. This choice is motivated by certain facts. Although analyzing future effects
of Baumol’s cost disease requires a preference specification that can display persistent income
effects, it is not the case here. As we shall see, the generalized Stone-Geary preferences remain
adequate and tractable for the research question in hand. Because of the level of disaggregation
I need for this part of the analysis, other preferences used in the structural change literature
(PIGL and non-homothetic CES) may not be fully satisfactory.9
2.6.1 Demand Side
For the household side the model preserves standard assumptions of the literature. As a depar-
ture, I do not model the agriculture sector separately. This choice reflects some facts. First,
the literature (Duarte and Restuccia (2010)) has already demonstrated the role of this sector in
the catching-up process. Second, in the end years of this study (2007 or 2015), the share of this
sector is already very small in many countries (for example, in Belgium it accounts for less than
1% of total value added in 2015). Although for some countries the agriculture constitutes a high
share of the economy in the beginning year of this study (in Austria and Italy, for example, the
share of agriculture accounts for more than 20% of aggregate employment in 1970), the priority
I give to the services in this study requires subsuming this sector under the goods.
9Only under restrictive assumptions, PIGL, introduced by Boppart (2014), does have an extension to more
than two sectors. Since its aggregate consumption index does not have a natural counterpart in the data, the non-
homothetic CES requires a complicated calibration process which remains mostly problematic for disaggregation
level I need. For details see Alder, Boppart, and Mueller (2019).
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As in the previous part, the problem of the representative household consists of two layers. In
the outer layer, he chooses between the goods and services sectors. In the inner layer, he allocates
among the services sub-sectors. He inelastically supplies labor, only input in production. I
abstract from the intertemporal choice, the model does not feature capital good and remains
static. The problem of the representative household is:
max
Cgt,Cst
[ω
1

a Cgt
−1
 + ω
1

s (Cst + C¯s)
−1
 ]

−1 s.t. PgtCgt + PstCst = wt
where Cgt and Cst are the consumption of the goods and services sectors, and Pgt and Pst
represent their prices at time t.  ≥ 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the goods
and services. In the case where C¯s = 0 and  = 0, the utility function represents the Leontief
preferences; if  = 1, the aggregate consumption good index becomes Cobb-Douglas. A value of
 < 1 is often needed to account for structural change from the goods to services.
C¯s represents the luxury consumption requirement for the services. C¯s > 0 is a standard
assumption in the structural change literature to account for the later increase in the share of
services sector. I follow a pragmatic approach and do not introduce any positivity constraints
on C¯s. Although I consider only standard drivers of structural change here (income and price
effects), other factors -trade, investment and intermediate demands- as well can affect the share
of a sector. With no restrictions on C¯s, I aim to incorporate the forces not explicitly considered
in the model.
In the inner layer of the household problem I consider the allocation problem within the
services sector. I use a nested Stone-Geary utility specification. In other words, a different
elasticity of substitution governs structural change within the services. The problem of the
representative household for the services could be expressed as follows:
max
{Cit}111
11∑
i=11
[ω
1
η
i (Cit + C¯i)
η−1
η ]
η
η−1 s.t.
11∑
i=11
PitCit = PstCst
and Pst = [
11∑
i=1
ωiP
1−η
it ]
1
1−η
where η represents the elasticity of substitution among the services sub-sectors. C¯i represent
the income effects for the i = 1, ..., 11 the service sub-sectors. As in the case of the problem
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between the goods and services, I do not introduce any restrictions on C¯i. I expect them to
capture not-explicitly-considered forces that drive structural change within the services.
When C¯i = 0 for each i, for a value of η > 1 the direction of structural change within the
services will be from the low-productivity growth services sub-sectors to the high-productivity
growth ones. Since the high-productivity growth service sub-sectors for a country can be different
than ones I identify in this paper, a value of η greater than 1 does not necessarily mean that
structural change within the services favors the progressive services sector.
2.6.2 Supply Side
The economy consists of 11 services sub-sectors (i = 1, 2, ..., 11) and a sector that produces
the goods (g). Each sector is characterized by linear production functions. I allow the labor
productivity to change over time and take it exogenously. Because of the discrepancy between
the nominal value added and hours worked shares in the data, I also introduce the wedges. The
problem of the representative firm is:
max
Lit
PitYit − (1 + τit)wtLit where Yit = AitLit, i = g, 1, 2, ..., 11
Aggregate labor input is normalized to 1; therefore, Lit also represents the share of sector in
total employment. The first-order conditions of the firm’s problem renders the following results:
Pit
Pgt
=
(1 + τit)
(1 + τgt)
Agt
Ait
, i = 1, 2, ..., 11
Rearranging and imposing the market-clearing conditions yields:
PitCit/Lit
PgtCgt/Lgt
=
(1 + τit)
(1 + τgt)
, i = 1, 2, ..., 11
Again, this equation would help me to cover the hours worked shares from the nominal value
added shares.
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2.6.3 Market Equilibrium
The market clearing conditions are as follows:
Yit = Cit, i = g, 1, 2, ..., 11
1 = Lgt +
11∑
i=1
Lit
2.6.4 Characterization of Structural Change
To motivate the role of the elasticity of substitution in structural change, in what follows I report
the results without income effects. The first-order conditions of the representative household
together with the efficiency and market-clearing conditions yield the following result for the
allocation between the goods and services sectors:
PstCst
PgtCgt
=
ωs
ωg
[
Pgt
Pst
]−1
Without income effects, the first-order condition of the representative agent yields following
result for the allocation within the services:
PitCit
PjtCjt
=
ωi
ωj
[
Pjt
Pit
]η−1
A value of  ∈ [0, 1), all else equal, is a necessary condition for making the model consistent with
the structural change facts between the goods and services. Although the literature is abundant
with the estimates of , it is not the case for η. We cannot know a priori what kind of value for
η is needed to make the model consistent with structural change facts within the services.
When I combine market clearing conditions with allocation results between the goods and
services and those within the services, I obtain the following results for nominal value added
shares:
PgtCgt
PtCt
=
ωgP
1−
gt
(
1 + PstC¯s
)
ωgP
1−
gt + ωsP
1−
st
107
PstCst
PtCt
=
ωsP
1−
st
(
1 + PstC¯s
)
ωgP
1−
gt + ωsP
1−
st
− PstC¯s
PitCit
PstCst
=
ωiP
1−η
it
(
1 + P1tC¯1 + P2tC¯2 + ....+ P11tC¯11
)
ω1P
1−η
1t + ω2P
1−η
2t + .....+ ω11P
1−η
11t
− PitC¯i , i = 1, 2, ..., 11
Although the equations above refer to consumption value added shares, I follow a pragmatic
approach and match them to nominal value added shares.
2.7 Quantitative Analysis for Cross-Country Productivity Dif-
ferences
2.7.1 Calibration
To match data as closely as possible, I use the country-specific parameters and calibrate 27 pa-
rameters for each country. I derive the parameters that govern structural change within the ser-
vices sector {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5, ω6, ω7, ω8, ω9, ω10, ω11 η, C¯1, C¯2, C¯3, C¯4, C¯5, C¯6, C¯7, C¯8, C¯9, C¯10, C¯11}
by minimizing the sum of squared differences between the data and model. I target nominal
value added shares of each services sub-sector within the services. I derive the remaining pa-
rameters that govern structural change between the goods and services (that is, {ωg, ωs, , C¯s})
again by minimizing the sum of squared differences between the data and model. I target the
nominal value added share of services sector, therefore by construction I also match the nominal
value added share of the goods sector.
The model usually fits data very well (Figure 2.12 shows the model’s fit for the US - for
other countries I refer to the reader to Appendix I). As Table 2.17 demonstrates, the calibration
results I obtain for a more disaggregated level of the services sector with a different preference
specification mostly agree with the ones from the Baumol’s cost disease part. First, for all
countries except six of them the elasticity of substitution for the services sub-sectors (η) is
greater than that between the goods and services (). A standard structural change model
that mingles the services sub-sectors with other broad sectors of the economy under a uniform
elasticity of substitution would not capture this difference. Second, for all countries except seven
of them the elasticity of substitution governing structural change within the services is either
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Table 2.17: Calibration Results for the Elasticity of Substitution
η 
Australia 1.21 0.00
Austria 0.09 0.14
Belgium 2.19 0.19
Canada 0.94 0.00
Denmark 1.27 0.42
Finland 1.03 0.70
France 0.60 0.40
Germany 0.24 1.18
Greece 1.42 0.85
Ireland 1.50 0.43
Italy 0.76 0.56
Japan 1.14 0.00
Korea 1.13 0.96
Luxembourg 0.93 1.19
Netherlands 0.61 0.65
Norway 0.61 0.43
Portugal 0.99 1.86
Spain 1.34 0.32
Sweden 0.75 1.05
UK 1.17 0.48
USA 0.96 0.52
greater than 1 or slightly below it (more specifically, between 0.90 and 1). This result shows that
the substitutability characterizes structural change within the services sector, and its direction
from the low-productivity growth services sub-sectors to high-productivity growth ones.
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2.7.2 Counterfactuals
Concerning productivity growth in the services many developed countries could not catch-up
the US, so they also fall behind him in aggregate labor productivity. The counterfactuals
in this sub-section aim to characterize the most problematic services sub-sectors. To assess
the effect of individual services sub-sectors on aggregate relative productivity, I equate the
productivity growth in a certain sub-sector to its counterpart in the US between 1970-2007.
These counterfactuals, as shown in Table 2.18, show that the Wholesale and Retail Trade,
Financial Intermediation, and Business Services are the services sub-sectors that affect aggregate
relative productivity most, and confirm the results of Buiatti, Duarte and Saenz (2018) for a
larger set of countries. For all countries except for Norway, catching up the productivity growth
rate of the US in the Wholesale and Retail Trade increases aggregate relative productivity.
Although the share of this services sub-sector decreases monotonically within total services,
it still remains the largest services sub-sector for most countries in the period considered this
study. For all countries except for the UK, displaying the productivity growth rate of the US
in the Business Services pushes aggregate relative productivity upward. Only four countries
(Denmark, Finland, Korea, and Portugal) do not benefit from having the productivity growth
rate of the US in the Financial Intermediation. Considering that these service sub-sectors also
supply intermediates to other sectors, their total effect might be greater than what is suggested
here.
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The services sub-sectors that have the greatest impacts on aggregate relative productiv-
ity largely make up the progressive/business services sector. Since the split between progres-
sive/business and stagnant services sectors captures well the evolution of productivity in total
services for the US, this split looks like a natural choice for analyzing cross-country produc-
tivity differences. To this end, I calibrate the initial relative productivity levels for the pro-
gressive/business stagnant services and goods sectors in each country. Given the sectoral-level
productivity growth rates, I choose the initial levels of relative productivity for the sectors that
minimize the sum of squared differences between the model-implied levels of relative aggregate
productivity and the data, and obtain time series for sectoral relative productivity levels.10
Figure 2.13 shows how cross-country productivity differences behave differently across sec-
tors. Duarte and Restuccia (2010) already noted the catch-up in the goods sector, and the lack
of it in the services. My results also confirm that from 1970 to 2007 countries in each quintile
improved their relative productivity levels with respect to the US in the goods sector. But only
the countries in the first and fifth quintiles improved their relative productivity levels in the ser-
vices; all other quintiles declined. When I consider how the different services sub-groups behave,
however, a different picture emerges: The progressive/business and stagnant services sectors
display entirely different patterns. Although the countries in each quintile either improved or
kept constant their relative productivity levels in the stagnant services sector, there is no single
quintile that did not decline in the progressive/business services. These results show that only
a subset of the services, the progressive/business services sector, pushed all the declines in the
relative productivity levels for the services and aggregate economy. The results for the end year
of the study, 2007, point stark differences between different services sub-sectors: For a typical
country its relative productivity level with respect to the US in the progressive/business services
is usually half of that in the stagnant services sector (Figure 2.14).
To see these results in a context let’s reflect upon what Baumol’s cost disease implies for cross-
country productivity differences. Baumol’s cost disease would induce the stagnant services sector
to seize the whole services and whole economy, and under the assumption that productivity does
not grow in the stagnant services sector, aggregate productivity growth rate would gradually
10The aggregate productivity index implied by the WORLD KLEMS usually does not match well to the ag-
gregate productivity index in the Total Economy Database. To overcome this problem, I pick up the relative
productivity levels from the Total Economy Database for the initial year (1970) and extrapolate them with
productivity growth rates from the KLEMS. The constructed relative productivity indexes exhibit qualitatively
similar aggregate relative productivity patterns in the third part of this chapter.
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Figure 2.13: Sectoral Productivity Differences across Time
a. Goods (1970 vs. 2007) b. Services (1970 vs. 2007)
c. Progressive/Business Services (1970 vs. 2007) d. Stagnant Services (1970 vs. 2007)
Notes: I rank the countries with respect to their GDP per capita in 1970. The first quintile represents the
most-developed countries in 1970 in my sample, and the fifth quintile the least-developed ones in the same year.
The bars show the average relative productivity of each quintile with respect to the US in each sector. The
blue-colored bars show the average relative productivity level with respect to the US in 1970, the red-colored bars
those in 2007.
converge to zero. Since the US represents the technology frontier, aggregate productivity growth
rate would first decrease in the US and those in other countries would follow it with a lag.
Baumol’s cost disease implies that productivity differences between the US and other countries
should decline over time, and in the limit there should be absolute convergence - that is, all
countries would share same productivity level. The declines in relative aggregate productivity
that started in the second half of the 1990’s and continue well into 2015, therefore pose a challenge
to Baumol’s cost disease. As we shall see, the substitutability between the progressive/business
and stagnant services could actually solve this puzzle.
Duernecker, Herrendorf, and Valentinyi (2019) argue that the substitutability between the
progressive/business and stagnant services would limit Baumol’s cost disease for the US in the
future. For many countries I show that the progressive/business services sector also drives the
productivity growth resurgences that started in the second half of the 1990’s. To analyze how
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Figure 2.14: Progressive/Business vs. Stagnant Services in 2007
Notes: The blue-colored bars represent the average relative productivity level with respect to the US in the
progressive/business services for each quintile in 2007, the red-colored bars those in the stagnant services for the
same year.
progressive/business services shape cross-country productivity differences, I simplify the model
I consider in the previous part of this paper: Instead of 11 sub-sectors, the services sector would
comprise of only 2 sub-sectors, progressive/business and stagnant services. The aggregator for
the services sector in this case becomes:
Cst = [ω
1
η
p Cpt
η−1
η + ω
1
η
u (Cut + C¯u)
η−1
η ]
η
η−1
where the η now denotes the elasticity of substitution between the progressive/business and
stagnant services sectors. C¯u captures the income effects, but again I do not put any restrictions
on it. The stagnant services is denoted by u.
The results in Table 2.19 make a strong case in favor of the substitutability between the
progressive/business and stagnant services sectors. The elasticity of substitution that governs
structural change between these two services sub-sectors either exceeds 1 or takes a value close to
it.11 To see how the progressive/business services affects cross-country productivity differences,
11The reader should notice that if the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1 in the US, and lower than 1
in other countries, my argument about the role of structural change would still remain valid. I, however, do not
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Table 2.19: Elasticity of Substitution between the Progressive/Business and Stagnant Services
η 
Australia 0.51 0.00
Austria 1.04 0.21
Belgium 1.98 0.13
Canada 1.10 0.00
Denmark 1.02 0.12
Finland 1.12 0.73
France 0.97 0.38
Germany 1.47 0.28
Greece 0.77 0.77
Ireland 0.96 0.38
Italy 0.81 0.41
Japan 1.15 0.00
South Korea 0.75 1.01
Luxembourg 2.25 0.68
Netherlands 1.62 0.06
Norway 0.91 0.41
Portugal 0.00 2.99
Spain 1.23 0.20
Sweden 0.78 0.83
UK 1.06 0.00
US 1.21 0.50
I run a counterfactual where starting in 1995 productivity in the progressive/business services
would grow at such a rate that in the end year of the sample, 2007, the relative productivity
level in the progressive/business services sector would be equal to that in the stagnant services
in each country. Figures 2.15 and 2.16 show the results of these counterfactuals. As these graphs
demonstrate, the progressive/business services sector entirely accounts for almost all declines in
aggregate productivity. Countries would continue overtaking and even excelling the US in this
counterfactual, except for the growth miracles (Korea, Ireland, and Norway) and the countries
where low productivity growth inhere in every sector (Italy, Spain, and Greece).
How does structural change within the services sector relate to cross-country productivity
differences? Recall that the relative productivity index of the progressive/business services with
respect to stagnant services increases over time, and the share of progressive/business services
displays a shallow U-shaped pattern within total services. In the second half of the 1990’s,
want to make a case for such an unlikely result.
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Figure 2.15: The Catch-Up in the Progressive/Business Services
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Figure 2.16: The Catch-Up in the Progressive/Business Services - Continued
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productivity growth soared in the progressive/business services sector in many countries, but
somehow increased more in the US. Despite this productivity growth resurgence, the share
of progressive/business services either remained stable or increased within total services. If the
progressive/business and stagnant services were the complements, as Baumol’s cost disease would
predict, the share of the progressive/business services sub-sector within total services would have
been lowered by productivity growth resurgence in this services sub-sector. Depending on the
magnitudes of the elasticity of substitution and income effects, the decline in the share of the
progressive/business services might have been great enough to offset the productivity growth
resurgence in this services sub-sector. Therefore, we might not have observed productivity
growth resurgences in aggregate services and aggregate economy.12 To sum up, structural change
facts for the services sector that would limit Baumol’s cost disease in the US also advance
aggregate productivity differences between this country and others.
I analyze cross-country productivity differences also with the recent and revised data, and
update the results to 2015: Reassuringly, they remain robust (Figure 2.17). Although developed
countries either improved or maintained their relative productivity levels with respect to the US
in the stagnant services sector, their relative productivity levels all except for the first quartile
declined in the progressive/business services. The revised data, however, implies lesser relative
productivity differences between these two services groups in the end year of the sample (Figure
2.18). Smaller productivity differences between these services sub-groups indeed gives more role
to the structural change in shaping cross-country productivity differences. My results about the
substitutability between the progressive/business and stagnant services also remain intact with
the revised data, as it can be seen from Table 2.20.13
Sectoral productivity levels in the end year of the study, 2015, for all 40 countries I have
data show sectoral underpinnings of development (Figure 2.19). For example, what differentiates
Greece and Portugal, two countries in the fourth quintile, from Turkey, a country in the fifth
quintile, is their greater relative productivity in the goods sector. Countries in the fourth quin-
tile also display a greater relative productivity in the progressive/business services than those in
12For the US, a value as low as 0.50 for the elasticity of substitution between the progressive/business and
stagnant services is enough to offset the positive effects of the productivity growth resurgence in the progres-
sive/business services on aggregate productivity growth. The results of this counterfactual are available upon
request.
13I calibrate the model for every country I have data, but report the results only for the countries I have longer
series. For the 65% of the countries in my sample (in total, 40 countries) the calibration results show that the
progressive/business and stagnant services are the substitutes. These results are available upon request.
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Table 2.20: Elasticity of Substitution between the Progressive/Business and Stagnant Services
η 
Austria 1.04 0.27
Belgium 1.77 0.18
Denmark 1.05 0.87
Finland 0.77 0.71
France 0.79 0.51
Germany 1.71 0.00
Italy 0.62 0.64
Japan 1.09 0.00
Netherlands 1.69 0.23
Norway 0.94 0.56
Spain 1.07 0.57
UK 1.09 0.55
USA 1.01 0.46
the fifth quintile, but this difference is somehow minor with respect to that in the goods sector.
Productivity differences in the goods sector still determine the difference between the third and
fourth quintiles (say, between Italy/Spain and Greece/Portugal). The stagnant services sector
also contributes to these differences. After the third quintile, however, the services sector takes
charge. France and Germany, two countries in the second quintile, differ from Italy and Spain
because of their greater productivity levels in aggregate services. The progressive/business ser-
vices sector makes the greatest impact in differentiating the first quintile from the second. More
dramatically, concerning stagnant services, countries in the second quintile have comparable
relative productivity levels with respect to the countries in the first quintile: It is their lower
relative productivity levels in the progressive services that pull them back. As far as 2015 is
concerned, it looks that some developed countries have been catching up the frontier (the US) in
the progressive/stagnant services sector. Since my results make a strong case that this services
sub-group would become more dominant over time, it is not unreasonable to expect aggregate
productivity divergences not only between the US and other developed countries but also among
country groups in the future.
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Figure 2.17: Sectoral Productivity Differences across Time
a. Goods (1975 vs. 2015) b. Services (1975 vs. 2015)
c. Progressive/Business Services (1975 vs. 2015) d. Stagnant Services (1975 vs. 2015)
Notes: I rank the countries with respect to their GDP per capita in 1975. The first quintile represents the
most-developed countries in 1975 in my sample, and the fifth quintile the least-developed ones in the same year.
The bars show the average relative productivity of each quintile with respect to the US in each sector. The
blue-colored bars show the average relative productivity level with respect to the US in 1975, the red-colored bars
those in 2015.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper I identify common high- and low-productivity growth services sub-sectors across
countries, and analyze structural change facts for the services sector with respect to these classi-
fications. I concentrate upon the implications of structural change within the services sector for
Baumol’s cost disease and cross-country productivity differences. My results show that one can
identify common high- and low-productivity growth services sub-sectors across countries, and
theses definitions remain robust across time and data. Developed countries display same struc-
tural change characteristics in the services sector: The share of the progressive services sector
remains remarkably stable around 25 − 35% of aggregate economy and the substitutability of
this services sub-sector with the rest of the economy would sap Baumol’s cost disease for future
productivity growth.
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Figure 2.18: Progressive/Business vs. Stagnant Services in 2015
Notes: The blue-colored bars represent the average relative productivity level with respect to the US in the
progressive/business services for each quintile in 2015, the red-colored bars those in the stagnant services for the
same year.
I later analyze aggregate productivity differences between the US and other developed coun-
tries. My results show that the progressive/business services sector can entirely justify why
many developed countries have started falling behind the US in the second half of 1990’s after
a sustained catch-up with the end of the Second World War. My results point diverse relative
productivity patterns across the services sub-sectors: Although many developed countries have
caught up the US in the stagnant services sector, they have fallen behind him in the progres-
sive/business services. I argue that structural change within the services sector also contributes
to productivity differences between the US and other developed countries. Because of the substi-
tutability between these services sub-sectors, structural change favors the progressive/business
services where developed countries do not perform well against the US, and therefore prompts
the declines in aggregate relative productivity. Even if developed countries caught up the pro-
ductivity growth rate of the US in the progressive/business services sector from now on, their
relative productivity levels in aggregate services could still decline, because the share of the
progressive/business would increase within the aggregate services. This result implies that the
declines in aggregate relative productivity tend to persist over time, and justifies that many
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Figure 2.19: Sectoral Productivity Levels in 2015
Notes: I rank the countries with respect to their GDP per capita in 2015. The first quintile represents the most-
developed countries in 2015 in my sample, while and the fifth quintile the least-developed ones. The bars show
the average relative sectoral productivity levels with respect to the US in each quintile in 2015.
countries have not reverted back to their course of the catch-up despite lackluster productiv-
ity growth performance of the US after 2007. Any explanation that does not take into account
structural change would struggle to explain cross-country productivity differences after this time.
What accounts for productivity growth differences among the services sub-sectors? Since
the trade does not exert much influence on the services, and the stagnant services sector largely
comprises of the skill-intensive sub-units we should seek alternative explanations. Even among
the skill-intensive services sub-sectors, Finance and IC behave differently from others in terms
of productivity growth. These facts also pose challenges to the models that emphasize human
capital for economic growth.
Do productivity growth differences between the US and other developed countries reflect
the measurement problems? Since my results remain largely unchanged with the revised data,
I find difficult to give an affirmative answer to this question. If the US had actually not a low
productivity level in the stagnant services, then it means that productivity differences between
him and other developed countries are actually understated in the services sector. If developed
countries had relative productivity levels in the progressive/business services actually compa-
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rable to those in the stagnant services, then one should explain why mismeasurement were a
much problem in the part of the services where productivity is measured better. The indirect
evidence about cross-country productivity differences also support the findings of this paper.
It is well known that aggregate price level increases over development, and this fact is often
interpreted as the evidence of lower cross-country productivity differences in the services. But
this result reflects the final consumption expenditures in which the stagnant services accounts
for a large share of the services. Lastly, one should also consider that productivity growth in
the progressive/business services took off in other countries as well during the second-half of the
1990’s. So perhaps higher productivity growth performance of the US in this services sub-sector
does not reflect different measurement practices.
Why do other developed countries fail to catch up the US in the progressive/business services
sector? For the Wholesale and Retail Trade, the services sub-sector that has the greatest impact
on productivity differences, the land-size regulations could play a role (Guner, Ventura, and Xe,
2008). The fact that productivity growth took off in other developed countries as well suggests
that technology diffusion was active in the services. But since these countries did not achieve
productivity growth rates that the US achieved, it is of interest to consider why they could
not fully benefit from these new technologies. Does management account for these differences
(Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen, 2012)? Since the progressive/business services is more related
to the production side of the economy, intersectoral linkages could also affect aggregate produc-
tivity. Perhaps, the intermediate goods multiplier was so huge in every country that even small
productivity growth differences in some services sub-sectors were amplified through the linkages
and led to aggregate productivity differences between the US and other developed countries. Or
perhaps, the production structure were different in the US and productivity improvements in
certain services sub-sectors transmitted better to other services sub-sectors and pushed aggre-
gate productivity growth more in the US. These, and similar questions, should be better left for
future research.
The services sector now makes up 75− 80% of the GDP in developed countries and consists
of diverse sub-units. This papers shows that the heterogenous character of the services has
dramatic consequences for aggregate productivity. My message is clear: We can no longer
treat such a large and heterogeneous sector of the economy as unified. Especially, it does not
make sense to consider the progressive services sector, a services sub-sector so different from the
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rest of the services, together with other services sub-sectors. The databases that supply cross-
country sectoral data (the WORLD KLEMS, OECD STAN, 10-Sector Database) should take
into account these differences across services sub-sectors and supply longer and more detailed
data on them for a larger number of countries.
I hope structural change facts I present here could motivate some future research. As a start,
I want to emphasize that it is largely the stagnant services sub-sectors that drive the hours
worked differences between the US and European countries (Jorgenson and Timmer, 2011).
The rise of the business services sector could be linked to the global decline of the labor share
(Koh, Santaeulalila-Llopis, and Zheng, 2016). Concerning the composite intermediate good,
the complementarity between the goods and business services sectors, and the substitutability
among the services sub-sectors could shed light on productivity growth slowdowns and revivals
(Baqaee and Farhi, 2018). The positive correlation between nominal and real value added shares
of the services sector largely reflects a misspecification that does not separate the progressive
services from the rest of the services (Sen, 2019). Since the progressive/business services sector
mostly supplies intermediate and capital goods, it is of interest to consider how it affects business
cycles and inequality. Recent work by Bostanci (2019) takes a first step in the inequality part.
Structural change within the services sector does not conform to what Baumol’s cost disease
suggests. What stands behind this result? I argue that it is because that supply-side forces
overlooked by Baumol, intermediate and investment demands, to a greater extent affects struc-
tural change within the services. Although Ngai and Pissarides (2007) argue that the demand
for intermediate and capital goods could slow down structural change from the goods to ser-
vices, their claim does not withstand recent research: Investment value-added is not produced
by the industry alone and structural change within investment value-added favors the services
(Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2018)); the services sector becomes a net supplier of in-
termediate goods, and its share in aggregate intermediate input has been increasing (Grobovsek
(2018)). Therefore, the argument in Ngai and Pissarides (2007) looks more relevant to structural
change within the services than that between the goods and services sectors.14
Although I concentrate upon the OECD countries in this study, I believe that we need
to understand better the experience of developing countries. Whether they exhibit similar
14To their credit, Ngai and Pissarides (2007) also hypothesize that structural change within broad sectors could
favor high-productivity growth sub-sectors. It would not be wrong to argue that they somehow anticipate the
results in Duernecker, Herrendorf, and Valentinyi (2019).
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productivity-growth heterogeneity within the services, and implications of this heterogeneity for
their development trajectory should be topics to be explored in the future. Analyzing India’s
economy at more disaggregated level, Serrano-Quintero (2020) takes a first step in this direction.
My final message is for economic modeling. Structural change models should incorporate
supply-side forces, since they to a greater extent shape structural change within the services,
with significant consequences for aggregate productivity. Although recent research by Garcia-
Santana, Pijoan-Mas, and Villacorta (2016) and Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2018)
advance in integrating investment to structural change models, more works explicitly consider-
ing the network structure of the economy are needed. As Oulton (2001) argues, the rise of the
services sub-sectors that supply intermediate and capital goods implies different results for Bau-
mol’s cost disease. Recent research by Miranda-Pinto and Young (2019) shows a substitutability
result between value-added and intermediate inputs for the services sub-sectors, suggesting that
Oulton’s argument could be true.15 What these results, more flexible sectoral production func-
tions and changes in the input/output table imply for aggregate productivity should be fully
explored in the future. Such models could also bring forth new insights for the balanced-growth
facts.
15In the case where the elasticity of substitution between value added and intermediate inputs differs from
1, sectoral value added would not have any meaning. The results in Miranda-Pinto and Young (2019) are also
destructive for the sectoral value added functions commonly used in the structural change literature.
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Appendix B
Data Sources and Description
I analyze the data based on both the ISIC Rev.3.1 and ISIC Rev.4 classifications and report
the results for both. Doing separate analyses for two different data classifications might seem
overstretched, but this choice is motivated by certain concerns. My main objective in this study
is to report structural change facts on the services sector from a productivity-growth perspective
for the largest number of countries. Although the WORLD KLEMS, together with the OECD
STAN, provide sectoral data compatible with the ISIC Rev.4 classification for as much as 40
countries, their data coverage for most countries starts after 1995. Unfortunately, such a time
coverage would not help me to fulfill what I want to do in this study. Although I can go back
as far as 1970 for 13 countries, it reduces my country coverage to a core of West European
countries, limiting the extent of this research. One particular solution could be to extrapolate
the data by combining different releases of the WORLD KLEMS. Unfortunately, the data made
available by the WORLD KLEMS are usually not detailed enough to make a precise mapping
between two different data classifications. This is particularly a concern for the Information
and Communication sub-sector in the services. This novel services sub-sector introduced by the
ISIC Rev.4 classification relates to various industries in the ISIC Rev 3.1., even the ones in the
manufacturing. The productivity patterns implied by these two different sector classifications
also differ from each other. To associate my research more closely with the existing studies
in the literature and ensure robustness, I decide to analyze the data compatible with both
classifications.
For the data compatible with the ISIC Rev. 3.1 I mostly rely on the March 2011 update of
the November 2009 release of the EU KLEMS. I omit the categories ”Private Households with
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Employed Persons” and ”Extra-Territorial Organization and Bodies”, because of the lack of data
for most countries. The following gives a list of 21 countries considered in this study: Australia
(1970-2007, EU KLEMS), Austria (1970-2007, EU KLEMS), Belgium (1970-2007, EU KLEMS),
Canada (1961-2007, WORLD KLEMS), Denmark (1970-2007, EU KLEMS), Finland (1970-2007,
EU KLEMS), France (1970-2007, EU KLEMS), Germany (1970-2007, EU KLEMS), Greece
(1970-2007, EU KLEMS), Ireland (1970-2007, EU KLEMS), Italy (1970-2007, EU KLEMS),
Japan (1973-2007, EU KLEMS), Korea (1970-2007, EU KLEMS), Luxembourg (1970-2007, EU
KLEMS), Netherlands (1970-2007, EU KLEMS), Norway (1970-2007, OECD STAN), Portugal
(1970-2006, EU KLEMS), Spain (1970-2007, EU KLEMS), Sweden (1970-2007, EU KLEMS),
UK (1970-2007, EU KLEMS), USA (1947-2007, WORLD KLEMS). The years in the brackets
show the years I can compute sectoral productivity growth rates.
For the data compatible with ISIC Rev.4 I can extend time coverage of the study as far as to
2015, but do a longer term analysis (roughly, from 1970 to 2015) only for 13 countries. Combining
the WORLD KLEMS and OECD STAN increases country coverage to 40, and countries as
diverse as Mexico, Costa Rica, and the New Zealand are now included to the study. But for the
newly-added countries I can do a detailed productivity analysis for the period between 1995 and
2015 only, and for some the time coverage is even shorter. I should also note the unbalanced
nature of the OECD STAN database leads to the detailed analyses for some countries in some
parts of the paper, but not so detailed analyses in others. This might be of concern, but in the
end I decide to utilize available data as the most efficiently as possible.
For the data compatible with the ISIC Rev.4 my main source is the September 2017 release
of the EU KLEMS. I also benefit from the OECD STAN though. I omit the categories ”Activi-
ties of Households as Employers; Undifferentiated Goods- and Services-Producing Activities of
Households for Own Use” and ”Activities of Extraterritorial Organizations and Bodies” for the
lack of data for most countries. The following gives a list of the countries considered in this study.
Australia (1989-2015, OECD STAN), Austria (1970-2015, EU KLEMS), Belgium (1970-2015,
EU KLEMS), Bulgaria (2000-2015, EU KLEMS), Canada (1997-2015, OECD STAN), Chile
(2014-2015, OECD STAN), Costa Rica (1991-2015, OECD STAN), Croatia (2008-2015, EU
KLEMS), Czech Republic (1995-2015, EU KLEMS), Denmark (1970-2015, OECD STAN), Es-
tonia (1995-2015, EU KLEMS), Finland (1975-2015, OECD STAN), France (1970-2015, OECD
STAN), Germany (1970-2015, EU KLEMS), Greece (1995-2015, EU KLEMS), Hungary (1995-
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2015, OECD STAN), Iceland (1997-2015, OECD STAN), Ireland (1998-2015, OECD STAN),
Israel (1995-2015, OECD STAN), Italy (1970-2015, EU KLEMS), Japan (1973-2015, OECD
STAN), Korea (2004-2015, OECD STAN), Latvia (2000-2015, EU KLEMS), Lithuania (1995-
2015, EU KLEMS), Luxembourg (1995-2015, EU KLEMS), Mexico (1993-2015, OECD STAN),
Netherlands (1970-2015, EU KLEMS), New Zealand (2000-2015, OECD STAN), Norway (1970-
2015, OECD STAN), Poland (2000-2015, EU KLEMS), Portugal (1995-2015, EU KLEMS),
Romania (1995-2015, EU KLEMS), Slovakia (1995-2015, EU KLEMS), Slovenia (1995-2015,
EU KLEMS), Spain (1970-2015, EU KLEMS), Sweden (1993-2015, OECD STAN), Switzerland
(1997-2015, OECD STAN), Turkey (2004-2015, OECD STAN), UK (1970-2015, EU KLEMS),
USA (1970-2015, EU KLEMS). The years in the brackets show the years I can compute sectoral
productivity growth rates.
In the OECD STAN the hours worked data is usually shorter than the number of people
engaged data. For these countries I use the method in Duarte and Restuccia (2010). I calculate
the ratio of the hours worked share to the employment share for each sector. I take the average of
these ratios and use the employment data to extrapolate the hours worked. If the hours worked
data is not available for a country, I use the total hours worked data from the Total Economy
Database and obtain the sectoral hours worked data by applying the employment shares.
For Canada, Chile, Japan, Israel, New Zealand, and Switzerland, the productivity growth
rates for the Arts, Entertainment and Other Recreation sector include the Other Services sector.
For Israel: Accommodation and Food includes the Wholesale and Retail Trade; Public Admin-
istration includes Health and Education. For New Zealand: Real Estate Activities includes
Business Services; Public Administration includes Health and Education.
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Appendix C
Robustness Checks on the
Categorization of Services
Sub-sectors
In this appendix I present additional robustness checks on the categorization of services sub-
sectors. First, I consider whether my classification of progressive and stagnant services remains
robust for two countries that I can calculate labor productivity growth rates for a longer period.
Second, I redo the categorization of services sub-sectors for recently available data compatible
with ISIC Rev.4.
For two countries, Canada and the US, I can calculate labor productivity growth rates for
a longer period (for Canada, since 1961 and for the US, since 1947). Table C.1 displays the
results: It is assuring that the categorization of high-productivity growth services sub-sectors
remains the same.
To provide additional checks for the categorization of the services sectors I present the results
for the data compatible with the ISIC Rev.4 classification system which was introduced to make
the national accounts compatible with the rise of the services sector. The services categories in
the ISIC Rev.4 usually overlap with the ones in the ISIC Rev.3.1, but the ISIC Rev.4 introduces
Information and Communication; and Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation as two additional
services sub-sectors. Table C.2 displays the list of services sub-sectors according to the ISIC
Rev.4.
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Tables C.3-C.4 show productivity growth rates of the services sub-sectors and whether a
services sub-sector displays a productivity growth rate greater than the aggregate services re-
spectively. Information and Communication now replaces Post and Telecommunications, and it
is ensuring that our definition of high-productivity growth services sub-sectors remains robust,
despite the fact that the data now also includes the Great Stagnation period. The number of
services sub-sectors that display above-average productivity growth but differs from any of the
four high-productivity services sub-sectors I identify also decreases when the period is longer,
providing additional support to my categorization. Tables C.5-C.6 presents information about
productivity growth rates of the services sub-sectors and whether a services sub-sector displays
an above-average productivity growth for any country I have data. For the newly-added coun-
tries on the list the time coverage is shorter and varies considerably across countries - one
should then beware the noisy information supplied by this table. Despite the noise, the picture
emerged from this table is again clear: Four services sub-sectors (Wholesale and Retail Trade;
Transportation and Storage; Information and Communication; Finance and Insurance) display
a higher productivity growth rate than others and the set of these high-productivity growth
services sub-sectors remains robust across countries and time. Table C.7 presents productivity
growth rates for sectoral aggregates for any country I have data and Table C.8 summarizes the
categorization of services sub-sectors. Last, Table C.9 presents country codes used in the Figures
2.2-2.3 in the main body of the text.
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Table C.2: List of Services Sub-Sectors According to the ISIC Rev.4
ISIC Code Name of services sub-Sector
G Wholesale and Retail Trade
H Transportation and Storage
I Accommodation and Food Service Activities
J Information and Communication
K Financial and Insurance Activities
L Real Estate Activities
M-N Professional, Scientific, Technical, Administrative and Support Service Activities
O Public Administration and National Defense; Compulsory Social Security
P Education
Q Health and Social Work
R Arts, Entertainment and Recreation
S Other Service Activities
Source: WORLD KLEMS
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Table C.8: Categorization of Services Sub-Sectors
ISIC Rev.4
Progressive Services Wholesale and Retail Trade
Transportation and Storage
Information and Communication
Financial and Insurance Activities
Stagnant Services Accommodation and Food
Real Estate Activities
Professional, Scientific, Technical,
Administrative and Support Service Activities
Public Administration and National Defense;
Compulsory Social Security
Education
Health and Social Work
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation
Other Service Activities
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Table C.9: Country Codes
Australia AUS Japan JAP
Austria AUT Korea KOR
Belgium BEL Latvia LVA
Bulgaria BGR Lithuania LTU
Canada CAN Luxembourg LUX
Chile CHL Mexico MEX
Costa Rica CRI Netherlands NLD
Croatia HRV New Zealand NZL
Czech Republic CZE Norway NOR
Denmark DNK Poland POL
Estonia EST Portugal POR
Finland FIN Romania ROU
France FRA Slovakia SVK
Germany DEU Slovenia SVN
Greece GRC Spain ESP
Hungary HUN Sweden SWE
Iceland ISL Switzerland CHE
Ireland IRE Turkey TUR
Israel ISR United Kingdom GBR
Italy ITA United States USA
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Appendix D
Structural Change Facts for the
Services in Other Developed
Countries
Figure D.1 shows the share of progressive services in aggregate value added for developed coun-
tries where I have longer data series. Figure D.2 repeats it for the share of progressive/business
services within total services; Figure D.3 compares the shares of stagnant services and business
services/real estate within aggregate economy.
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Figure D.1: Progressive Services, Other Countries
Notes: The data sources are the WORLD KLEMS and OECD STAN. The figures refer to the nominal value-added
share of the progressive services sector in aggregate economy.
Figure D.2: Progressive/Business Services, Other Countries
Notes: The data sources are the WORLD KLEMS and OECD STAN. The figures refer to the nominal value-added
share of the progressive/business services sector in the aggregate services.
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Figure D.3: Stagnant Services vs. Business Services/Real Estate Activities, Other Countries
Notes: The data sources are the WORLD KLEMS and OECD STAN. The figures compare the nominal value-
added share of the stagnant services sector excluding business services and real estate with that of the composite
of business services and real estate in aggregate economy. The green line shows the share of the stagnant services
sector excluding business services and real estate; the pink line that of the composite of business services and real
estate.
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Appendix E
Baumol’s Cost Disease Between 1970
and 2015
This sub-section extends the results of accounting exercises for Baumol’s cost disease for data
compatible with the ISIC Rev.4. Table E.1 compares actual and counterfactual aggregate pro-
ductivity growth rates. Table E.2 shows how much Baumol’s cost disease accounts for the
productivity growth slowdowns from 1995-1970 to 2015-1995. Table E.3 shows which sectoral
splits capture Baumol’s cost disease better.
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Table E.1: Counterfactual Aggregate Labor Productivity Growth Rates (1970-2015)
Country Data Counterfactual Difference
Austria 2.34 2.77 -0.44
Belgium 2.23 2.81 -0.58
Denmark 2.06 2.54 -0.48
Finland 2.36 2.72 -0.37
France 2.18 2.70 -0.52
Germany 2.20 2.39 -0.19
Italy 1.55 2.07 -0.52
Japan 2.11 2.45 -0.33
Netherlands 2.01 2.30 -0.29
Norway 2.31 2.63 -0.32
Spain 1.87 2.63 -0.76
UK 2.07 2.25 -0.17
USA 1.67 1.89 -0.21
Max 2.36 2.81 -0.17
Min 1.55 1.89 -0.76
Median 2.11 2.54 -0.37
Average 2.07 2.47 -0.40
Notes: The sources are the WORLD KLEMS, OECD STAN and my calculations. The results are for the
data compatible with the ISIC Rev.4. The counterfactual aggregate productivity growth rates are calculated by
Nordhaus (2008) method discussed in the main body of the text.
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Table E.2: Baumol’s Cost Disease and Productivity Growth Slowdown
Productivity Growth
Data Counterfactual Baumol’s Effect Baumol’s Effect
(in percentage)
1970-1995 1995-2015 Difference 1970-1995 1995-2015 Difference
Austria 3.03 1.61 -1.42 3.26 2.27 -0.99 -0.44 30.69
Belgium 3.29 1.11 -2.18 3.60 1.98 -1.63 -0.55 25.31
Denmark 2.85 1.24 -1.60 3.08 1.97 -1.10 -0.50 31.11
Finland 3.33 1.38 -1.95 3.53 1.91 -1.62 -0.33 16.84
France 3.11 1.20 -1.91 3.52 1.84 -1.69 -0.22 11.56
Germany 2.85 1.52 -1.33 2.89 1.88 -1.01 -0.32 24.36
Italy 2.27 0.80 -1.47 2.82 1.29 -1.53 0.06
Japan 2.98 1.25 -1.73 3.16 1.73 -1.43 -0.30 17.33
Netherlands 2.72 1.26 -1.46 2.86 1.71 -1.15 -0.31 21.13
Norway 3.53 1.04 -2.49 3.04 2.21 -0.83 -1.66 66.63
Spain 2.83 0.86 -1.97 3.58 1.64 -1.94 -0.03 1.45
UK 1.83 2.32 0.49 2.23 2.27 0.04 0.45
USA 1.78 1.56 -0.23 1.98 1.79 -0.19 -0.03 14.99
Max 3.53 2.32 0.49 3.60 2.27 0.04 0.45 66.63
Min 1.78 0.80 -2.49 1.98 1.29 -1.94 -1.66 1.45
Median 2.85 1.25 -1.60 3.08 1.88 -1.15 -0.31 21.13
Average 2.80 1.32 -1.48 3.04 1.88 -1.16 -0.32 23.76
Notes: The sources are the WORLD KLEMS, OECD STAN and my calculations. The results are for the data
compatible with the ISIC Rev.4. Baumol’s Effect is calculated as the difference between actual productivity
growth rates difference between 1995-1970 and 2015-1995 and the counterfactual one for same periods. If the
counterfactual productivity growth rates did not show much difference across time periods but the actual ones
did, we conclude that Baumol’s cost disease accounts for productivity-growth differences across time. The effect of
Baumol’s cost disease in percentage terms is only expressed for the countries where Baumol’s cost disease exerted
a negative effect on productivity growth from 1995-1970 to 2015-1995.
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Table E.3: Sector Splits for Baumol’s Cost Disease
Goods vs. Goods vs. 5 Goods Sub-sectors vs. Goods vs. Goods vs.
Services 12 Services Sub-sectors Services Progressive and Progressive/Business and
Stagnant Services Stagnant Services
Austria 0.35 0.18 0.14 0.22 0.28
Belgium 0.41 0.09 0.32 0.18 0.38
Denmark 0.18 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.13
Finland 0.27 0.10 0.20 0.07 0.22
France 0.37 0.16 0.19 0.24 0.32
Germany 0.20 0.03 0.23 0.07 0.18
Italy 0.52 0.16 0.35 0.43 0.49
Japan 0.30 0.07 0.23 0.13 0.24
Netherlands 0.29 0.08 0.21 0.15 0.35
Norway 0.67 1.12 0.45 1.01 0.81
Spain 0.55 0.31 0.26 0.37 0.52
UK 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.04 0.07
USA 0.34 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.37
Notes: The data sources are the WORLD KLEMS, OECD STAN and my calculations. The results are for data
compatible with the ISIC Rev.4 between 1970 and 2015. I calculate two counterfactual aggregate productivity
growth rates: First, by fixing the nominal value added and hours worked shares of 17 industries at their initial
values (1970 and 1971); second, by fixing same shares of same 17 industries at their end values (2014 and 2015).
The difference between these two counterfactual productivity growth rates is considered as an alternative measure
of Baumol’s cost disease in Nordhaus (2008). I apply the same procedure to the sectoral aggregates considered in
table. For example, in the sectoral split between the goods and 12 services sub-sectors (third column) I consider
the shares of the goods and 12 services sub-sectors at their initial and end values, and keep productivity growth
rates of in total 13 sub-sectors as in the data. This exercise differs from the previous one in the sense while
the disaggregation level for the services sector remains the same, the goods sector is now more aggregated. My
purpose in doing it is to see the relevancy of structural change within the services for Baumol’s cost disease. I
then calculate the difference between these two counterfactual productivity growth rates. If this difference is close
to the one obtained by considering all 17 industries, then I conclude that the sectoral split captures well Baumol’s
cost disease. The numbers in table represent the absolute value of the difference between these two differences.
The lower the numbers in the table the better the related sectoral split captures Baumol’s cost disease.
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Appendix F
An Alternative Model for Baumol’s
Cost Disease
This appendix presents an alternative model for Baumol’s cost disease. Differently from the
model presented in the main body of the text, the outer layer of the consumer problem represents
the allocation between the goods and services, and in the inner layer I concentrate upon the
allocation problem between progressive and stagnant services. More formally, the allocation
problem for the outer layer now becomes:
min
Cgt,Cst
PgtCgt + PstCst s.t. (α
1
σc
g C
g−1
σc
t C
σc−1
σc
gt + α
1
σc
s C
s−1
σc
t C
σc−1
σc
st )
σc
σc−1 ≥ Ct
Now s denotes the services sector. The inner layer now represents the allocation problem between
the progressive and stagnant services sectors:
min
Cpt,Cut
PptCpt + PutCut s.t. (α
1
σs
p C
p−1
σs
t C
σs−1
σs
pt + α
1
σs
u C
u−1
σs
t C
σs−1
σs
ut )
σs
σs−1 ≥ Cst
Now u denotes the stagnant services and Cst becomes the consumption quantity for the services
sector.
The first-order conditions for the outer layer yield the following results:
PgtCgt
PstCst
=
αg
αs
[
Pgt
Pst
]1−σc
C
g−s
t
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Pt = (αgC
g−1
t P
1−σc
gt + αsC
s−1
t P
1−σc
st )
1
1−σc
where Pt represents model-implied aggregate price index.
Similarly, the first-order conditions of the inner-layer optimization problem yield the following
results:
PptCpt
PutCut
=
αp
αu
[
Ppt
Put
]1−σs
C
p−u
t
Pst = (αpC
p−1
t P
1−σs
pt + αuC
u−1
t P
1−σs
ut )
1
1−σs
where Pst represents model-implied price index for the services sector.
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Appendix G
Quantitative Analysis for the
Alternative Model of Baumol’s Cost
Disease
To calibrate the alternative model of Baumol’s cost disease in addition to the relative nominal
value added shares of
V Agt
V Ast
and
V Apt
V Aut
, I also target the relative quantity of the services with
respect to aggregate economy
Cst
Ct
and its relative price with respect to aggregate price index
Pst
Pt
.
I normalize g = 0.85 and u = 0.58 so that the model would satisfy the regularity conditions.
Again, I normalize αg = 1 − αs and αu = 1 − αp. I obtain model parameters by matching the
data targets as closely as possible. Table G.1 shows the calibration results for the alternative
Baumol’s cost disease model.
The calibration results yield the expected outcomes for most countries. The goods and
services are gross complements (σc < 1); the services sector is a luxury against the goods
(s − g > 0); the progressive and stagnant services are gross substitutes (σs > 1); the stagnant
services sector is a luxury with respect to the progressive services (u − p > 0). For only five
countries (Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, UK, and USA) I do not obtain a substitutability result
between the progressive and stagnant services sectors. For these countries when I target relative
hours worked shares instead of nominal value added ones, the substitutability result is vindicated
only for Portugal.
I simulate the alternative Baumol’s cost disease model for each country under the assumption
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Table G.1: Calibration Results for Alternative Model of Baumol’s Cost Disease, 1970-2007
αg αs αp αu σc σs s − g u − p
Australia 0.45 0.55 0.42 0.58 0.45 1.04 0.26 0.44
Austria 0.48 0.52 0.44 0.56 0.44 1.03 0.14 0.55
Belgium 0.47 0.53 0.39 0.61 0.32 1.05 -0.22 0.36
Canada 0.41 0.59 0.38 0.62 0.68 1.06 0.42 0.40
Denmark 0.36 0.64 0.42 0.58 0.54 0.83 0.30 1.60
Finland 0.48 0.52 0.42 0.58 0.53 1.01 0.09 0.58
France 0.43 0.57 0.32 0.68 0.27 1.01 -0.41 0.44
Germany 0.49 0.51 0.33 0.67 0.22 1.02 0.07 0.43
Greece 0.48 0.52 0.39 0.61 0.29 1.02 0.50 0.48
Ireland 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.57 0.91 1.30 0.29 0.29
Italy 0.49 0.51 0.41 0.59 0.34 1.04 0.08 0.48
Japan 0.49 0.51 0.44 0.56 0.40 1.02 0.07 0.55
Korea 0.55 0.45 0.56 0.44 1.05 1.16 0.26 0.54
Luxembourg 0.36 0.64 0.53 0.47 0.52 1.02 0.29 0.39
Netherlands 0.43 0.57 0.38 0.62 0.41 1.04 0.11 0.37
Norway 0.40 0.60 0.47 0.53 1.04 1.04 0.20 0.57
Portugal 0.42 0.58 0.46 0.54 0.43 0.58 0.57 2.49
Spain 0.55 0.45 0.38 0.62 0.43 1.20 0.30 0.28
Sweden 0.38 0.62 0.41 0.59 0.69 0.81 0.36 1.06
UK 0.45 0.55 0.46 0.54 0.21 0.57 -0.85 5.51
USA 0.35 0.65 0.36 0.64 0.61 0.96 0.43 0.92
that between 2009 and 2050 countries would retain the average sectoral labor productivity
growth rates of the period between 1970 and 2007, and sectoral wedges would be equal to
their average values of the same period. Figure G.1 shows the results of these simulations by
comparing the effect of Baumol’s cost disease on aggregate productivity growth between 1970-
2007 to its predicted effect for 2009-2050. Apart from Australia, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and
Sweden, Baumol’s cost disease would depress aggregate productivity growth less in the future
than it did in the past. On average its future effect for the productivity growth slowdown would
be 43% of its past effect. Lastly, Figure G.2 compares the results of the alternative model with
the one used in the main body of the text. For most countries the alternative model implies
lesser effects for Baumol’s cost disease, but in general our results change little with respect to
this different modelling assumption.
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Figure G.1: Baumol’s Cost Disease Effect on Aggregate Productivity Growth
Notes: The bars show how much Baumol’s cost disease declined or would decline aggregate productivity growth
rate in each country.
Figure G.2: Comparison of Different Models
Notes: The bars show how much Baumol’s cost disease declined or would decline aggregate productivity growth
rate in each country. Model I refers to the simulation results of the model introduced in the main body of the
text; Model II those of the model used in the Appendix E.
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Appendix H
Quantitative Analysis of Baumol’s
Cost Disease for Data Compatible
with the ISIC Rev.4
I calibrate the model and perform simulations also by using the revised dataset compatible
with the ISIC Rev.4. This would ensure the robustness of our results and provide a long-
term perspective needed for analyzing Baumol’s cost disease. Because of data unavailability, I
calibrate the model only for 13 countries. Table H.1 shows calibration results for the model used
in the main body of the text. From these results we observe that the substitutability between
progressive services and the rest of economy holds true for all countries except for six. For these
six countries I re-calibrate the model now by targeting relative hours worked shares instead of
nominal value added ones. Table H.2 presents the results of this exercise: It is reassuring that
the substitutability result between progressive services and the rest of the economy is retained
for all of them except for two. But for these two countries (Finland and Norway) the elasticity
of substitution remains very close to one, implying that the share of progressive services would
be mostly stable and transition dynamics would be slow.
I again simulate the model under the scenario that countries now retain average sectoral
productivity growth rates of 1995-2015 for the next 60 years and wedges would be equal to
their average values between 1970 and 2015. Figure H.1 compares the effect of Baumol’s cost
disease between the periods 1970-1995 and 1995-2015 to its predicted effect for the next 60 years
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Table H.1: Calibration Results for the Revised Data: Nominal Value Added
αg αs αp αr σc σr s − g
Austria 0.67 0.33 0.28 0.72 0.87 0.00 0.38
Belgium 0.61 0.39 0.26 0.74 1.24 0.40 2.40
Denmark 0.49 0.51 0.28 0.72 1.03 0.11 -0.17
Finland 0.61 0.39 0.22 0.78 0.61 0.18 -0.80
France 0.53 0.47 0.24 0.76 1.01 0.40 1.80
Germany 0.61 0.39 0.21 0.79 0.49 3.44 36.27
Italy 0.66 0.34 0.26 0.74 1.04 0.55 3.39
Japan 0.64 0.36 0.25 0.75 1.21 0.37 1.02
Netherlands 0.55 0.45 0.23 0.77 0.89 1.21 3.52
Norway 0.57 0.43 0.32 0.68 0.46 0.45 0.52
Spain 0.70 0.30 0.18 0.82 0.89 1.28 8.09
UK 0.61 0.39 0.27 0.73 1.04 0.54 3.65
USA 0.47 0.53 0.27 0.73 1.07 0.58 0.96
Table H.2: Calibration Results for the Revised Data: Hours Worked Shares
αg αs αp αr σc σr s − g
Austria 0.71 0.29 0.21 0.79 1.04 0.88 4.18
Finland 0.66 0.34 0.24 0.76 0.95 0.00 0.16
Germany 0.71 0.29 0.25 0.75 1.06 0.00 4.56
Netherlands 0.58 0.42 0.29 0.71 1.00 0.94 2.97
Norway 0.61 0.39 0.31 0.69 0.93 0.46 2.98
Spain 0.79 0.21 0.23 0.77 1.13 0.53 3.85
(2015-2075). For almost all countries the results imply lesser effects of Baumol’s cost disease for
future productivity growth (Finland is a notable exception). On average, the effect of Baumol’s
cost disease for future productivity growth slowdown would be 1/3 of its past effect. For the
revised data I also calibrate the alternative Baumol’s cost disease model and simulate it under
same scenarios. The results of the alternative model are similar to what Figure G.2 suggests.
These results are available upon by request.
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Figure H.1: Baumol’s Cost Disease Effect on Aggregate Productivity Growth
Notes: The bars show how much Baumol’s cost disease declined or would decline aggregate productivity growth
rate in each country.
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Appendix I
Calibration Results for the
Cross-Country Productivity Section
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Chapter 3
Structural Change within the
Services Sector: A Supply-Side View
3.1 Introduction
The workhorse supply-side structural change model, Ngai and Pissarides (2007), assume that the
input/output table is fixed and all investment value added is produced by the goods sector. These
assumptions are not confirmed by the data. First, the substitutability between the primary and
intermediate inputs characterizes the production within the services (Miranda-Pinto and Young
2019); as a result, the intermediate input intensity increases over time for this sector. Second,
the goods and the services sectors use the output of the services sector more as an intermediate
over time, and the services sector becomes a net supplier of intermediate inputs (Grobovsek
2018). Third, structural change from the goods to services occurs within the investment value
added as well (Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi 2018).
In Sen (2020) I show that the services sub-sectors that produce intermediate and capital
goods become more prominent over time: The supply-side forces of structural change become
so significant that they could offset the negative effects of Baumol’s cost disease for aggregate
productivity growth. In this paper, I would consider more explicitly how these supply-forces
shape structural change. To what extent is the substitutability between the progressive/business
and stagnant services sectors affected by these supply-side forces? Do income effects reflect
different specifications of consumer’s preferences? These are the questions I would address.
After reporting some facts about the US economy in the post-WII period, I consider a
195
simple partial-equilibrium model to assess how changes in input/output table and structural
change within investment value added affects aggregate structural change. My results show that
the changes in input/output table rationalize the 23% of structural change in nominal value
added from the goods to services sector, and structural change within investment value added
contributes to further 17%, Taken together, these two not-commonly-used supply-side forces
account for 40% of total structural change.
I later analyze how these supply-side forces shape structural change within the services. The
progressive services displays a stable share within both consumption and investment value added,
and this result remains robust with respect to the changes in input/output table and structural
change within investment value added. Neutralizing the supply-side forces implies that the
business services would display a flat share in aggregate value added. I therefore conclude that
the substitutability between the progressive/business and stagnant services sectors within total
services reflects the impact of these supply-side forces. The quantitative analysis suggests that a
nested-CES framework where the progressive services is modeled separately from the rest of the
services provides a good fit for capturing structural change in both consumption and investment
value added. Structural change also favors the sector with the highest productivity growth, the
progressive services, in both consumption and investment value added.
I later consider how income effects reflect different modelling assumptions. It turns out that
the services sub-sectors that drive the relative price of the services against the goods differ from
the ones that drive its relative quantity. The correlation between nominal and real value added
shares of the services largely reflects the presence of the progressive services sector: Modeling
this group of the services separately in a nested-CES framework could alone account for 1/3 of
income effects.
The literature recently pays more attention to how the supply-side forces affect structural
change. Recent works by Garcia-Santana, Pijoan-Mas, and Villacorta (2016) and Herrendorf,
Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2018) incorporate investment to the structural change models: While
Garcia-Santana et al. (2016) study how changes in investment rate affects structural change,
more specifically the hump-shaped pattern shown by the industry in aggregate economy, Her-
rendorf et al. (2018) consider structural change within investment value added, i.e. the intensive
margin. Since I study the US economy where investment rate shows a steady behavior over the
years I do not address the role of the changes in investment rate for structural change. There-
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fore, this paper is closer to Herrendorf et al. (2018) than Garcia-Santana et al. (2016): I also
consider structural change within investment in the intensive margin by further disaggregating
the services sector.
Some papers also note the rise of the services sector as a supplier of intermediate input
and study its implications for structural change (Berlingieri 2014, Grobovsek 2018, and Sposi
2019). With respect to these works I am more interested in how changes in input-output table
affect structural change within the services, more specifically the substitutability between the
progressive/business and stagnant services.
Some works in the structural change literature consider the gross-output production func-
tions in a business cycle context: Moro (2012, 2015) and Carvalho and Gabaix (2013). While
Moro (2012, 2015) analyzes the role of the intermediate input intensity differences between the
goods and services sectors for the aggregate volatility, Carvalho and Gabaix (2013) consider how
changes in the Domar weights of the sectors, for example because of their increasing importance
as intermediate suppliers or demanders, impact aggregate volatility over time. My work also
relates to the literature that analyze how intersectoral linkages affect aggregate productivity
(Ngai and Samaniego 2009 and Duarte and Restuccia 2019).
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces some stylized facts about
production structure of the post-WWII US economy. The third section is devoted to a partial
equilibrium analysis of the supply-side forces of structural change. In the fourth section I
analyze and calibrate a unified model of structural change within consumption and investment
value added by disaggregating the services. In the fifth section I discuss how income effects could
change quantitatively with respect to different utility specifications. The last section concludes.
3.2 Facts
3.2.1 Data
I use the BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis) input-output tables in the US for years from 1947
to 2016. I aggregate industries given in the input-output tables to 18 sectors and later aggregate
them further to 4 sectors: goods, progressive services, stagnant services, and business services.
Table 3.1 presents the list of these sectors.
The input-output tables for the US come in USE and MAKE forms. While the USE ta-
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Table 3.1: List of Sectors, ISIC Rev.4
Goods Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Mining and Quarrying
Total Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
Construction
Progressive Services Wholesale and Retail Trade
Transportation and Storage
Information and Communication
Financial and Insurance Activities
Stagnant Services Accommodation and Food
Real Estate Activities
Public Administration and National Defense;
Compulsory Social Security
Education
Health and Social Work
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation
Other Service Activities
Business Services Professional, Scientific, Technical,
Administrative and Support Service Activities
Source: WORLD KLEMS
198
bles are expressed as Commodities-by-Industries, MAKE tables are expressed as Industries-
by-Commodities. From these USE and MAKE tables I obtain symmetric Industry-by-Industry
input-output tables. Horowitz and Planting (2009) explain the methodology of obtaining Industry-
by-Industry input-output tables.
3.2.2 Facts about Input-Output Tables of the US
The first stylized fact I note about the US Input-Output tables is the intermediate-input share
of aggregate gross output and consumption and investment value added shares (Figure 3.1). The
literature usually assumes that the intermediate input share in aggregate gross output remains
constant. My results show that the intermediate input share in gross output slightly decreases
throughout the post-WWII period in the US, reflecting the well-documented differences between
the manufacturing and services sectors in terms of intermediate use (for example, Carvalho and
Gabaix 2013 and Moro 2012), and structural change toward the services. Another stylized fact
about the US economy for the post-WWII period is the stability of the shares of consumption
and investment in total value added: The share of consumption in aggregate value added remains
stable around 0.8, and this number for investment value added share is 0.2.
I also consider the intermediate input use shares of individual sectors (Figure 3.2). I observe
that the intermediate input use share remains largely stable around 0.6 for the goods sector,
while the intermediate input use displays a U-shaped patter for all services sub-sectors. The
increase is the most stark for the stagnant services sector: Their intermediate use share increases
10 percentage points from 0.25 to 0.35. For the progressive services sector the intermediate use
share increases from 0.35 to 0.40; this increase occurs prominently after 1980’s. The intermediate
input use share in the business services shows a U-shaped pattern as well: the increasing part
starts around the end of 1980’s.
For the final output composition of the sectors, I observe that the shares of intermediate and
final use do not change much over time (Figure 3.3.a). For the goods sector, on average 57−58%
of their output serves as an intermediate to other sectors. The numbers for the progressive and
stagnant sectors are 44% and 14% respectively. For the business services sector on average 70%
of their output is used as an intermediate, but this share decreases until 1972 from 75% to 65%.
The most dramatic contrasts across sectors come from the shares within the final uses. Although
almost all the final use of the stagnant services sector serves to consumption, only 35% of the
199
final use of the business services goes to consumption (Figure 3.3.b). The consumption share of
the final use is also high for the progressive services sector, on average 84%, while this number
is only 55% for the goods sector. The investment share of the final use is remarkably greater
for the business services and goods sectors than the progressive and stagnant services (Figure
3.3.c). To sum up, two extremes prevail for my sector categorization: On the one hand, there
exist the goods and business services sectors whose output is mostly used as an intermediate
and investment (Figure 3.3.d). In the other extreme, there exists the stagnant services sector,
that is exclusively related to the consumption. Progressive services lay in the middle of these
two extremes.
200
Figure 3.1: Intermediate and Value Added Shares in Aggregate Gross Output
Source: My calculations based on the BEA Input-Output Tables.
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Figure 3.2: Intermediate Input Shares in the Gross Output across Sectors
Source: My calculations based on the BEA Input-Output Tables.
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I now describe the shares of sectors in the intermediate inputs used in other sectors (Figure
3.4). The sectors mostly use their own outputs more intensively as an intermediate input,
while the stagnant services sector registers as an exception. The share of the goods sector in
the composite intermediate input decreases monotonically for all services sub-sectors (Figure
3.4.b,c,d). Also, the goods sectors uses less its own output as an intermediate over time, and
the shares of the progressive and business services increase in the composite intermediate input
used in the goods sector (Figure 3.4.a). The share of the progressive services sector increases
monotonically in the intermediate input used in this sector (Figure 3.4.b). Surprisingly, the
progressive services sector displays a hump-shaped pattern within the intermediate input used
in the business services sector. The share of the business services in the intermediate input
used in the same sector, on the other hand, shows a U-shaped pattern (Figure 3.4.d). For the
intermediate input used in the stagnant services sector, the shares of all services sub-sectors
increase over time, but the increase is the strongest for the business services (from 0.03 to 0.23)
(Figure 3.4.c).
Using the input-output data I derive sectoral consumption and investment value added
shares; I repeat the procedure explained in Appendix in Garcia-Santana et al. (2016). Struc-
tural change from the goods to services sector for consumption and investment value added are
well documented in the literature (Herrendorf et al. 2013, 2018). My results reiterate these
findings (Figure 3.5). When I look at structural change patterns within the services I observe
that the share of the stagnant services remains stable around 0.50 for consumption value added
(Figure 3.6.a). The share of the business services increases slowly within the consumption value
added; as of 2016, it remains stable around 11%. If the sharp drop starting after the Great
Recession is put aside, the share of the progressive services within the services’ consumption
value added remains stable around 0.32 − 0.33 after the end of 1980’s. Before reaching this
stability its share within the services value added decreases slowly from 0.40. For the services
sector, structural change within investment value added shows more dynamism than that within
the consumption value added (Figure 3.6.b). The rise of the business services sector within the
services investment value added arrests attention. The strong decline of the progressive services
matches this rise. The share of the stagnant services within investment value added for the
services remains low, and decreases slowly throughout the period. The progressive services show
a stable trajectory within aggregate investment value added, despite their strong decline within
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Figure 3.4: Sectoral Shares of Intermediate Input Used in Other Sectors
a. Goods b. Progressive Services
c. Stagnant Services d. Business Services
Source: My calculations based on the BEA Input-Output Tables.
the investment value added for the services. The stability of this services sector within both
consumption and investment value added looks well-established (Figure 3.6.c,d).
205
Figure 3.5: Sectoral Shares in Consumption and Investment Value Added
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We can summarize our most important findings as follows. First, the Input-Output table is
not fixed and changes on it are largely driven by the services: over time the services uses both
intermediate inputs (extensive margin) and their own output as intermediates more intensively
(intensive margin). Second, the aggregate share of the progressive services remains relatively
stable in both consumption and investment value added. Motivated by these facts, in the
next section I would introduce a partial equilibrium model to quantify the role of supply-side
forces (changes in Input/Output table and structural change within investment value added)
on structural change at the aggregate level. I later consider a general equilibrium model that
considers structural change within consumption and investment value added by disaggregating
the services sector between the progressive and stagnant services.
3.3 A Gross-Output Accounting Model for Structural Change
The model presented here is a simplified version of the intermediate-inputs augmented Ngai and
Pissarides (2007) model.
3.3.1 Demand Side
The time is discrete and the model is static (e.g. no intertemporal choice). There are J sectors
where each produces a distinct commodity. The demand side consists of one representative agent.
The representative agent allocates the final uses of commodities. He inelastically supplies labor
and receives a wage wt. His problem is stated as follows:
max
C1t,C2t,....,CJt
J∏
j=1
C
αjt
jt
subject to
J∑
j=1
PjtCjt = P1tC1t + P2tC2t + ....+ PjtCjt = wtLt = wt
αjt ≥ 0
J∑
j=1
αjt = 1
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where Pjt and Cjt are the price and quantity of commodity j at time t. Labor input is normalized
to 1. The utility function is Cobb-Douglas, therefore the share of each commodity in total final
use remains constant. More formally,
PjtCjt
PtCt
=
PjtCjt
P1tC1t + P2tC2t + ....+ PJtCJt
=
PjtCjt
wt
= αjt
I choose a Cobb-Douglas utility function to abstract from the changes in demand side. This
particular choice for the utility function is motivated to stress the effect of IO structure on
structural change and also consistent with the findings of Herrendorf et al. (2013) where they
argue that when the household’s preferences are defined over the final expenditure shares, relative
price differences across sectors becomes less important in accounting structural change. I would
like to emphasize a couple of things that may not be apparent about the household problem.
First, in a generalized model allocations would reflect the relative gross-output prices. In this
way, the model differs from the standard structural change models where relative prices are
linked to value added production functions. Second, the nominal GDP corresponds to the
aggregate wage wt in the model. Although wt refers to the aggregate value added,
PjtCjt
wt
does
not represent the nominal value added share of a sector. More correctly,
PjtCjt
wt
matches the
total use share of a sector j in the aggregate value added. For the sectors that do not serve to
final uses, αjt will be low (for example, the business services). The reader also should note that
I allow the parameters of utility function to be time variant. This assumption would help me to
make a simple structural change accounting by fixing these parameters to their initial values.
3.3.2 Gross Output Production - Firm’s Problem
There exist J sectors where each produces a distinct commodity j. The production of each
sector is represented by a representative firm. The firms use labor and intermediate inputs from
other sectors to produce the gross output of sector j. I assume that labor and intermediate
inputs are perfectly mobile across the sectors and markets are perfectly competitive. Because of
the perfect competition, labor and intermediate inputs would be paid their marginal products in
the gross output. The problem of a representative firm in a sector j can be expressed as follows:
max
Ljt,mjt
PjtYjt − wtLjt − Pmjtmjt, ∀j ∈ 1, 2, ...., J
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and
Yjt = AjtL
1−βjt
jt m
βjt
jt , ∀j ∈ 1, 2, ...., J
where βjt ≥ 0. Yjt and Pjt are the gross output of sector j and gross output price of commodity
j. Ljt and mjt are the labor input and composite intermediate input used in the production of
commodity j. Therefore, wt and Pmjt represent the wage rate and price of composite interme-
diate input mj . Ajt is the productivity index of sector j.
The firm j’s problem yield the following first-order optimality conditions:
(1− βjt)PjtYjt = wtLjt
βjtPjtYjt = Pmjtmjt
Because of Cobb-Douglas production functions, a constant share of nominal gross output would
be paid to labor and the composite intermediate input each period t.
3.3.3 Intermediate Inputs Production
Intermediate input producers in sector j combine intermediate inputs from other sectors to
produce the composite intermediate input mj . Their problem is stated as follows:
max
x1jt,x2jt,...,xJjt
Pmjtmjt − P1tx1jt − P2tx2jt − ....− PJtxJjt, ∀j ∈ 1, 2, ...., J
where xijt represents intermediate input provided from sector i to sector j at time t. The
intermediate input production function mjt is:
mjt =
J∏
i=1
[
xijt
ϕijt
]ϕijt
, ∀j ∈ 1, 2, ...., J
ϕijt ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀t
J∑
i=1
ϕijt = 1, ∀t
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Again, because of Cobb-Douglas assumption, each intermediate input xijt would earn a constant
share of nominal composite intermediate input used in sector j. Formally,
Pitxijt = ϕijtPmjtmjt, ∀i for each j
ϕijt represents the intensity of intermediate input provided by sector i to sector j in the composite
intermediate input mj . By substituting this optimality condition into the production function
for intermediate inputs, I obtain a price index for the composite intermediate input. That is,
Pmjt =
J∏
i=1
[
Pit
ϕijt
]ϕijt
3.3.4 Market Equilibrium
The gross output of each sector can be used as either a final good or an intermediate input.
Formally,
Yjt = Cjt + hjt
= Cjt + (xj1t + xj2t + ....+ xjJt)
Labor markets clear and aggregate labor input is normalized to 1 each period.
J∑
i=1
LJt = Lt = 1
3.3.5 Characterization of Sectoral Shares
I would relate the sectoral shares to the consumer’s problem and input-output table. What
the model implies for the sectoral shares would illuminate how the IO structure could affect
structural change
I start showing that the employment and nominal value added shares of a sector are equal.
Recall, the nominal value added of a sector equals to:
P vjtY
v
jt = PjtYjt − Pmjtmjt = PjtYjt − (βjtPjtYjt) = (1− βjt)PjtYjt
where the last equality follows from the optimality conditions of the firm’s problem. Since
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(1 − βjt)PjtYjt = wtLjt for any j and the aggregate nominal value added equals to wtLt = wt,
the equality of employment and nominal value added shares follows:
P vjtY
v
jt
P vt Y
v
t
=
(1− βjt)PjtYjt
wt
=
wtLjt
wtLt
= Ljt
To obtain sectoral shares, I first multiply market equilibrium condition Yj = Cj + hj by Pj and
expand it as follows.
PjtYjt = PjtCjt + Pjthjt
= PjtCjt + (Pjtxj1t + Pjtxj2t + ....+ PjtxjJt)
= PjtCjt + (ϕj1tPm1tm1t + ϕj2tPm2tm2t + .....+ ϕjJtPmJtmJt)
= PjtCjt + (ϕj1tβ1tP1tY1t + ϕj2tβ2tP2tY2t + .....+ ϕjJtβJtPJtYJt)
⇒ −ϕj1tβ1tP1tY1t − ϕj2tβ2tP2tY2t − ..+ (1− ϕjjtβjt)PjtYjt...− ϕjJtβJtPJtYJt = PjtCjt
For all sectors I can express this in a matrix notation
ΩtYt = Ct
where
Ωt =

1− ϕ11tβ1t −ϕ12tβ2t · · · · · · −ϕ1JtβJt
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
−ϕJ1tβ1t −ϕJ2tβ2t · · · · · · 1− ϕJJtβJt

,
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Yt =

P1tY1t
P2tY2t
...
...
PJtYJt

and
Ct =

P1tC1t
P2tC2t
...
...
PJtCJt

Solving this system of equations for Yt yields
Yt = Ω
−1
t Ct
where Ω−1t refers to total requirements or Leontief-inverse matrix.
Recall Ljt =
(1− βjt)PjtYjt
wt
represents the nominal value added/labor share of a sector. I
express sectoral shares as a vector and substitute Yt above to obtain the sectoral shares as
function of IO matrix. Thus,
Lt =
(I− βt)Yt
wt
= (I− βt)Ω−1t
Ct
wt
where
I− βt =

1− β1t 0 · · · · · · 0
0 1− β2t
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · · · · 1− βJt

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and
Ct
wt
=

P1tC1t
wt
P2tC2t
wt
...
...
PJtCJt
wt

=

α1t
α2t
...
...
αJt

I would use the above expression to assess how changes in the IO matrix affect structural change.
For a particular year I keep the coefficients of IO matrix fixed, then compare the model-implied
shares with data.
3.3.6 Counterfactuals
By using the model of the previous section I perform some counterfactuals to assess how IO
structure and investment demand affect structural change in the post-WWII US economy. In
these counterfactuals I neutralize the changes in IO-matrix and structural change within invest-
ment value added. To neutralize the effects of input-output structure I fix the IO-matrix to its
1947 values. More formally, recall nominal value added/labor shares of sectors are given by the
following equation:
Lt = (I− βt)Ω−1t
Ct
wt
Counterfactual on the IO table is obtained by fixing (I − βt)Ω−1t to its value in 1947, that is,
(I− βt)Ω−1t = (I− β1947)Ω−11947 for all t. On the other hand, the final use shares
Ct
wt
will remain
as in the data. For the counterfactual on investment demand I relax the notion on the final use
shares by allowing them to include also investment final use shares. More formally,
Ct
wt
=

P1tC1t
wt
P2tC2t
wt
...
...
PJtCJt
wt

=

α1t
α2t
...
...
αJt

=

αc1t + α
x
1t
αc2t + α
x
2t
...
...
αcJt + α
x
Jt

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Table 3.2: Counterfactuals
∆ Goods p.p. (Data) Counterfactual IO Counterfactual IO+Investment
1947-2016 -0.20 -0.16 -0.13
% 23.1 % 40.30
1997-2016 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03
% 17.81 % 41.52
where αcjt and α
x
jt refer to the consumption final expenditure and investment final expenditure
shares of a sector j respectively. Counterfactual on investment demand corresponds to fixing
αxjt’s to their values in 1947, α
x
jt = α
x
j,1947 for all j.
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.7 give a summary of the counterfactuals. My results show that
the changes in the IO-matrix constitutes an important force behind structural change: they
account for 23% of structural change from the goods to services sector. This number is lower
than that in Berlingieri (2014) where he argues that 40% percentage increase in the share of the
services results from the changes in input/output matrix. The data source I use treats categories
such as software and R&D as capital goods, but previously they were classified as intermediate
inputs. The difference between my result and that of Berlingieri (2014) mostly likely reflects
this measurement change in national accounts.
I later neutralize the effects of investment demand by fixing the final investment expenditure
shares to their 1947 levels. This exercise shows that structural change within the investment
value added accounts for 17.26% of the structural change from the goods sector to the ser-
vices. Taken together, the changes in IO matrix and structural change within investment, two
supply-side forces of structural change not commonly-referred in the literature, explain 40% of
structural change from the goods to services sector in the post-war US economy. These results
sharply contrast with standard assumptions of structural change literature where the IO-matrix
is assumed to be stable and the industry produces all investment value added.
When I look at the effects of changes in the Input-Output table and investment demand on
structural change for the services sub-sectors (Figure 3.8), I observe that the near-stability of the
progressive services in total value added remains unchanged. As expected, my counterfactuals
imply the greatest changes for the business and stagnant services sectors. This is not a surprising
result for the business services sector, since intermediate and investment demands exclusively
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Figure 3.7: Counterfactuals
direct its share in the economy. For the stagnant services sector, the counterfactuals imply
an increase for its share within the aggregate economy. I relate this result to the increasing
tendency of the stagnant services to use both more intermediate inputs and intermediate inputs
supplied by other services sub-sectors.
What is the significance of these results? Recall that Duernecker, Herrendorf, and Valentinyi
(2019) show that the substitutability between the progressive/business and stagnant services
within total services implies that Baumol’s cost disease would depress the productivity growth
less in the future for the US. In a related research, Sen (2020), I show that the same substi-
tutability within the services also drive aggregate productivity level differences between the US
and other developed countries. Without consulting any formal analysis, we can observe intu-
itively that this substitutability result within the services is strongly driven by the supply-side
forces of structural change. These forces, in the end, depress the share of stagnant services in
the aggregate economy, and cultivate the strong rise of the business services. Although this
conjecture follows from a partial equilibrium analysis, I believe that showing this result formally
would be an interesting challenge for future research. Unfortunately, one should overcome cer-
tain theoretical challenges to achieve this task: when gross output production are characterized
by non-unitary elasticities of substitution between primary and intermediate inputs/among dif-
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ferent types of intermediate inputs, and this elasticity parameter differs across the sectors no
closed form solutions exist for sectoral shares.
Figure 3.8: Counterfactuals for the Services Sub-Sectors
Notes: Counterfactuals show the shares of the services subsectors after the changes in the Input/Output table
and structural change within investment value added are neutralized.
3.4 Structural Change within Consumption and Investment: A
Disaggregated Analysis for the Services
In this part of the paper I provide a model that analyzes structural change within consumption
and investment value added by considering the services sector at a more disaggregated level.
One particular result that emerges from Herrendorf et al. (2018) is that structural change
favors the sector with the lowest productivity growth, i.e. the services, in both consumption
and investment value added. Here I would make a distinction between the progressive and
stagnant services sectors and reevaluate the results of Herrendorf et al. (2018) in the presence
of productivity-growth heterogeneity within the services. As we shall see, their results turn out
to be pessimistic, since structural change favors the progressive services in both consumption
and investment value added. In what follows I would present a structural change model to show
this result, and argue that a nested-CES framework could shed light on some puzzles of the
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structural change literature. For tractability, I combine the business services with the stagnant
services in the aggregation.
3.4.1 Demand Side
The economy is populated by a representative household who owns the capital stock of the
economy, rents capital and provides labor to the firms. In return he receives a wage rate wt and
a rental rate of return rt each period. His problem is stated as follows:
max
Cpt,Cut,Cgt,Kt+1
∞∑
t=0
βt logCt s.t.
PgtCgt + PutCut + PgtCgt +Xt = rtKt + wt
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Xt
K0 > 0 given
The aggregator for consumption value added is given by the following nested-CES function:
Ct =
[
ω
1

p Cpt
−1
 + (1− ωp) 1Crt
−1

] 
−1
where Crt =
[
ω
1
r
g Cgt
r−1
r + (1− ωg)
1
r Cut
r−1
r
] r
r−1
here p, g, and u refer to the progressive services, the goods, and the stagnant services sectors
respectively.  represents the elasticity of substitution within consumption value added between
the progressive services and the composite of the goods and stagnant services, and r denotes
the elasticity of substitution between the goods and stagnant services sectors. This specification
of utility is motivated by near-stable share of the progressive services and increasing share of
the stagnant services in aggregate consumption value added.
The first-order conditions of the representative household yields the following Euler equation:
Pt+1Ct+1
PtCt
= β(1− δ + rt)
where
Pt =
[
ωpPpt
1− + (1− ωp)Prt1−
] 1
1−
and
Prt =
[
ωgPgt
1−r + (1− ωg)Put1−r
] 1
1−r
For the intratemporal allocation, the representative household’s problem yields the following
sectoral shares for consumption value added:
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PptCpt
PtCt
=
ωpP
1−
pt
ωpP
1−
pt + (1− ωp)P 1−rt
PgtCgt
PrtCrt
=
ωgP
1−r
gt
ωgP
1−r
gt + (1− ωg)P 1−rut
PutCut
PrtCrt
= 1− PgtCgt
PrtCrt
3.4.2 Supply Side
The economy consists of three sectors (goods, progressive services, and stagnant services) that
produce consumption and capital goods. The production technology in these three sectors
are identical except for the differences in productivity parameter, Ajt. The problem of the
representative firm in a sector j is stated as follows:
max
Kjt,Ljt
PjtAjtK
θ
jtL
1−θ
jt − rtKjt − wtLjt
where θ refers to the capital intensity same across the sectors. The first-order conditions of the
firm’s problem give out the following results for the rental rate of capital and the wage rate:
θPjtAjtK
θ−1
jt L
1−θ
jt = rt
(1− θ)PjtAjtKθjtL−θjt = wt
It is instructive to see that
Kjt
Ljt
=
θ
1− θ =
wt
rt
, ∀i
Because of same capital input intensity assumption, capital-labor ratios are equalized across sec-
tors. The relative prices between two sectors are solely determined by their relative productivity
levels:
Pjt
Pit
=
Ait
Ajt
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3.4.3 Investment Value Added
Investment value added is produced by combining value added of different sectors. The aggre-
gator for investment value added is given by the following nested-CES specification:
Xt = Axt
[
ω
1
x
pxXpt
x−1
x + (1− ωpx)
1
xXrt
x−1
x
] x
x−1
where Xrt =
[
ω
1
z
gxXgt
z−1
z + (1− ωgx)
1
zXut
z−1
z
] z
z−1
where x represents the elasticity of substitution within investment value added between the
progressive services and the composite of the goods and stagnant services, and z denotes the
elasticity of substitution between the goods and stagnant services sectors. This choice for in-
vestment value added aggregator is again motivated by same observations that motivate the
aggregator for consumption value added. More specifically, the share of progressive services
sector remains near constant in aggregate investment value added, and the stagnant services of
which the business services constitutes a disproportionate part largely accounts for structural
change from the goods to the services in investment.
From the cost-minimization problem of investment value added producers we obtain the
following sectoral shares within investment value added:
PptXpt
P xt Xt
=
ωpxP
1−x
pt
ωpxP
1−x
pt + (1− ωpx)P 1−xx,rt
PgtXgt
Px,rtXrt
=
ωgxP
1−z
gt
ωgxP
1−z
gt + (1− ωgx)P 1−zut
PutCut
Px,rtXrt
= 1− PgtCgt
Px,rtXrt
where Px,rt is given by
Px,rt =
[
ωgxP
1−z
gt + (1− ωgx)P 1−zut
] 1
1−z
3.4.4 Market Clearing Conditions
The market clearing condition for capital is given as follows:
Kgt +Kpt +Kut ≤ Kt
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The market clearing condition for labor is given as follows
Lgt + Lpt + Lut ≤ Lt = 1
Lastly, the market clearing conditions for commodity markets are given as follows
Cit +Xjt ≤ Yjt, for j ∈ g, b, u
3.4.5 Calibration and Quantitative Analysis
I first start with calibrating sectoral shares for consumption value added; recall the model implies
the following sectoral shares:
PptCpt
PtCt
=
ωpP
1−
pt
ωpP
1−
pt + (1− ωp)P 1−rt
PgtCgt
PrtCrt
=
ωgP
1−r
gt
ωgP
1−r
gt + (1− ωg)P 1−rut
PutCut
PrtCrt
= 1− PgtCgt
PrtCrt
where the first equation refers the share of progressive services in aggregate consumption value
added, the second the share of the goods sector in the composite of the goods and stagnant
services in consumption value added, the last one the share of the stagnant services in the
composite of the goods and stagnant services in consumption value added. I obtain the model
parameters by minimizing the sum of squared differences between model-implied sectoral shares
and data. Table 3.3 gives the calibration results, and Figure 3.9 shows how successfully the
model tracks the evolution of consumption value added shares over time.
Table 3.3: Calibration, Consumption-Value Added: US, 1947-2016
ωp 1− ωp ωg 1− ωg  r
0.26 0.74 0.45 0.55 1.10 0.00
Calibration results show that the progressive services and rest of the economy are gross substi-
tutes ( > 1), and the goods and stagnant services are perfect complements (r = 0). Herrendorf,
Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2018) show in a model that features only the goods and services sec-
221
Figure 3.9: Consumption Value Added: Model vs. Data
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tors structural change favors the sector with the lowest productivity growth, e.g. services. But
their conclusion does not hold when one takes into account the productivity-growth heterogene-
ity between the services sub-sectors. In addition to this, the nested-CES framework used in our
paper fits better to structural change within consumption value added. Herrendorf, Rogerson,
and Valentinyi (2018) argue that a CES utility function misses half of the structural change
between the goods and services in consumption value added since it does not feature persistent
income effects; but our nested-CES specification accounts for 82% of structural change between
the goods and services. In later part of the paper I would discuss in more detail what these
results imply for the quantitative importance of income effects for accounting structural change.
The model implies the following sectoral shares for investment value added:
PptXpt
P xt Xt
=
ωpxP
1−x
pt
ωpxP
1−x
pt + (1− ωpx)P 1−xx,rt
PgtXgt
Px,rtXrt
=
ωgxP
1−z
gt
ωgxP
1−z
gt + (1− ωgx)P 1−zut
PutCut
Px,rtXrt
= 1− PgtCgt
Px,rtXrt
where the first equation refers the share of progressive services in aggregate investment value
added, the second the share of the goods sector in the composite of the goods and stagnant ser-
vices in investment value added, the last one the share of the stagnant services in the composite
of the goods and stagnant services in investment value added. The reader should note that the
price index for the rest of the economy (the composite of the goods and stagnant services) in
investment value added could show different behavior than the one for consumption value added
depending on its intensity for using the goods sector and the elasticity of substitution between
the goods and stagnant services. Again, as in the case of consumption value added I obtain the
model parameters by minimizing the sum of squared differences between model-implied sectoral
shares and data. Table 3.4 gives the calibration results, and Figure 3.10 shows the model fit for
accounting structural change within investment value added.
The calibration exercise for investment value added gives results similar to those for consumption
value added: The progressive services and rest of the economy are gross substitutes (x > 1),
and the goods and stagnant services are perfect complements (z = 0). From these results
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Figure 3.10: Investment Value Added: Model vs. Data
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Table 3.4: Calibration, Investment-Value Added: US, 1947-2016
ωgx 1− ωgx ωpx 1− ωpx x z
0.83 0.17 0.26 0.74 1.51 0.00
I conclude that structural change favors the sector with the highest productivity growth (the
progressive services) in both consumption and investment value added: The substitutability
of the progressive services with the rest of the economy is well established. Having said that,
in comparison to consumption value added the nested-CES specification performs less well for
capturing structural change within investment value added: It overall misses 40% of structural
change from the goods to services. It is because of strong increase in the relative quantity of the
stagnant services with respect to the goods in investment value added; surprisingly, to match
the data better we need to attenuate our nested-CES specification for investment value added
with non-vanishing income effects.
3.5 Income Effects or Misspecification?
A particular concern of the structural change literature is the positive correlation between nom-
inal and real value added shares of the services sector in the data. This property challenges
the CES and Stone-Geary utility functions commonly used in the literature and motivate the
models that feature persistent income effects (Boppart 2014 and Comin, Mestieri, and Lashkari
2018). In this section, I argue that the correlation between nominal and real value added shares
of the services sector largely reflects the presence of the progressive services sector. Modelling
the progressive services sector separately could alone account for 1/3 of the income effects.
For the motivation consider Figure 3.11. The part (a) shows the well-established co-movement
of the relative price and quantity of the services sector with respect to the goods. What is less
known, however, is that the service sub-sectors that drive the relative price of the services differ
from the ones that drive its relative quantity. Although the stagnant services sub-sector largely
accounts for the increase in the relative price of the services, it does not display a clear trend
in the relative quantity. The progressive services sub-group, on the other hand, shows a declin-
ing relative price and increasing relative quantity against the goods. A nested framework that
models the progressive services separately, as we consider in the previous section of this paper,
can indeed account for the positive correlation between the nominal and real value added shares
225
of the services without featuring income effects.
Figure 3.11: Relative Prices and Quantities: US, 1947-2016
a. Goods vs. Services
b. Service Subsectors vs. Goods: Relative Prices c. Service Subsectors vs. Goods: Relative Quantities
Notes: The data source is the WORLD KLEMS. The quantity refers to the real value added. All observations
are normalized to 1 in the initial year, 1947.
To address this question I consider two different specifications with nonhomothetic CES
preferences. The first one handles the allocation between the goods and services sectors in a
standard way. The second one treats the progressive services sector independently, and considers
an inner allocation problem between the goods and the stagnant services. More formally, the
first specification considers the following utility function:
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where g and s refer to the goods and the services sectors. The second one considers the following:
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where p, r and u refer to the progressive services, the rest of the economy, and stagnant services
respectively. The sum of value added shares of the progressive and stagnant services in the
second specification would constitute total share of the services. For the first specification the
solution of the model implies the following for the share of the services sector:
PstCst
PtCt
=
αsPst
1−σcCst
αsPst
1−σcCst + αgPgt
1−σcCgt
The second specification yields the following solution for the share of services sector which is a
sum of the shares of the progressive and stagnant services in aggregate value added:
PstCst
PtCt
=
ωpPpt
1−
ωpPpt
1− + ωrPrt1−
+
ωrPrt
1−
ωpPpt
1− + ωrPrt1−
[
αuPut
1−σrCut
αuPut
1−σrCut + αgPgt
1−σrCgt
]
I calibrate the parameters of both specifications by minimizing the sum of squared differences
between model-implied shares of the services and data. The calibrations give out the following
outcomes:
Table 3.5: Calibration, Specification I: Total Value Added (US, 1947-2016)
αg αs σc s − g
0.53 0.47 0.70 0.49
Table 3.6: Calibration, Specification II: Total Value Added (US, 1947-2016)
ωp ωr  αg αu σr u − g
0.25 0.75 1.14 0.65 0.35 0.48 0.44
The reader should note that I differentiate the second specification from the first one by
separating the progressive services from the stagnant services and allowing a different elasticity
of substitution to govern the allocation problem between the progressive services and the rest
of the economy. In the second specification the aggregator between the progressive and the
rest of the economy is homothetic; my results which are not reported here suggest that income
effects are negligible for the allocation problem between these two groups, therefore omitted
here. As the next step I quantify the magnitude of income effects in both specifications by
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Figure 3.12: Income Effects: Specification I
fixing Ct in its initial value, i.e. Ct = C1947,∀t. Figure 3.12 and Table 3.7 demonstrate that
in the first specification where the progressive services sector is treated together with the rest
of the services, the income effects account for 80% of structural change from the goods to the
services, which is consistent with the findings of Comin, Mestieri, and Lashkari (2018). In
the second specification where the progressive services sector is treated separately, however,
the explanatory power of the income effects reduce by 28 percentage points (Figure 3.13 and
Table 3.7): income effects now account for the 53% of structural change between the goods
and services. I therefore conclude that 1/3 of the income effects in the non-homothetic CES
preferences actually reflects a misspecification resulting from not treating the allocation problem
of the progressive services independently. Surprisingly, the magnitude of income effects is now
closer to what Boppart (2014) finds, suggesting that accounting for the progressive services could
reconcile the conflicting findings in the literature.
What is the significance of using a nested-CES utility function where the progressive services
is treated differently than the rest of the services? It turns out that such a specification sheds
light on the positive correlation between nominal and real value added shares of the services
(Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi 2014) and conflicting results regarding the magnitude of
income effects (Boppart 2014 vs. Comin, Mestieri, and Lashkari 2018), and improves the fit
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Figure 3.13: Income Effects: Specification II
Table 3.7: Income Effects: Model I vs. Model II
∆ Goods p.p. (Data) Model I Model II
without Income Effects without Income Effects
1950-2016 -0.21 -0.04 -0.11
% 81 % 53
of a homothetic aggregator for replicating structural change within consumption value added
(Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi 2018). It could be also useful for theoretical models of
structural change where the co-existence of price and income effects requires stringent conditions
under balanced growth. It looks the conjecture of Buera and Kaboski (2009) was true: consid-
ering the sectors at a more disaggregated level could solve some puzzles of structural change. I
therefore hope that the merits of taking into account the heterogeneity within the services are
evident, and the models that account for this heterogeneity will be applied more widely in future
research.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper I consider how the supply-side forces affect structural change. My results show
that the changes in input/output table and structural change within investment value added
account for 40% of structural change in the US during the post-WWII period. I conjecture that
same supply-side forces also contribute to the substitutability between the progressive/business
and stagnant services sectors within total services. I also analyze structural change within
consumption and investment by considering the services sector at a more disaggregated level:
my results reveal that structural change favors the sector with the highest productivity growth,
the progressive services, in both consumption and investment value added.
I argue that the positive correlation between nominal and real value added shares of the
services sector mostly reflects the presence of the progressive services. When one considers this
sub-sector separately from the rest of the services, the income effects account for structural
change by 28 percentage points less. The same nested-CES framework provides a good fit for
capturing structural change within consumption value added. These results show that treating
the progressive services differently could shed light on some puzzling findings of the structural
change literature. For the future research I believe that investigating the applicability of such a
model for other countries would be an interesting one.
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